Mykhailo SamusDonald Trump’s provocative statements have sent shockwaves through online discussions and the wider information space, as the new U.S. administration accelerates its approach to the Russia-Ukraine war. His pre-election promise of ending the war in 24 hours has now stretched to 24 days—still an unnervingly rapid pace for many in Ukraine and Europe.
Yet, in reality, neither Trump nor his team have said anything particularly new. The key points raised recently—ceasefire talks, doubts over Ukraine’s NATO accession, and the improbability of an immediate return to the 1991 borders—were all part of Trump’s rhetoric both as a candidate and after his inauguration. These parameters have long been viewed as the likely contours of a potential “freeze” in the conflict.
Ukraine’s official stance on these positions remains unclear, which has only amplified confusion and emotional reactions both in Kyiv and across Western media. However, what is evident is that Ukraine will not negotiate the fate of its sovereign territory with the aggressor. Even from a constitutional standpoint, making territorial concessions would require changes backed by a parliamentary supermajority—an unimaginable scenario under current conditions. Likewise, abandoning NATO aspirations is out of the question, as this too would necessitate constitutional amendments.
A ceasefire along the current front lines is a more realistic topic for negotiation, but without additional concessions to Moscow. That means no reductions to Ukraine’s armed forces, no forced adoption of the Russian language, and no fulfilment of the Kremlin’s other demands.
One issue that Putin cannot ignore, however, is the status of the Russian-held areas of Kursk Oblast, seized by Ukrainian forces. Despite Moscow’s denials, territorial exchanges will be on the table. Whether the Kremlin agrees to trade Kursk territory for parts of Ukraine or not, it will have to factor this into ceasefire talks. One potential compromise could involve swapping the Kursk region for the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant and its surrounding areas, a deal that could address a host of security concerns, including those raised by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).
Another overlooked but critical aspect is the demilitarisation of occupied Crimea and the Black Sea. A frozen conflict could see the Russian Black Sea Fleet regrouping in Crimea, resuming hostilities in the western Black Sea, and creating new security threats. Under a ceasefire, Ukraine would likely be restricted in its use of naval drones and other deterrence systems, allowing Russia to conduct hybrid operations that destabilise maritime trade routes and disrupt energy projects—particularly in the Romanian sector of the Black Sea.
Additionally, Turkey might lift its blockade of military vessels through the Bosporus and Dardanelles under the Montreux Convention, once the war is formally “frozen.” This would enable Russia to reinforce its Black Sea Fleet with ships from other naval commands. Given the weakness of Ukrainian, Romanian, and Bulgarian navies, Moscow could quickly reassert its dominance in the region—a deeply unwelcome prospect for Ankara. This is why demilitarisation must be a priority in any future negotiations.
A Pause Before a Bigger War
The most important takeaway from this scenario is that a Trump-imposed freeze would merely serve as a preparatory phase for a second, larger Russo-Ukrainian war. The fundamental clash between Ukraine’s independence and Russia’s imperial ambitions remains unresolved, making a renewed conflict highly likely once the “Trump factor” fades—but the “Putin factor” remains. Accepting this as inevitable would prevent emotional fatigue and allow Ukraine to focus on what truly matters: preparing for the next phase of war.
This means ramping up recruitment efforts with a focus on motivation and military readiness for all Ukrainians, alongside the rapid expansion of Ukraine’s armed forces with a new generation of officers and generals. The development of drone warfare must be intensified, while radical defence industry reforms should prioritise private-sector initiatives. The military justice system must also be transformed into an efficient wartime mechanism.
At the same time, Europe must be shaken out of its complacency. With the U.S. likely stepping back from defending the continent, European nations must stop treating Ukraine as a buffer zone and instead fully integrate it into a robust European security structure. The answer lies in building a unified European Defence Force—including strategic deterrence capabilities.
A European Deterrence Doctrine
A realistic European security framework must encompass:
- Nuclear deterrence—expanding Europe’s nuclear capabilities to establish strategic parity with Russia, with Ukraine playing a key role.
- Missile defence—developing an integrated European air and missile defence system.
- Long-range strike capabilities—including cruise missiles, ballistic weapons, and strike drones.
- Strategic intelligence, targeting, and command systems—to ensure operational superiority.
This is an immense undertaking, but failure to act will leave Ukraine vulnerable to renewed aggression while Europe remains a passive spectator in the unfolding geopolitical storm.
Mykhailo Samus, Director, the New Geopolitics Research Network, Co-founder of the Consortium for Defence Information