NGRNRemarks by Andrii Biletskyi, Commander of the Centre Group of Forces, at the YES international conference in Kyiv, 11 September 2026.
On expectations for the coming months and the likely duration of the war: we must look at the enemy’s strategic objectives and proceed from that assessment. According to some Western intelligence services and open sources, Russia is currently pursuing two principal objectives.
The first is to complete the occupation of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts. They have still not captured the whole of Luhansk Oblast. The second is to break Ukraine’s backbone—its industrial production and its ability to sustain the defence.
Russian military commanders expect these objectives to be achieved by mid-April. Russia’s political leadership is demanding the impossible: that the operation be completed before the beginning of 2027.
I believe that Ukraine’s defenders are well positioned to hold the line. In some sectors of Donetsk Oblast, we may even improve the situation. We will probably be able to demonstrate this progress within a month [apparently a reference to the Lyman salient].
April next year will be decisive for Russia. It will coincide with yet another “deadline” for the seizure of Donetsk Oblast. The second component is the state of Ukraine’s economy and its civilian population.
The winter will not be easy. Success or failure will depend largely on our ability to close the skies to jet-powered drones and ballistic missiles. If we withstand this trial successfully, Russia will face an existential question in March or April: whether it can continue combat operations at all—and, if so, how. That may be the right moment to begin genuine peace negotiations and secure peace on terms that take Ukrainian conditions into account.
The “kill zone” is more a convention than a strictly defined term. Formally, it is an area in which the probability of a target being struck reaches 80–90 per cent. In my assessment, such zones exist on both sides of the line of contact. Ukraine currently has the advantage over the enemy in this respect. At least for the time being. This gives our forces certain tactical advantages.
There is, however, a great deal of speculation surrounding the concept. Kill zones are created through multi-layered systems comprising drones, sensors and strike drones that cover the entire area. But I always emphasise—and I want to be honest with our soldiers—that a kill zone is not an impenetrable barrier. People on the ground remain decisive. Nothing can replace them. Technology can assist them, but it cannot replace them. Our soldiers have learnt to survive even inside kill zones. They have learnt not merely to survive, but also to attack while sustaining minimal casualties.
💬 The so-called “meat assaults” [conducted by Russian forces] have not changed significantly. Last year, the Russians burned through large numbers of soldiers and secured some advantages, at least in certain sectors. This basic tactic has now resulted in massive personnel losses. Their losses already exceed the numbers they can replace through recruitment.
They have not devised any new tactics that would genuinely enable them to advance. They are now attempting to copy the Ukrainian model by developing unmanned aerial systems at the tactical and operational levels. They are following in our footsteps. But there is a strong likelihood that Ukraine will retain its advantage for a considerable time.
First, we are already several steps ahead. Second, we are not as centralised as they are, and this encourages innovation. There is also the question of human potential: the men and women joining the Armed Forces of Ukraine are far more receptive to new technologies than those whom Russia largely sends forward as expendable “meat”.