Assessing the Impact of Equipment Shortages on Russian Military Operations in Ukraine
NGRN experts, Mykhailo Samus and Volodymyr Solovian, took part in the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) research.
230731_Schwartz_War_AttritionExecutive Summary
This report examines the impact of Russia’s growing military equipment and ammunition shortages on the Kremlin’s ability to prosecute the war in Ukraine and to carry out operations in other areas. In doing so, it focuses on availability of artillery ammunition, as well as five weapons categories of central importance for Russia’s ability to sustain operations: tanks, artillery, uncrewed aerial vehicles, electronic warfare systems, and long-range precision strike weapons. For each category, the report examines how the size and composition of Russian weapons portfolios in Ukraine are changing under the twin influences of attrition and sanctions, while taking account of Russian efforts to increase defense production and otherwise replenish its forces. It concludes by assessing the impact of Russia’s declining weapons portfolios in Ukraine on its ability to carry out future operations against Kyiv, as well as in other regions of interest such as Central Asia, the Middle East and North Africa, and the Caucasus.
The report finds that the magnitude of Russian equipment losses and ammunition usage in Ukraine is having a major negative effect on the Kremlin’s ability to prosecute the war. In each of the five categories, Russian defense production is struggling to keep pace with its growing losses on the battlefield due to sanctions and capacity limitations, although they have been offset to some extent by various stopgap measures. The resulting decline in the size and quality of Russian weapons portfolio in Ukraine are further undermining Russia’s ability to sustain operations. Growing signs of an impending ammunition shortage are particularly problematic since Russian forces in Ukraine rely so heavily on artillery to sustain operations. By contrast, the Ukrainian military has been able to rely on a steady influx of Western military equipment to replenish its forces and preserve its combat power. Resulting shifts in the balance of forces are creating a window of opportunity for Ukraine to renew its counteroffensive and recover additional territory. It is not clear, however, whether conditions are ripe enough yet for Kyiv to make enough gains to decisively seize the initiative and escape the current cycle of attrition altogether. So far, equipment and ammunition shortages have tended to undermine Russia’s offensive capabilities more than they have its defensive capabilities. Moreover, the Kremlin is making a concerted effort to mobilize defense production. Given its enormous prewar equipment stockpiles, remaining defense production capabilities, and continuing support from countries still willing to do business with Russia, the Kremlin likely still retains the capacity to reverse recent declines in its weapons portfolio and replenish its forces in Ukraine at levels sufficient to continue the war effort, albeit with some limitations. However, the prolonged invasion coupled with heavy manpower and equipment losses will likely limit Moscow’s ability to engage in high-intensity conventional military operations in other areas, at least in the near future.
This report, which was drafted in May 2023, is the second report in a series exploring Russia’s defense industry under the allied sanctions and export controls. The first report examined the impact of sanctions on the Kremlin’s ability to manufacture and sustain advanced weapons systems without direct access to higher end Western components.
