Early Elections in Slovakia: Implications for Ukraine Policy

The next parliamentary elections in the Slovak Republic are scheduled for the end of September 2027. Nevertheless, discussions have emerged within the political discourse regarding the possible early termination of the current government’s mandate. Prime Minister Robert Fico himself has repeatedly stated that he sees no grounds for holding early parliamentary elections, and his goal is to win the regular elections in 2027. Despite this, public dissatisfaction and statements by opposition parties suggest otherwise.^1,2

Although public dissatisfaction and opposition gains have increased political pressure on the government, institutional, parliamentary, and political incentives make early parliamentary elections in Slovakia before 2027 unlikely. The greater policy significance lies in how different future governing coalitions would reshape Slovakia’s approach toward Ukraine.

Factors Reducing the Likelihood of Early Elections

The political party Demokrati has collected 400,000 signatures for a referendum, which is scheduled to take place on July 4, 2026. The referendum aims to abolish Robert Fico’s lifetime benefits and restore the NAKA agency, as well as the Office of the Special Prosecutor. However, despite the successful collection of signatures, the upcoming referendum does not imply the termination of the current government or create the possibility of early elections.³

Therefore, the referendum may increase political pressure on the government, but it should not be treated as a direct institutional pathway to early elections.

On the other hand, several factors suggest that the current government is likely to complete its mandate. On June 18, 2026, the National Council of the Slovak Republic expressed confidence in Robert Fico’s government. The motion received support from 78 deputies, while 54 voted against it. The Prime Minister described the vote as a clear signal that the coalition continues to function without major internal disruptions and that early elections are therefore unlikely to take place.⁴

The successful confidence vote significantly reduced the immediate likelihood of early parliamentary elections by demonstrating that the governing coalition retains a working parliamentary majority. Although political tensions remain, the opposition currently lacks the parliamentary numbers necessary to force a change of government. As a result, pressure on the government is more likely to affect the 2027 campaign than to trigger an early vote.

Many coalition deputies may perceive limited prospects of re-election, creating incentives to preserve the current parliamentary term.

In May 2026, the international rating agency Fitch confirmed that Slovakia remains a reliable borrower by assigning it an “A-” rating and maintaining a stable outlook. This indicates that the government has successfully addressed the task of improving the country’s financial standing. In addition, Slovakia successfully sold government bonds worth 700 million Swiss francs to foreign investors, further strengthening confidence in the country’s financial markets. Robert Fico himself stated that the coalition would continue its efforts to restore order to public finances.⁵

Although credit ratings do not directly influence electoral outcomes, they strengthen the government’s argument that its fiscal policies remain credible despite opposition criticism. This may reduce pressure from financial markets and weaken claims that an economic crisis could precipitate early elections.

Risk Factors for Government Instability

At the same time, there are also several risk factors that could lead to instability. The government’s request for a vote of confidence was prompted by the critical level of public debt, which reached the highest sanction threshold under the constitutional law on budgetary responsibility. During the parliamentary session on June 18, Michal Šipoš stated that the current government had not presented a single argument explaining how it intended to resolve the debt problem or why it should continue its mandate. Likewise, PS deputy Štefan Kiš pointed out that the coalition’s actions had created a system in which state resources and influence were used to reward individuals with the right connections, while Slovakia continues to suffer from a stagnating economy and rising public debt.³

Nevertheless, fiscal challenges alone are unlikely to trigger early elections. Unless they produce serious divisions within the governing coalition or widespread social unrest, economic problems are more likely to influence voter preferences in the scheduled 2027 elections than to shorten the government’s mandate.

As a result of measures aimed at consolidating public finances, the budgets of local governments have been reduced. This has led to dissatisfaction among schools and other institutions, and this factor may have a significant impact on the upcoming municipal elections in 2026.⁴

Another important factor is the strengthening of the opposition. Public opinion polls conducted in May 2026 show that Progresívne Slovensko (PS) holds a lead over SMER-SD by 0.8%, creating constant political pressure on the government.⁶ Although the opposition currently leads in opinion polls, the difference remains within a relatively narrow margin. Moreover, polling results alone do not determine government survival, as parliamentary majorities – not public opinion surveys – decide whether a government can continue in office.

Possible Coalition Scenarios

In addition to external factors, an examination of the long-term strategies of SMER-SD and its chairman reveals that the party is currently focused primarily on resolving internal coalition disputes and shaping its European policy agenda.⁴

The latest opinion polls suggest the following possible election results: the political party Progresívne Slovensko (PS) has the highest support at 19.7%, followed by the ruling party SMER-SD at 18.9%. In third place is Republika with 9.1%, followed by Hlas-SD with 8.9%, SaS with 8.6%, Slovensko with 8.2%, KDH with 7.9%, and Demokrati with 5.1%.⁶

Regarding possible coalition scenarios, Progresívne Slovensko has declared its intention to strengthen a bloc of constructive opposition parties consisting of PS, SaS, KDH, and Demokrati. The coalition’s primary objectives would be addressing the cost-of-living crisis, combating corruption, and supporting democratic stability.⁷

While the PS-led coalition would be numerically viable, it would possess only a narrow parliamentary majority, potentially limiting its legislative effectiveness. Conversely, the current governing parties would require additional support to retain power, making coalition negotiations a decisive factor in any future government formation.

According to the latest polling data, such a coalition would secure 75 parliamentary seats (PS – 37, SaS – 14, KDH – 13, Demokrati – 11). Another possible scenario would be the continuation of the current governing coalition of SMER-SD and Hlas-SD with the support of the Republika party. Together, they would obtain 62 seats, distributed as follows: SMER-SD – 32, Hlas-SD – 16, and Republika – 14.⁸

Implications for Slovakia’s Policy Toward Ukraine

A PS-led government would likely pursue a significantly more supportive policy toward Ukraine. The party’s policy platform indicates active support for and continued partnership with Slovakia’s eastern neighbor. PS expresses strong support for Ukraine’s aspiration to join the European Union, emphasizing Ukraine’s contribution to defending European values. The party argues that Ukraine’s integration into the EU would have a positive impact on the economy of eastern Slovakia.⁹

The party also insists on maintaining and increasing humanitarian, financial, diplomatic, and military assistance to Kyiv. This is directly linked to supporting Ukraine and ensuring the security and sovereignty of Slovakia, as well as preserving European norms and principles.⁹

PS views the current crisis as an opportunity for Slovakia to assume a leading role in Ukraine’s post-war reconstruction process. To achieve this, the party proposes establishing a national coordination institute for reconstruction that would be responsible for mobilizing the necessary resources and creating favorable conditions for attracting Slovak investment.⁹

In the context of foreign policy, the party actively supports EU sanctions against Russia and Belarus.⁹

If SMER-SD were to win the elections and form a government under Robert Fico’s leadership, no fundamental changes in Slovakia’s current policy toward Ukraine should be expected. Based on the current policy trajectory, Bratislava would likely continue the cautious approach toward Ukraine that it has pursued since the current government came to power in autumn 2023.

This approach would likely continue to emphasize diplomatic efforts over increased military support for Ukraine while prioritizing Slovakia’s national economic and energy interests. The government would probably maintain its critical rhetoric toward additional military assistance and oppose initiatives that it considers to increase Slovakia’s direct involvement in the conflict. At the same time, Slovakia would likely continue to comply with EU and NATO commitments where consensus among member states exists, thereby preserving its position within both organizations while pursuing a more restrained policy toward Ukraine.

Early elections in Slovakia would require either a constitutional mechanism, a loss of parliamentary support, or a political agreement among parties to shorten the parliamentary term. At present, none of these conditions appears sufficiently developed.

Conclusion

Despite ongoing discussions about early elections, as of the summer of 2026, the likelihood of such elections remains relatively low. The governing coalition retains a parliamentary majority and has a clear interest in completing its mandate until 2027. However, high levels of public dissatisfaction, budgetary challenges, and growing support for the opposition continue to generate political uncertainty. In the event of a victory by pro-European forces, Slovakia’s policy toward Ukraine could become significantly more active, whereas the continuation of the current coalition’s rule would likely mean the continuation of its existing cautious approach.

Therefore, the most probable scenario is not an early election before 2027, but a prolonged period of political tension in which the main strategic question is whether Slovakia’s next government will maintain the current cautious line toward Ukraine or return to a more openly pro-Ukrainian position.

¹ Stačilo Fica
² R. Fico nevidí žiadne dôvody na predčasné parlamentné voľby. Za kľúčové považuje schválenie budúcoročného rozpočtu
³ Parlament vyslovil vláde R. Fica dôveru, návrh podporilo 78 koaličných poslancov
⁴ Žiadne veľké prekvapenia, malé koaličné krízy a komunálne voľby: Akým výzvam bude čeliť vláda Roberta Fica v roku 2026?
⁵ Dobré správy pre finančnú dôveryhodnosť Slovenska
⁶ Prieskum AKO: Smer sa doťahuje na PS, ktoré drží na čele už len tesný náskok
⁷ Progresívne Slovensko si zvolilo nových podpredsedov a podpredsedníčky
⁸ Voľby by podľa AKO vyhralo PS. Do parlamentu by sa dostalo osem strán a takmer aj SNS
⁹ Podporíme Ukrajinu