Exporting Integrated Capabilities: Ukraine’s Strategic Opportunity

Ukraine enters 2025 with one of the world’s fastest-growing defence industries. Wartime demand has driven mass production of UAVs, EW systems, counter-drone solutions, artillery and missiles at a scale unmatched even by NATO states. While the Pentagon plans to procure 4,000 drones in 2025, Ukraine already manufactures and employs more than 4,000 per day. Western assessments now confirm that Ukraine has reached a stable trajectory of several million drones annually, marking a structural shift in modern warfare.

Against this backdrop, a strategic dilemma emerges: what happens to Ukraine’s defence-industrial base if the war becomes frozen and domestic procurement contracts collapse? For many private manufacturers – particularly in the UAV segment – this could result in dramatic downsizing unless a viable export model is secured.

Structural Barriers to Traditional Export Models

A “simple entry” into EU or US markets is unrealistic. Europe is reinforcing protectionist policies, prioritising its own EDTIB and funnelling hundreds of billions of euros into local production. Ukraine still lacks equal producer status and operates without a coherent export framework, predictable licensing system, IP protection mechanisms or a state-backed defence-industrial diplomacy model. Selling individual drones, EW units or armoured vehicles abroad will not guarantee long-term sustainability.

Why Selling Hardware Alone Is Insufficient

Ukraine’s platforms—UAVs, FPV systems, robotic vehicles, mobile EW and short-range air defence—can be replicated internationally. What cannot be replicated is the doctrine: drone-centric force design, integration of unmanned systems into brigade structures, new C-UAS models, AI-enabled kill-chains, and layered defence against Shahed-type swarms. This operational ecosystem is Ukraine’s unique competitive advantage.

NATO militaries have not yet internalised these lessons. None has adopted a doctrine matching Ukraine’s experience of constant drone-saturated threats, nor created “Unmanned Systems Forces” or a fully integrated C-UAS force-protection model. This creates a historic window: a global demand for doctrinal, organisational and integrated capability packages.

What Ukraine Can Export: Integrated Capability Packages

The most promising product is not “equipment” but combat capability. Potential export formats include:

  • A new-type battalion or brigade “turn-key” (structure, C2, UAV/EW/AD integration, training, digital systems).
  • Design and build-up of Unmanned Systems Forces for partner states.
  • Integrated air and counter-drone defence systems combining sensors, EW, kinetic effectors and interceptor UAVs.
  • Robotic unit concepts with doctrine, applications and integration into logistics, MEDEVAC and combined-arms manoeuvre.

The global market for combat system integration is projected to exceed USD 60 billion by 2030, with the fastest growth in complex, multi-layered capabilities rather than individual systems.

Role of Private Military/Defence Service Companies

Most major powers rely on private military/defence service entities to train foreign forces, integrate new technologies and deliver turnkey capabilities. Ukraine possesses a vast pool of combat-experienced personnel, yet lacks a legal framework enabling such activity. Formalising this sector would allow Ukraine to retain and monetise its wartime expertise while supporting system-level export projects.

Conditions for Success

To scale capability exports, Ukraine must establish:

  • a coherent defence-export and international cooperation policy;
  • legal frameworks for PMCs focused on training, consulting and integration (not combat);
  • robust IP protection ensuring Ukrainian doctrinal and technological innovations are monetised rather than copied;
  • standardised export packages (new-type brigade, C-UAS system, robotic unit, integrated air defence);
  • diplomatic mechanisms, including defence-industrial attachés, to support Ukrainian companies abroad.

Conclusion

Hardware alone will not secure Ukraine’s defence-industrial future in a post-war environment. The country’s real strategic asset is its combat-proven model of warfighting – its doctrine, integration concepts and capability architecture. Exporting comprehensive solutions, not isolated products, offers Ukraine a durable competitive niche and a foundation for global leadership in next-generation defence transformation.

Mykhailo Samus

NGRN Director

After 20 years in media as well as in security and defence analysis and consultancy, Mykhailo is an experienced researcher in the sphere of international relations, national resilience and new generation warfare. Served 12 years in the Ukrainian Armed Forces, he gained his Master’s Degree in International Journalism from the Institute of Journalism, Kyiv Shevchenko National University (2007). Having started his career as a journalist at Defense Express, he became the Editor-in-Chief of the Export Control Newsletter magazine, and then the Deputy Director of the Center for Army, Conversion and Disarmament Studies.

He was the founder (2009) of the EU CACDS office in Prague (Czech Republic), and was responsible for the coordination of CACDS international activities, its regional sections, and projects with NATO and the EU. Mykhailo also was the member of the editorial border of the CACDS Analytical Bulletin Challenges and Risks.

Now Mykhailo is a chief and one the drivers of new international project – The New Geopolitics Research Network which is an independent and nonpartisan initiative to provide a think tank platform for researchers, academics, experts, journalists, intellectuals who aspire to shape a new facets of geopolitics.

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