Volodymyr SolovianRussia’s full-scale aggression against Ukraine has radically changed the security architecture of the European continent. Since February 2022, Ukraine’s position within the European security landscape has fundamentally changed. It is no longer a buffer state, but rather a frontier of the West. The shifting geopolitical landscape demands a complete renewal of the paradigm of Ukraine-NATO relations.
Consequently, on the eve of the Vilnius Summit, Kyiv was optimistic about enhancing Ukraine-NATO relations. The outcome of the Summit fell far short of the most optimistic expectations. The final Communiqué did not provide certain details regarding the terms of Ukraine’s invitation to NATO. Obviously, the Vilnius Summit did not become a turning point on Ukraine’s Euro-Atlantic path. However, its productive results should not be underestimated.
Ukraine’s expectations
Ukraine officially applied for NATO membership on September 30, 2022. However, Kyiv’s initiative was met with a rather cautious response within the Alliance. Given the peculiarities of NATO’s functioning, especially the mechanism of collective responsibility for the defense of members, an immediate decision to grant membership in the Alliance before restoration of territorial integrity might not be supported by most of the member states.
Despite this, Kyiv did not hide hopes on a clear algorithm, which would clarify the terms and conditions of Ukraine’s membership, dispelling the uncertainty surrounding the issue. From the point of view of Ukrainian authorities, the best signal to Russia would be to start the procedure of inviting Kyiv to join the Alliance and guaranteeing Ukraine’s security prior to membership.
The main arguments regarding the strengthening of NATO in case of granting membership to Ukraine can be summarized as follows:
– Unprecedented experience in waging warfare of high-intensity using Western weapons against the main NATO’s adversary, which is extremely useful regarding military planning of member states;
– Strengthening of NATO conventional capabilities through the involvement of the Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU) as one of the most advanced army in the region. In terms of Russia deterrence, these could release significant American forces for the strategic confrontation with China.
– The admission of Ukraine into NATO would grant member states greater influence over the development and implementation of the AFU. Additionally, Ukraine’s membership would contribute to the country’s reconstruction and development by creating a conducive security environment for private investors.
NATO Summit decision: “Good” but Not “Perfect”
According to press reports, final position on Ukraine in the Vilnius Summit’s Communiqué was agreed at the last moment. As a result, the Alliance provided a number of bonuses for Kyiv, in particular:
– Removal of the requirement for a Membership Action Plan (MAP);
– Long-term military assistance program worth $500 million a year for the modernization of the AFU and transition to NATO standards;
– Launching of the Ukraine-NATO Council. Previously, a similar format existed exclusively with Russia, while Ukraine-NATO relations developed under the frame of the joint Commission. Any state within the Alliance had the ability to block the Ukraine-NATO Commission meeting. On the other hand, the convocation of the Council cannot be obstructed. Practically, this step ends Hungary’s constant abuse of its veto right as part of Viktor Orbán’s government confrontation with Kyiv over the issue of Hungarian minority rights.
Also, NATO countries supported President Volodymyr Zelensky’s “peace formula” as a viable approach to resolving the conflict.
At the same time, the decisions of the Vilnius Summit preserved the strategic uncertainty regarding the fate of Ukraine’s membership in NATO. The Summit Communiqué states: «NATO Foreign Ministers will regularly assess progress through the adapted Annual National Programme. The Alliance will support Ukraine in making these reforms on its path towards future membership. We will be in a position to extend an invitation to Ukraine to join the Alliance when Allies agree and conditions are met» [1].
Thus, the Annual National Program (ANP) de facto replaced the MAP. Since 2009, the ANP is a key instrument for the implementation of Euro-Atlantic reforms in Ukraine with the support of NATO. However, in its current form, it is very clumsy document, which can potentially turn into a bureaucratic obstacle rather than facilitate Ukraine’s accession to the Alliance.
Also, the “formula” of the Bucharest Summit (2008) “[Ukraine and Georgia] will become members of NATO” [2] was replaced by the new wording: “[the Alliance] will be in a position to extend an invitation to Ukraine to join the Alliance when Allies agree and conditions are met” [1]. In other words, the decision of the Summit leaves open all scenarios of further relations between Ukraine and NATO.
The lack of progress in determining the conditions and time frames caused discontent of the officials in Kyiv. The Ukrainian leader’s first reaction to the Summit’s decision was a statement of harsh criticism: «Unprecedented and absurd – when there is no time frame for the invitation and the membership of Ukraine, and when some strange wording is added about the ‘conditions’ even for the invitation of Ukraine…. There seems to be no readiness to invite Ukraine to join NATO or make it a member of the Alliance» [3].
It is worth noting that the maximalist expectations regarding the invitation of Ukraine to NATO contrasted with the cautious position of the main players of the Alliance. This brought some nervousness to the public communication of the Summit participants.
Obviously, against the background of the quite predictable results of the Summit, the UK defense minister statements that Ukraine’s partners wanted to “see gratitude” and that his country was “not Amazon” when it came to the delivery of weapons attracted almost all the press attention [4]. Instead, the Alliance’s practical steps, which show real support for Ukraine, remained in the shadows. By the way, Russian propaganda tried to take advantage of this situation, fueling an ephemeral conflict between Ukraine and its NATO partners.
However, it seems that the sidelines of the Summit somewhat reassured the Ukrainian leadership. In the end, Zelenskyy noted: “the Summit’s results are good, but they would be perfect if there was an invitation” [5].
Reflecting the West’s Strategic Assessments
The results of the Vilnius Summit confirmed that NATO considers the Russian-Ukrainian war in the context of global challenges the Western world faced. Thus, Russia was recognized as the most serious threat to the security of the Alliance; the NATO states called on all countries to stop assisting the Kremlin. Simultaneously, the Communiqué emphasized the intention to keep open channels of communication with Moscow, while also acknowledging the collective desire for stability and predictability in the Euro-Atlantic region, as well as fostering stable relations between NATO and Russia.
Obviously, in the conditions of the ongoing large-scale war on the European continent, the West want to prevent the spread of the conflict through the direct involvement of NATO countries in the confrontation with Moscow. A key element of this strategy is to preserve space for negotiations with the Kremlin, regardless of whether the current Russian leadership remains in power. Therefore, the decisions of the Vilnius Summit confirmed the information circulating in the press on the position of the Biden administration. This stance suggests that linking Ukraine’s membership to the end of the war would stimulate Russia to continue hostilities.
The Vilnius Summit testifies that the West is not ready to link military assistance to Ukraine’s membership in NATO. Ukraine’s NATO membership will not come after the war automatically. The issue may be decided within the framework of broader agreements on the future security order in the region.
Therefore, the West faced the “dilemma of an ally” on the track of NATO-Ukraine relations – the fear of being drawn into a conflict that would not meet the common interests, as a result of which the allies would not come to the rescue properly at a critical moment. It is quite rational that the White House holds the position that in practice the state’s contribution to the defense capability of the alliance is not in a direct dependence on its desire to become a member of this alliance. Granting delayed membership to Ukraine could harm the consolidation within the Alliance, particularly Washington’s relationship with Berlin – the main opponent of Ukraine’s inclusion to NATO in the European camp. Given the Biden administration’s substantial efforts to reestablish trust and coordination within the transatlantic community during previous years, it is improbable that the US would jeopardize its own policy by making decisions, which cannot be implemented in the near future and therefore have more symbolic than practical significance.
Ukraine-NATO – the course remains unchanged
The agenda of the NATO Summit in Vilnius once again emphasized a number of Western capitals are convinced that Ukraine’s delayed invitation to NATO will significantly raise the stakes, to which Moscow will respond by increasing efforts to prolong the war. The Western countries prioritize the practical dimension of assistance to Kyiv, namely, arming, intelligence support, training the AFU personnel etc.
As for Ukraine, the most important task at the current stage is gaining access to the technologies of NATO member countries, admission to participation in NATO’s technological weapons programs and joint production of modern weapons. It is also advisable to use the result of the Vilnius Summit regarding the cancellation of the MAP. In doing so, it is necessary to turn the ANP into a limited and specific list of reforms. Once the war ends, the implementation of these efforts will enable Ukraine to receive an invitation to join NATO.
Kyiv’s task is to prevent replacing the perspective of membership with the assurance of strengthening the AFU to the level of the ability to deter new Russian aggression alone (the security model, known as “porcupine strategy”). Even accepting this approach during wartime, it is worth remembering that the only truly effective guarantee, for which future generations of Ukrainians will not have to pay in blood, is Ukraine’s full membership in NATO.
References:
- Vilnius Summit Communiqué, URL: https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_217320.htm?selectedLocale=en
- Bucharest Summit Declaration, URL: https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_8443.htm
- Zelenskyy criticised partners who discuss NATO without Ukraine: unprecedented and absurd, URL: https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2023/07/11/7410805/
- UK Defence Secretary Ben Wallace’s ‘we are not Amazon’ jibe at Ukraine a real warning about the risk of war fatigue, URL: https://news.sky.com/story/uk-defence-secretary-ben-wallaces-we-are-not-amazon-jibe-at-ukraine-a-real-warning-about-the-risk-of-war-fatigue-12920142
- Results of summit are good, but with invitation to NATO, they would be perfect – Zelenskyy, URL: https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2023/07/12/7410970/