Igor FedykOn 16 January, with 125 votes in favour and 114 against, the Bulgarian parliament elected a new permanent government, led by Prime Minister Rosen Zhelyazkov. Following protracted negotiations, three political forces — the conservative-populist GERB-SDS coalition, the pro-Russian Bulgarian Socialist Party – United Left, and the populist party There Is Such a People — agreed to form a joint government. The Democracy, Rights and Freedoms – DPS party (one of two factions that emerged after the split in the Movement for Rights and Freedoms), also pledged its support for the new coalition.
The defining characteristic of this government is its unlikely composition, namely: the alliance of GERB-SDS, which until recently positioned itself as ‘Bulgaria’s leading Euro-Atlantic’ political force, with the left, which has traditionally remained a friend of Moscow. Such an alliance would have been almost unthinkable until recently, but shifts in the international landscape, coupled with a range of domestic factors, have reshaped Bulgaria’s political arena, making this new coalition a reality.
The United States has got a new president, who has markedly different perspective on the Russian-Ukrainian war and support for Ukraine compared to his predecessor. Moreover, discussions about the potential end of the war this year have grown increasingly prominent. Under these circumstances, GERB-SDS found itself in a position where it could afford to downplay its ‘Euro-Atlanticism’ in order to keep its options open when selecting future coalition partners.
This shift was evident in the reluctance of ‘Bulgaria’s main Euro-Atlanticists’ to support the signing of a security cooperation agreement between Ukraine and Bulgaria. The reason was clear: GERB-SDS was in the midst of intensive negotiations over a power-sharing arrangement with the BSP, which is well known for its categorical opposition not only to a security pact with Ukraine but to any form of support for it.
GERB leader Boyko Borisov himself likened the signing of the Bulgarian-Ukrainian security agreement to “buying a factory on 9 September”— a reference to the well-known Bulgarian saying about 8 September 1944, alluding to the futility of purchasing a factory just after the communist coup and subsequent nationalisation.
Furthermore, GERB-SDS simply could not afford to fail in forming a government this time. In previous attempts, it had seven opportunities to rule the country, all of which ended in failure. An eighth unsuccessful attempt—likely triggering yet another round of snap elections—would have raised serious concerns among party supporters about both the party itself and its leader, Boyko Borisov. The formation of the Zhelyazkov government, therefore, saved GERB-SDS from significant reputational damage.
As for the BSP, the key factor that enabled its alliance with GERB-SDS was the expulsion of its former leader, Korneliya Ninova, who had been the main obstacle to any rapprochement with Borisov’s party. Moreover, the BSP is currently in a weakened state and in urgent need of access to resources. And the best way to get it is to become part of the government.
Ninova, now former Socialist No. 1, has not hidden her disdain for the fact that her former party has aligned itself with what was, until recently, its greatest political rival. She has warned that such an alliance is disastrous for the country. Similar criticisms have been voiced in parliament. Radostin Vasilev, leader of the MECH party, declared that the new government would be one of “absolute unprincipledness” and that it “cannot be anti-corruption or reformist,” given that “the most significant corruption scandals and incidents at various times have been linked to GERB’s leadership.”
This characterisation of Bulgaria’s newly formed government suggests, above all, that the hopes of Bulgarian society about permanently dismantling the ‘Borisov’ model of governance, which sparked mass protests in 2020, have been dashed. On the one hand, Bulgarians have been granted a reprieve from the relentless cycle of elections. On the other, they find themselves once again under a GERB-led government, effectively formalising the party’s emergence from its prolonged political isolation.
As for the country’s foreign policy direction under this new government — particularly its stance on NATO and Ukraine — it is likely to differ significantly from that of a year ago. This does not necessarily indicate a shift towards Moscow. However, GERB-SDS’s decision to sacrifice the security agreement with Ukraine in order to secure a coalition with the socialists, Boyko Borisov’s comparison of the agreement’s signing to ‘buying a factory on 9 September,’ the absence of staunch Ukraine supporters from the “We Continue the Change – Democratic Bulgaria” bloc in the new government, and the presence of a pro-Russian president point to one conclusion: Bulgaria’s role as a steadfast NATO ally and its commitment to supporting Ukraine — particularly in military terms — are unlikely to be key foreign policy priorities going forward.
It remains uncertain how long Bulgaria’s new ‘unprincipled’ coalition government will endure. However, it is clear that a fragile alliance between ideologically opposed parties, reliant on an unstable majority, is bound to face persistent crises — potentially cutting its lifespan short.