Why is the October 20th vote in Moldova crucial for Moscow and Putin?

Uzdrisch Constantin, political scientist, journalist Romanian Public Television Chișinău

In the 33 years of democracy in the Republic of Moldova, the political class has repeatedly proclaimed during every election cycle that “these elections are crucial.” Indeed, elections in Moldova have often been unpredictable, and the most unpredictable factor has been the foreign policy direction adopted by the government that comes to power.

Moldova’s independence began with aggression from the Russian Federation, following the model seen in Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Donetsk, and Luhansk. In 1992, in Chișinău, people talked about the “calf that must feed from two cows,” a quote attributed to Moldova’s first president, Mircea Snegur. This metaphor meant that Moldova should not have a clear external alignment but oscillate between East and West, among the former imperial centre, Moscow, and the Western states. The political class in Chișinău has skillfully managed both sides over the years. On the one hand, they benefited from corrupt schemes devised by Moscow, while on the other, they mimicked reforms demanded and financially supported by the West.

Returning to elections, after the 1990 Parliament, also known as the Parliament of Independence, which included many pro-Romanian and pro-Western representatives, the Democratic Agrarian Party (Agrarians) came to power in 1994. This party was predominantly composed of former Soviet officials, many of whom were Communist Party members since, under Soviet rule, one could not advance without being a member of the Communist Party of the Moldavian SSR. This Parliament adopted the Constitution, which included the term “Moldovan language” and, more importantly, permanent neutrality—a concept often mentioned by Maria Zakharova in Moscow and by pro-Kremlin politicians in Chișinău. From this perspective, the crucial elections of 1994 firmly sealed Moldova’s security—or rather, its insecurity—for decades to come.

In 1998, despite being fragmented, pro-European forces came to power, forming the Alliance for Democracy and Reforms. This alliance initiated the first contact with the European Union. Some former members of this alliance, including former Prime Minister Ion Sturza, stated that the EU was eager at the time to begin Moldova’s European integration process alongside Romania’s. However, this alliance was short-lived, largely due to Iurie Roșca, who later became a staunch pro-Russian and a follower of Dugin.

This led to another “crucial election” in 2001. Moldova reverted to its previous direction, toward Moscow. With a campaign advocating for the Russia-Belarus Union, Vladimir Voronin brought a majority of 71 seats to Parliament and became President of Moldova. However, the love for the Russia-Belarus Union soured in 2003 when Voronin rejected the Kozak Plan, which proposed the federalization of Moldova, making Transnistria and the Gagauz autonomy parts of the federation that could influence Moldova’s external alignment. Incidentally, this federalization model was also proposed by the Kremlin in Ukraine in 2014, after Yanukovych’s ousting and the start of the aggression in Donetsk and Luhansk. Under energy and economic embargoes from the Kremlin, Voronin approached the next “crucial elections” with pro-European rhetoric. The Moldova-European Union action plan was signed, and Voronin was welcomed in the West. This electoral campaign unfolded under the shadow of the country’s early signs of oligarchy. The Voronin clan began to control Moldova’s economy. During this period, oligarch Vladimir Plahotniuc started to rise, and endemic corruption quickly disillusioned Westerners. Voronin then turned his focus to national values, faith in God, and nationalist rhetoric reminiscent of “we will not sell our country.”

Thus, we arrive at the “crucial elections” of April 5, 2009. Although the Communists won the elections, they could only stay in power until the summer. The vote, which had significant democratic shortcomings according to international reports, was followed by violent protests in Chișinău, as well as the mistreatment of young protesters by law enforcement and the deaths of several individuals. On July 29, 2009, new “crucial elections” were held, and the Voronin clan lost power, with the Alliance for European Integration I taking over, followed by two more similar alliances. The fragmented pro-European opposition began to move closer to the European Union. Crucial elections were held again in 2010 and 2014, with voters called upon to save Moldova’s European direction. Meanwhile, corruption developed faster than reforms could even be passed in Parliament. However, during this period, following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the annexation of Crimea, Moldova succeeded in signing the Association Agreement and the Free Trade Agreement with the EU.

The end of the Alliances for European Integration came in 2015 when former Prime Minister Vlad Filat was arrested for corruption. Filat was later sentenced to nine years in prison, though the European Court of Human Rights ruled that he did not receive a fair trial.

In 2016, Moldova returned to direct presidential elections, with the pro-Russian Socialist Igor Dodon becoming president. Throughout his mandate, he only visited CIS countries and appeared alongside Western leaders at international meetings under the aegis of the UN, OSCE, or the Council of Europe.

In 2019, Moldovan citizens were once again called to the polls for a new “crucial election.” The Democratic Party, led by Vladimir Plahotniuc, sought to maintain the “European path” while keeping control over the judiciary. The opposition urged citizens to vote against the oligarchic system. After the elections, an anti-Plahotniuc coalition came to power, and the oligarch fled the country.

In the 2020 presidential elections, PAS candidate Maia Sandu won. In the summer of 2021, another “crucial election” took place, aiming to rid the country of corruption inherited from Plahotniuc and to set a clear European direction with a European-style justice system. The elections were won by Maia Sandu’s Party of Action and Solidarity (PAS), which secured 62 of 101 seats. Despite being shaken by an economic crisis and some scandals, this government applied for Moldova’s EU membership. During this time, Moldova obtained candidate status for EU membership and began negotiations.

The elections and referendum on October 20: Stakes and Context

On October 20, Moldovan citizens will head to the polls to elect the president. At the same time, President Maia Sandu has called for a referendum to amend the Constitution, stipulating European integration as a key foreign policy direction. This referendum is taking place amid the ongoing war in Ukraine and crucial elections in Georgia, a country also courted by Moscow and holding EU candidate status. Ukraine amended its Constitution right after the full-scale Russian invasion.

After the referendum was announced, Moscow undertook several political actions aimed at undermining the vote and preventing Moldova from fully anchoring itself in the European value space. The first to act was Igor Dodon’s Socialists, encouraged by the Kremlin, promoting discussions about love for “both East and West,” “permanent neutrality,” Christian values, sovereignty, and other favourite topics of Moscow. Later, under the watchful eye of fugitive Ilan Șor, who was sentenced to 14 years in prison, the “Победа” bloc was formed in Moscow, which includes several parties affiliated with the oligarch and the Kremlin. Between 2023 and 2024, Moldovan authorities uncovered hundreds of illegal funding schemes for these political formations, schemes for bribing the population and financing obscure media outlets promoting fake news and disinformation. The aggressive tactics employed by Moscow through individuals controlled by Ilan Șor reflect a heightened interest in these elections, more so than in previous ones, even though, according to the Constitution, the president’s powers in Moldova are limited.

Nonetheless, why is Moscow so eager to secure every vote against the referendum and for its candidates, of whom there are about seven out of eleven in the race?

For Moscow, these elections are crucial because:

1. They are a rehearsal for next year’s high-stakes parliamentary elections. If Maia Sandu wins again, the PAS government will remain credible to Europeans, who will continue to provide financial assistance to Chișinău, rendering false narratives about energy prices, systemic hunger, and destruction useless. Thus, PAS has a chance to remain, if not the majority, at least the leading force in a future pro-European coalition.
2. Over the years since independence, Moscow has only worked with politicians in Chișinău who were either loyal to the Kremlin, corrupt, or both (as previously mentioned with Vladimir Voronin, Vlad Plahotniuc, and Igor Dodon—both of the latter are currently on trial for corruption and other offences). Another four years with a pro-European government, which is in constant contact with European experts and officials, will inevitably lead to the activation of Moldova’s justice system. Although I don’t expect Moldova’s justice system to fully prosecute the major corrupt figures within the next four years, some high-profile individuals will be caught, and thus Moscow’s favoured networks may perish. In other words, there will be fewer corrupt politicians willing to serve Moscow.
3. The start of EU accession negotiations is accompanied by pre-accession funds. These funds will impact all sectors, from agriculture to education and healthcare, from infrastructure to administration. These funds will bring an improved standard of living for the population. Under these conditions, the task of propaganda and fake news will become impossible. Moldovans know not to trade a bird in the hand for one in the bush. When services improve, jobs are better paid, and healthcare is of higher quality, scare tactics claiming that everything is going wrong will lose their power.
4. Moscow’s greatest loss will be the removal of its leverage: the security threat to Moldova. Moldova’s accession to the EU would be a disaster for Kremlin policy. According to the Maastricht Treaty of 1992, the European community is viewed as a homogeneous entity, a unified whole. Let’s not forget that Russia’s plan on February 24 was to invade Moldova after conquering Ukraine. However, after Moldova acceded to the EU, Russia will not be able to afford to invade or aggress a part of a consolidated structure.
5. Another four years with a pro-European government and a pro-European state policy supported by all EU countries will lead to the creation of a young pro-Western generation that will want to travel freely, work freely in any European country, and despise any politician who offers them war, famine, or high-interest microloans from the ‘Russian World.’

For Moscow, another four years of pro-European governance in Chișinău will mean the almost total loss of influence in this part of Europe.