NGRNAnalysis by Consortium for Defence Information
The widespread use of various unmanned systems in the Russo-Ukrainian war, along with rapid advancements in software enabling their control, has significantly expanded the possibilities for remote warfare. It has also laid the groundwork for future conflicts involving artificial intelligence and swarm technologies—coordinated operations of large groups of unmanned systems. De facto, from 2022 to 2025, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and ground robotic platforms (GRPs) have fundamentally reshaped the battlefield, diminishing the role of tanks, various types of armoured fighting vehicles (AFVs), and even attack helicopters. While not yet a full-fledged revolution, this marks an evolutionary leap toward a new era of weapon systems. Since 2024, ground combat systems are increasingly being employed in complex integrated networks with UAVs and GRPs. By 2025, the dominant trajectory of warfare is clearly skewed toward unmanned systems.
Robert Brovdi, one of Ukraine’s most experienced combatants and commander of the 414th Independent Brigade of UAV Systems – known as “Magyar’s Birds” -foresees further radical transformation of the battlefield in the summer of 2025. He predicts the creation of a continuous 40-kilometre-wide kill zone along the frontline, within which neither vehicles nor infantry will be able to move unless the airspace is cleared of small aviation assets. Brovdi emphasises the growing battlefield dominance of drones and does not rule out that combat by mid-2025 will be conducted almost entirely by unmanned systems. This would generate a “dead zone” of 15-20 kilometres in both directions from the line of contact.
Military experts have increasingly observed that since mid-2023, tanks, armoured vehicles, and helicopters have been losing their traditional battlefield roles. Artillery, while still a key element in combined arms warfare, is gradually ceding its title as “the queen of battle” as drones make the battlefield radically transparent.
This raises key questions: What is the current and future role of tube artillery in the evolving battlespace? In what directions is it likely to transform? Several interconnected factors are driving these changes.
Russia’s Artillery: Quantity Over Quality
Massed artillery fire and the use of “fire barrages” remain signature elements of Russia’s approach to large-scale war, particularly in compensating for the poor quality of its infantry. However, despite its numerical superiority in artillery systems and ammunition stockpiles, by autumn 2023 Russian military leadership had already acknowledged the technological superiority of Western artillery systems. Russian 152mm artillery typically has a range of 24-30 km, while NATO-standard 155mm systems achieve 30-42 km with greater precision.
Russian artillery has proven highly vulnerable to drone strikes and generally fares poorly in counter-battery engagements. As of May 2025, Russia had lost over 24,000 artillery systems of various types. Furthermore, successful Ukrainian long-range strikes on Russian ammunition depots at the end of 2024 significantly reduced Moscow’s artillery fire density advantage – from an 8:1 ratio in summer 2024 down to 2:1 by early 2025.
In response, Russia has been improvising: repurposing tanks as ad-hoc self-propelled guns (PSGs), using kamikaze drones for counter-battery warfare, and employing glide bombs via manned aviation. There are even reports of Russia mounting RBU-6000 naval rocket launchers on T-72 and T-80 tank chassis.
Systemic issues persist within Russia’s artillery command-and-control (C2). Although new artillery units have been formed since 2022, Moscow has failed to replenish losses. The number of active SPGs dropped from 1,900 in early 2022 to 1,500 in early 2024 – losses outpaced new or refurbished arrivals. Additionally, following a shift in offensive tactics toward assault groups, Russia began fragmenting its artillery batteries and battalions into individual crews with narrowly defined responsibilities. This fragmentation, however, stretched fire coordination timelines – on average, 40 minutes from fire request to first shot.
In 2025, Russia plans to procure up to 240 M-1989 Koksan SPGs from North Korea, capable of firing high-explosive shells to 40 km. This illustrates the Kremlin’s growing dependency on Pyongyang – not only for munitions but also for long-range artillery systems. Notably, despite public announcements back in 2021 of deploying the new 2S35 Koalitsiya-SV SPG with similar range, no field use of this system has been documented. Instead, since summer 2024, the Russian army has fielded the wheeled 2S43 Malva SPG equipped with the 2A65 Msta-B howitzer, and from early 2025, its variant Giatsint-K with the Giatsint-K gun.
Ukrainian Artillery Practice: Agile, Digitised, Integrated
Departing from both Soviet and NATO doctrinal models, Ukraine has pioneered a unique artillery paradigm centred on speed, digital integration, and mobile application rather than massed firepower.
This doctrinal shift has been partly driven by the skyrocketing cost of artillery ammunition – especially for precision-guided munitions. Ukrainian artillery has become a precision tool for specific, high-impact missions. Though an artillery round is 8-10 times more expensive than a typical battlefield drone, its value lies in precision effects when integrated into a kill-chain with reconnaissance, fire control, and drone-based targeting. Consequently, artillery systems – alongside air defence assets and radars—have become top-priority targets for both sides.
To remain effective, artillery must operate in concert with supporting systems—reconnaissance drones, drone interceptors, electronic warfare (EW) assets, and new-energy weapons. For instance, Ukraine’s development of the Kropyva digital fire control system since 2022 has drastically reduced counter-battery response times.
The modern battlefield requires not only a high rate of fire but also ultra-fast sensor-to-shooter loops. In Ukraine, thanks to real-time integration of UAVs, tablets, and reconnaissance teams, the sensor-to-strike cycle has dropped below three minutes—an advantage Russia struggles to match. Traditional, hierarchical targeting chains have become obsolete.
Ukrainian experience now dictates maximised autonomy for fire teams and immediate feedback from drone operators. Instead of saturating grids, Ukrainian gunners engage pinpoint targets using drone video feeds. This model integrates both Soviet-era howitzers and modern Western systems (PzH 2000, M777, Caesar), often in tandem.
Key to artillery effectiveness has been the training of crews to operate within digital fire environments, where each shot has strategic implications. Mobility is critical. Static artillery positions are quickly detected and targeted. The ability to displace within 2–3 minutes of firing has become a frontline imperative. This requirement applies not only at the battery level but down to individual guns.
Ukraine’s artillery capability has also been boosted by Western assistance – most notably self-propelled Western howitzers have demonstrated Ukraine’s growing technological edge. A landmark case was Denmark’s 2024 initiative to directly finance the production of 18 domestically built Bohdana SPGs for Ukraine. These were delivered within two months.
Crucially, the Bohdana, developed by a previously little-known Ukrainian firm, outperformed France’s Nexter in production tempo – producing 6–8 units per month. More significantly, it cost approximately $2.5 million per unit, while the Caesar howitzer exceeded $4 million. The Bruegel think tank estimates Caesar’s cost at €6 million, while Germany’s PzH 2000 and RCH 155 are priced at €17 million and €11.08 million, respectively.
With the proliferation of fibre-optic-guided drones, the hunt for SPGs has intensified. Yet Ukraine’s defence industry has responded with innovations. One Ukrainian drone/EW developer has partnered with Germany’s Diehl Defence to provide EW protection for the new RCH 155 remote-controlled SPGs manufactured by KNDS.
Thus, the effectiveness of Ukrainian artillery has been and will continue to be shaped by adjacent capabilities – reconnaissance drones, drone defenders, EW systems, and even laser-based counter-drone technologies (which Ukraine began deploying in late 2024).
Evolving Requirements for Modern Artillery
Ukraine’s war against an adversary rich in EW assets, drones, and counter-battery radars has driven several non-negotiable requirements for artillery systems:
- Rapid deployment and redeployment, with time on target position limited to mere minutes.
- Full digital compatibility, including GPS/fire mission integration via tablets, Starlink, and secure battlefield networks.
- Greater accuracy and range, including future-proofing through modular upgrades (digital sights, sensors, stabilisers).
- Crew survivability, necessitating remote-control fire solutions and automation.
- Integration with UAV spotters, transforming artillery into a core element of the kill-chain.
Conclusions: Artillery’s Future Trajectory
- Artillery remains relevant, despite the growing dominance of drones. However, its effectiveness now depends on integration with drone guardians, UAV spotters, and digital C2 networks. Future artillery success will hinge on pre-emptive capabilities through ISR, data fusion, and automated fire control. Expansion of the Bohdana SPG and towed variants is vital for strengthening Ukraine’s defence-industrial resilience.
- Munitions will define artillery effectiveness. The 2022-2025 war demonstrated that Western ammunition and integrated systems decisively outperformed their Soviet-Russian counterparts. Future artillery must accommodate evolving functions – like drone or missile interception—as part of its development path.
- Autonomy and automation are the new benchmarks. Ukrainian artillery units increasingly operate as networked, real-time strike modules—not merely gun crews. The development of unmanned, remotely operated artillery platforms is an inevitable next step.