NGRNThe Transformation of Electronic Warfare in 2022–2025
Analysis by Consortium for Defence Information
By the fourth year of the full-scale Russian invasion, it had become increasingly evident that the most decisive battles were no longer taking place exclusively in the air or on the ground. From 2024 onwards, the electromagnetic spectrum emerged as a primary domain of warfare, where strategic advantage could determine the outcome of broader operations. The early stages of the full-scale invasion in 2022 had exposed the critical shortcomings of Russia’s traditional electronic warfare (EW) doctrine – an approach deeply rooted in Soviet concepts of spectrum dominance through heavy, static systems. Yet by 2024, both Russia and Ukraine had profoundly transformed their approaches, giving rise to an entirely new model of spectrum warfare.
For Ukraine, this transformation entailed a fundamental doctrinal shift: EW was no longer viewed as a technical support function but had evolved into an active, offensive capability integrated into the network-centric battlefield structure.
The Collapse of “Big EW”: Russia’s Early Failures in 2022
At the onset of the invasion, Russian forces leaned heavily on their inherited Soviet-era capabilities. Large electronic warfare systems such as Krasukha-4, Zhitel, and Murmansk-BN were expected to provide umbrella-like coverage, suppressing communications and GPS signals across wide operational zones. These systems were deployed with the expectation of achieving rapid electromagnetic dominance.
However, this model quickly faltered under the pressure of a high-intensity, manoeuvre-centric conflict. The fast-paced advances of Russian units in the first weeks of the invasion left little time or space to properly deploy these massive EW systems. Worse still, their significant electromagnetic emissions made them easy targets for Ukrainian precision-guided artillery and loitering munitions. Instances of “friendly jamming” further complicated their utility – Russian EW systems often disrupted their own forces, especially during the disorganised battles around Kyiv.
The outcome was devastating: dozens of Russian EW platforms were destroyed, and Russia lost its initial advantage in the spectrum domain.
Russia’s Return: From Spectral Domes to Tactical Swarms
In 2023, as the war shifted into a more positional phase, Russia undertook a doctrinal revision of its EW strategy. The focus moved away from large, conspicuous systems toward more distributed and survivable configurations. Heavy EW complexes were repositioned several kilometres behind the front line, while their capabilities were supplemented by disposable modules such as Pole-21, deployed closer to the front in a dispersed fashion.
Simultaneously, the Russian military began forming mobile EW teams equipped with jammers mounted on armoured personnel carriers, pickups, and even quad bikes – enhancing their mobility and survivability. A key innovation involved the integration of EW with other battlefield elements, especially drones, reconnaissance, and artillery. In practical terms, this meant jamming Ukrainian GPS signals and communications to identify the locations of drone operators or command nodes, then striking them with artillery in near real-time.
These efforts were further streamlined through the deployment of the “Bylina” system – an automated command and control platform that helped unify spectrum operations along entire segments of the front.
Ukraine’s Doctrinal Leap: From Passive Defence to Offensive EW Operations
Ukraine, too, transformed its approach to electronic warfare—shifting from a primarily defensive posture to an offensive, proactive doctrine that became particularly visible in 2024–2025. The transformation encompassed several core innovations.
Firstly, Ukrainian forces decentralised EW capabilities. Systems such as Eter, Piranha, Nota, Paralyzer, and Bukovel-AD were widely deployed across frontline units, including assault groups. These systems enabled individual companies to create “jamming bubbles” that neutralised enemy FPV drones without affecting Ukrainian communications or UAVs.
Secondly, Ukrainian EW was tightly integrated into the detect–designate–strike cycle. Once Russian electronic emissions were detected, Ukrainian forces responded immediately—deploying loitering munitions or calling in precision artillery to strike during the adversary’s period of maximum spectral vulnerability.
A major strategic leap involved the deployment of the “Pokrova” GNSS-spoofing system. Its purpose was to mislead incoming Shahed drones, Kalibr cruise missiles, and UMPKs by feeding them false GPS data. Initial operational results showed these weapons deviating 5 to 10 kilometres from their intended targets in Ukrainian rear areas.
Finally, the Ukrainian military began to adopt a concept of “spectral manoeuvre.” Units were trained to operate in conditions of “spectral silence,” activating their own emissions only in coordinated time windows to avoid detection. Brigades established dedicated EW departments responsible for managing this dynamic environment and synchronising spectrum use across UAVs, strike assets, and communications systems.
Electronic Warfare in Future Manoeuvre Battles: Comparative Doctrines
The evolution of EW doctrine in both Russian and Ukrainian forces reflects a broader shift in the nature of modern warfare. No longer a secondary technical component, EW has become a central instrument of battlefield success. This shift can be summarised through key doctrinal and organisational contrasts:
| Operational Principle | Russia | Ukraine |
| Spectrum as Manoeuvre | EW operations are coordinated with artillery fires. | Brigades form “spectrum companies” integrated with C2, UAVs, and artillery. |
| Decentralisation | EW assets are embedded at the platoon level. | Portable systems are assigned to every assault unit. |
| Integration with Strike Systems | EW identifies targets; artillery or drones engage them. | Same model, but with emphasis on FPV drone strikes. |
| EW Command and Control | “Bylina” automates spectrum management and targeting processes. | Implementation of systems like Quartz and Delta-Radio, with growing automation. |
| Survivability and Emission Control | Emphasis on low-emission, mobile, and deceptive EW tactics. | Development of spectrum mapping and passive emitter detection. |
Challenges and Prospects
For Ukraine, the road ahead requires mass localisation of EW production. The immediate priority lies in producing portable systems for infantry, spectrum denial modules for UAVs, and specialised platforms for GPS and Starlink disruption. Additionally, Ukraine must continue building out full-spectrum manoeuvre brigades capable of coordinating EW, drones, and fire support into a unified operational force.
For NATO, the implications are profound. The alliance must assume that any future conflict will involve contested spectrum from the opening minutes. Every company-level tactical group should possess a degree of spectral autonomy. More broadly, EW must be fully integrated into NATO’s joint fires doctrine and cyber operations architecture.
Conclusion
Electronic warfare has become the artillery of the 21st century. Though it does not leave behind craters or shrapnel, it can paralyse logistics, sever communications, neutralise command structures, and blind drones and missiles. In 2022, survival often depended on remaining invisible within the spectrum. By 2025, success belongs to those who command and exploit it.
Control over the spectrum is now synonymous with control over the battle.
The wars of the future will not only be fought with steel and silicon – but between algorithms that listen, jam, and strike. In this emerging battlespace, Ukraine has already developed its own unique approaches to EW – and now has the opportunity to lead in shaping the new school of spectrum warfare.