Igor FedykTo divert the attention of the international community from Ukraine, Russia is trying to create additional zones of instability in the world. The center of her special “attention” is traditionally the Western Balkans, where there is still a considerable Russian influence, as well as potentially dangerous unresolved issues, such as the Kosovo one. About whether Russia will succeed in turning the Balkan Peninsula into another zone of instability, whether it has the capabilities to do so, what are the prospects for solving the Kosovo issue, and what is needed for this, we spoke with Ramadan Ilazi, Head of Research of the Kosovo Center for Security Studies.
Let’s start with the statement of Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyi that Ukraine has information about Russia’s intentions to start a war in the Balkans. How correct are his assessments?
I think President Zelenskyi is correct. It appears that Russia could be orchestrating instability in various regions to divert the attention and resources of the EU and the US away from Ukraine. The Balkans, particularly through Russian influence in the Serbian government, seem to be a critical area in this strategy. This aligns with President Zelenskyi’s viewpoint. Furthermore, the Banjska terrorist attack on September 24th in the north of Kosovo could be seen as potential evidence supporting this assessment. It suggests a pattern of creating regional disturbances, possibly as a tactic to weaken international focus on Ukraine, as well as undermine cohesion among the EU and NATO allies.
Ramadan Ilazi
What are the most likely parts of the region for this to happen?
Two primary regions in the Western Balkans are particularly susceptible to instability: the north of Kosovo and Republika Srpska in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
In the north of Kosovo, the predominant Serbian community has created a unique dynamic since 1999. This area has experienced limited governance by Kosovar authorities and has been under inconsistent international oversight. This lack of robust control has allowed the region to become a haven for criminal networks and organized crime. A notable example is Milan Radoicic, identified as the mastermind behind the Banjska terrorist attack in September 2023. Radoicic’s influence, along with his connections to Belgrade politicians and Kremlin links, underscores the complex political and criminal entanglements in the region. Furthermore, the reported presence of groups like Wagner and the Night Wolves, with Kremlin backing, amplifies the geopolitical significance of this area. In December of 2022 in a period of heightened ethnic tensions in the north, there were reports that several members of Wagner and the Night Wolves (a Russian motorcycle club backed by the Kremlin) came to Kosovo. This seemed to be confirmed by the leader of Night Wolves Aleksandr Zaldostanov who wrote in a Telegram post that “Serbia’s victory is Russia’s victory”. Thus, the convergence of criminal activity, political ambitions, and external influences makes the north of Kosovo a volatile hotspot.
Republika Srpska, under the leadership of Milorad Dodik, also presents significant risks. Dodik’s open allegiance to Russia, coupled with his aspirations for secession from Bosnia and Herzegovina, heightens tensions. His efforts, reportedly supported by Russia, to enhance military capabilities within Republika Srpska are a cause for concern. The international response to events like the Banjska incident serves as a barometer for Dodik, potentially influencing his secessionist strategies.
Moreover, Russia’s attempts to destabilize other countries like Montenegro and North Macedonia, though unsuccessful, indicate a persistent strategy to undermine stability in the Western Balkans. Russia’s objectives, shared to some extent by China, are clear: to thwart NATO and EU expansion in the region and foster greater reliance on Russian and Chinese support rather than Western alliances. This overarching goal of creating dependency on their influence, rather than on the EU and NATO, adds another layer of complexity and risk to the region’s stability.
Does Russia have the resources to implement its plans?
I think it has. One notable example is the establishment of what’s termed a ‘humanitarian center’ in Niš, Serbia. However, credible reports suggest that this center might serve as an intelligence hub or a covert military base. Additionally, paramilitary groups with ties to the Kremlin, such as the Night Wolves and the Wagner Group, have a presence in the region. The Wagner Group, in particular, has reportedly used Serbia and Republika Srpska as recruitment grounds for soldiers to fight in Ukraine.
Moreover, Russia wields considerable soft power in the region. Key factors of Russia’s influence in the region are its position on the Kosovo situation, the backing of Republika Srpska, and its connections to the Orthodox Church, all of which are major channels for its regional influence. Regarding the level of Russian impact, Serbia experiences the most. Serbia is an observer state in the Collective Security Treaty Organization. However, it is important to note, that this perception of Russia is not universally shared among the Serbian public, with many opposing close ties between Serbia and Russia.
Another aspect of Russia’s influence strategy involves leveraging its positions within major security organizations in the region, such as the OSCE or the UN. For instance, in 2019, during a police operation in Kosovo, Mikhail Krasnoshchenkov, the Russian team leader of a UNMIK office in northern Kosovo, was arrested. Kosovo police alleged that Krasnoshchenkov attempted to hinder the operation by using his vehicle to block police access to a village. This incident illustrates how Russia might use its roles in these organizations to exert influence in regional affairs.
Given all of the above, what are the chances of a big war in the Balkans?
The likelihood of a large-scale war appears to be minimal at present. Nonetheless, there is a tangible risk of localized violence and limited conflicts, particularly in the north of Kosovo. The year 2024 is poised to be a critical period in determining the trajectory of these tensions. Interestingly, the war in Ukraine has had an indirect, yet profound impact on the Balkans. For instance, early last year, there were strong indications of a brewing conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina, with Milorad Dodik signaling moves toward secession. However, the international community’s robust response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine served as a deterrent against such escalations in the Balkans. In Kosovo, there was a real fear that Serbia might deploy a ‘little green men’ tactic in the north, akin to Russia’s approach in Crimea. Post-Ukraine invasion, this assessment has shifted significantly. There’s now a heightened belief that NATO and Western allies would react decisively against any such aggression. Following the Banjska incident, NATO’s enhancement of KFOR’s capabilities including equipping with the force with ‘combat power’ sent a clear message in that direction. Essentially, any Serbian military intervention in Kosovo could lead to a confrontation with NATO. I am hopeful that Serbia recognizes the gravity of this situation and chooses to avoid such a conflict.
And what about incidents like the one in Banjska? Do you expect something like that to repeat in the future?
Considering NATO’s proactive stance, evidenced by the bolstering of KFOR’s combat capabilities, the likelihood of a repeat of the Banjska-level scenario seems less likely. However, it would be imprudent to dismiss the possibility entirely. We must remember that the majority of the individuals involved in the Banjska terrorist group are currently free in Serbia. The fact that three members of this group were killed in the incident is unlikely to be forgotten by their associates. Moreover, their underlying mission—to establish a guerrilla force in the north of Kosovo aimed at undermining security control—likely remains unchanged. Furthermore, Russia’s interests in the region cannot be overlooked. While NATO’s presence serves as a significant deterrent and a cornerstone of security, vigilance is imperative. We must actively work to forestall any scenario that could destabilize the Western Balkans, particularly those instigated by Russian influence and facilitated by Russian assets and supporters in our region.
Ok, let’s move to the relations between Serbia and Kosovo. How would you characterize their current state?
The current situation in Kosovo is increasingly concerning and appears to be on a downward trajectory. Previously, there was a notable process of integration in the region, anchored by the 2013 Brussels Agreement, officially known as the First Agreement of Principles Governing the Normalization of Relations. This landmark agreement, signed by the Prime Ministers of Kosovo and Serbia, is focused on three critical areas: political, security, and judicial integration of the north of Kosovo. Initially, there were positive developments, particularly in political integration. Post-2013, local elections were conducted in four northern municipalities for the first time, marking a significant step forward. The planned establishment of the Association of Serb Majority Municipalities (ASM) in Kosovo was also intended to further integrate the north with the rest of Kosovo, but this was stalled. In terms of security integration, we saw a move away from illegal militias, with around 300 former members transitioning into roles within the Kosovo Police, contributing to policing efforts in the north. However, this progress has regrettably unraveled. In November 2022, a mass resignation of police officers amid a license plate dispute marked a significant setback, leading to a resurgence of militia-style presence in the north. This is compounded by the presence of Kosovo’s special police units, which, while curbing militia activities, simultaneously evoke discontent among local Serbs. These communities have raised concerns about the Kosovo government’s alleged expropriation of private property for constructing new police stations, a process they claim lacks due procedure. The approach to integrating and pacifying northern Kosovo through the heavy deployment of special police units is not sustainable. The region must be policed by Kosovo Serb members of the Kosovo Police, reflecting a more community-oriented and sensitive approach. The government needs to actively listen and respond to the concerns of the Serb community in the north. Currently, the situation in the north mirrors the pre-independence era of Kosovo, indicating a significant regression in the region’s path towards peace and integration.
What was the turning point for this?
If you trace the process, it becomes obvious that the decision of the Kosovo government not to extend the deadline of the Agreement with Serbia on car license plates was this turning point [the transition from Serbian-issued car plates for Kosovo cities to a proper Kosovo car plates].
The government’s decision to do this was heavily criticized by both the United States and the European Union. The Kosovo government was acting within the framework of the agreements with Serbia, but it failed to communicate properly its decision to the citizens living in the north as well as coordinating with the international presence in Kosovo, mainly EU and US on its implementation. So, the government could have done a better job to prepare the conditions for this transition and also communicate better to the citizens in the north what this decision means and how it is implemented.
Do you believe that under current leadership in Belgrade and Pristina, the normalization between Kosovo and Serbia is possible at all?
Both Serbian President Vucic and Kosovo Prime Minister Kurti appear to be leaders who prioritize their long-term legacy, making decisions with an eye on how they will be perceived two decades hence. This foresight and when they were in opposition, has led them to craft narratives that labeled their predecessors and others involved in the Serbia-Kosovo normalization process as traitors. Such narratives have now boxed them into a corner, especially Prime Minister Kurti, making it challenging for them to engage in the very actions they have previously criticized without contradicting themselves.
It seems that even the international community has grown skeptical about achieving full normalization between Serbia and Kosovo under the current attitudes of both leaders. As a result, the goal has subtly shifted from formal recognition to a state of de-facto recognition. In practical terms, this means Serbia refrains from speaking on Kosovo’s behalf, stops opposing Kosovo’s membership in international organizations, acknowledges Kosovo’s legal system and the two countries exchange diplomatic missions, such as liaison offices.
It is critical to highlight that in the negotiations this February, it was President Vucic, not Prime Minister Kurti, who declined to sign the EU’s proposed Agreement on the Path to Normalization of Relations between Kosovo and Serbia. This decision is significant in the context of Serbia’s stance towards Kosovo.
For Kosovo, de-facto recognition by Serbia is an important step, but it must be coupled with the unblocking of Kosovo’s process of international integration. Without this, Kosovo risks remaining in a state of limbo, a scenario the country can ill afford. Essential elements of this integration include achieving EU candidate status, strengthening relations with NATO such as through access to the Partnership for Peace program or even being Membership Action Plan, and gaining recognition from the five EU member states that have yet to acknowledge Kosovo’s independence. These steps are indispensable for Kosovo’s future stability and development.
So, at this stage of normalization, the result for Kosovo will be the de-facto recognition. What will Serbia get? The ASM?
A key component of the Agreement on the Path to Normalization of Relations between Kosovo and Serbia from February of this year is article 7, which includes an obligation for Kosovo “to ensure an appropriate level of self-management for the Serbian community in Kosovo”, which in practical terms translates into the establishment of the Association of Serb Majority Municipalities. This entity is designed to offer political guarantees to the Serb civilian community in Kosovo, ensuring their autonomous administration in sectors like education, healthcare, social welfare, and culture.
However, the significance of establishing the ASM extends beyond these immediate benefits. It represents a crucial step forward in the European Union membership aspirations for both Kosovo and Serbia. The EU has closely linked the accession process for both countries with the normalization of their relations. Therefore, the establishment of the ASM not only serves to address immediate community concerns but also plays a central role in advancing both nations toward EU integration. This dual benefit underscores the strategic importance of the ASM in the broader context of regional stability and European integration.
But we see that your Prime Minister is strongly opposing the establishment of the ASM. So, how to deal with such a position?
Understanding the context is crucial in discussing the establishment of the ASM. Prime Minister Kurti, previously a strong opponent of the ASM as the leader of the opposition, has somewhat shifted his stance in recent months. This change was evident when he expressed cautious support for the ASM statute proposed by the EU and US, a move that surprised many. While he has not fully embraced it, his defense of the EU and US-proposed statute marks a significant change in his position. However, several challenges remain in the establishment of the ASM. A primary concern is the constitutional legality of the statute. Following a 2015 decision by Kosovo’s Constitutional Court, the government is required to submit the statute for a review to ensure it aligns with constitutional standards. The content of the statute is yet to be officially disclosed, though leaks suggest that it may not fully comply with Kosovo’s constitutional requirements. This raises concerns among opposition parties and implies that the constitutional review process could be lengthy and its outcome uncertain. Another critical aspect to consider is the actual need for the ASM among the Serb population in the north of Kosovo. Conversations with local Serbs there reveal a preference for separation and unification with Serbia over remaining within Kosovo under the ASM framework. This sentiment raises questions about the practicality and desirability of the ASM in its intended form. Additionally, there is ambiguity over President Vucic’s genuine interest in the ASM. His actions and statements in the coming period will be telling, potentially leading to a complex interplay between him and Kurti regarding the ASM’s future.
Once there were very intensive talks about the exchange of territories between Kosovo and Serbia as one of the possible solutions to the Kosovo issue. Is there a possibility that these talks will be returned to again?
The topic of territorial exchange between Kosovo and Serbia was once a prominent subject in the discourse on resolving the Kosovo issue. Specifically, this proposal involved the idea of adjusting borders where the predominantly Serb northern part of Kosovo would join Serbia, while Serb municipalities with a majority Albanian population in Presheva Valley would be integrated into Kosovo. Interestingly, this concept was first proposed in the 2000 report by an international commission on Kosovo established by the Prime Minister of Sweden.
When this idea resurfaced in 2018 as a potential solution, it encountered strong resistance from some actors in the EU, particularly Germany. The opposition stemmed from concerns about the potential ripple effects on regional stability, particularly regarding Bosnia and Herzegovina and North Macedonia. The fear was that such a precedent could trigger similar demands and lead to conflicts.
At present, the notion of territorial exchange seems to be off the table. However, its revival cannot be completely ruled out, especially in a scenario where there is a shift in U.S. foreign policy, such as a possible return of Donald Trump to the presidency. In such a case, if a resolution between Kosovo and Serbia has not been achieved, this idea might regain traction.
Given this uncertainty, it is imperative to find a solution soon that aligns with the preferences of the EU and the current U.S. Biden Administration. This solution revolves around the establishment of the ASM. If Prime Minister Kurti wishes to avoid the prospect of territorial exchange or separation of the north of Kosovo, it would be advisable for him to accept the ASM and expedite its implementation.