Two years of war. Further stable and timely military support for Ukraine is decisive

Analyzing two years of large-scale Russian military aggression against Ukraine, two conclusions immediately emerge. The first is that with a qualified military command, trained and motivated personnel, modern and sufficient weapons and ammunition, as well as asymmetrical actions, the Ukrainian military can achieve quite serious success in a fight against a numerically superior enemy. The second, and it became especially relevant last year, is that without a sufficient and timely supply of the army with the necessary weapons and ammunition, not a single military genius will ensure the fulfillment of the goals set in the war. This condition – “timely and sufficient quantities of weapons and ammunition for the army” – will be decisive for the further actions of the Ukrainian forces in the war, which, without exaggeration, is shaping a new world order.

Successes of Ukraine in 2022
Immediately after the start of large-scale Russian military aggression on February 24, 2022, Ukraine proved that it can provide quite effective resistance. During the first year of the war, Russian troops were pushed out of the central and northern regions of Ukraine. In September, the Ukrainian army launched a successful counter-offensive in the east, liberating most of the Kharkiv region. In November, Kherson was liberated in the south – the only regional center that the Russian army managed to occupy after February 24. Subsequently, a bridgehead was created on the left bank of the Dnipro River, which is of great strategic importance. At the beginning of 2023, Valeriy Zaluzhny, the then Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, summed up the results of 2022, in which, in particular, he noted that the Ukrainian military had liberated 40% of the territories occupied by the Russians since the beginning of their large-scale invasion. This was done without any serious support for land forces with aircraft, long-range missiles, and in conditions of a shortage of artillery systems and ammunition.
Ukraine’s successes in the naval theater of war deserve special attention. In addition to liberating the Snake Island and gas platforms in the Black Sea, the Ukrainian military inflicted heavy losses on the Russian Black Sea Fleet. The sinking of the Moskva missile cruiser in April 2022 was just the beginning: today the number of destroyed Russian military vessels is approaching 30.

Positive expectations and problems of 2023
Having positive experience in the liberation of territory occupied by the Russians in 2022, it was natural that Ukrainians and the democratic societies that support them had positive expectations for 2023. However, the military campaign of 2023 was completely different. The size of the territory liberated from the Russians in 2023, in particular, due to the summer counter-offensive of the Ukrainian army, was not as expected. There are several reasons for this.
Firstly, the promised military assistance from Ukraine’s partners was limited and extended over time, which was due to the existence among them of the belief that “Putin should not be provoked by providing Ukraine with weapons.” The consequence of this belief was that by the time the counteroffensive began, the Ukrainian army did not have an advantage in the air, and experienced a shortage of air defense systems and mine clearance vehicles. It also lacked long-range weapons, and the cluster munitions sent by the United States were provided too late and in small quantities. It is safe to say that if at the start of the counteroffensive the Ukrainian army already had, for instance, F-16 aircraft or ATACMS and TAURUS missiles, its course and consequences would have been completely different.
Secondly, the expectation of the arrival of the promised weapons and the completion of the training and armament of new units forced the Ukrainian command to postpone the counteroffensive. This gave the Russians time to replenish their reserves and prepare a line of defense in the direction of a possible main Ukrainian attack. In practice, this meant hundreds of kilometers of continuous trenches, bunkers, pillboxes, earth-and-timber emplacement, individual strongholds, etc. Ahead of their military positions along the front, Russian troops placed a dense layer of anti-personnel and anti-tank mines, which Ukrainian sappers had to sweep under the constant supervision of Russian UAVs, and as a result, by artillery and army aviation fire.
In addition, the open, flat terrain in the south, where the main impact of the Ukrainian counteroffensive took place, did not allow for covert actions, especially with Russia using its entire reconnaissance capabilities and immediately responding with fire to any advance of Ukrainian forces.
The lack of modern aircraft with appropriate weapons in the Ukrainian army affects not only its offensive capabilities but also its defensive ones. Although Russian tactical aviation rarely approaches the front line, it operates quite effectively from a “safe distance.” This efficiency is achieved thanks to a unified planning and correction module installed on aircraft bombs and allowing them to be launched from a distance of 50-70 km. These are guided aerial bombs (GBs) that have become one of the biggest problems for the Ukrainian army, and at the same time are the basis of the advances and achievements of the Russians during the 2023 military campaign. Remaining inaccessible to man-portable anti-aircraft systems, Russian aircraft drop GBs on Ukrainian fortified areas, after which FPV drones and assault groups are used. This situation can be changed, for example, by the F-16 aircraft, which carries AIM 120 AMRAAM air-to-air missiles and is capable of hitting targets at a distance of 70 to 120 km (depending on the modification). Delay in their transfer to Ukraine will lead not only to increased losses among the Ukrainian military but also to the continuation of the Russians’ destruction of Ukrainian cities and villages. The latest vivid example of this is Avdiivka.
Along with the abovementioned, it should be noted that at the end of the year, the Ukrainian army began to experience problems with weapons and ammunition supplies, which is a consequence of the political struggle in one of Ukraine’s main partners – the United States. European partners say they will continue to support Ukraine in the coming months, even if US funding for Ukraine declines. At the same time, it is obvious that they will not be able to completely substitute the American share of military support. Therefore, the resumption of military support from the United States is critical for Ukraine. The Russians, on the contrary, were able to establish a stable line of supply of weapons and ammunition from their allies in the “axis of evil” – Iran and North Korea, who understand that their fate largely depends on their support for Russia in the war against Ukraine.

Prospects for 2024
The consequence of the difficult situation at the front and with support from its partners was that Ukraine was forced to switch to strategic defense by the beginning of this year. The Russians, on the contrary, are trying to take maximum advantage of the “shell hunger” of the Ukrainian troops and are making attempts to advance on several sectors of the front.
At the same time, Ukraine’s transition to strategic defense does not mean that in 2024 it will not have the opportunity to resume its offensive operations. However, for this to happen, at least one of two conditions must be met: quantitative advantage or technological dominance. As for the first, it will be very difficult to achieve it in a confrontation with Russia, which has much greater mobilization resources and huge military warehouses. But as for the second, here Ukraine has chances. Moreover, the Ukrainian army has repeatedly shown that by having modern weapons such as high-precision missiles and artillery shells, unmanned platforms, reconnaissance, and electronic warfare equipment, as well as well-trained personnel, it can defeat one of the strongest armies in the world. Many foreign-made systems provided to Ukraine have demonstrated their effectiveness on the battlefield and superiority over Russian ones. A very illustrative example of the effective use of modern weapons is the current situation in the Black Sea. By the way, the Russians themselves acknowledge this. “Not a single Crimean port is safe for Russian warships anymore. Ukraine ejected the fleet from Crimea,” said Ruslan Pukhov, director of the Centre for Analysis of Strategies and Technologies in Moscow.
Significant changes at the front in favor of the Ukrainian army are possible if it has at its disposal a sufficient number of modern aircraft, long-range artillery systems, MLRS and shells, long-range missiles such as ATACMS, Storm Shadow/SCALP, TAURUS, and UAVs for various purposes. At the same time, not only the range of weapons and ammunition supplied to the Ukrainian army will remain of key importance, but also that this is done on time and in the required quantities.
Another important aspect on which the work of both Ukraine and its partners should be intensified is compliance with the imposed and adoption of new sanctions. A serious mechanism must be put in place to monitor and prevent violations of the sanctions regime by third countries. This will block not only the supply channels for components necessary for Russian enterprises to manufacture weapons but also financial revenues to the Russian budget, from which the war against Ukraine is financed.
To summarize, it should be noted that Russia does not intend to end the war it started. During a TV conference on December 14, Vladimir Putin said that Russia will continue to fight until all its goals are achieved. His defense minister, Sergei Shoigu, later confirmed that Russian troops would continue fighting in Ukraine and “fulfill all the tasks” their president set for them. The Ukrainians, for their part, have repeatedly proven that they can defeat the Russian army and destroy the plans of its president. However, to do this in the future, the following formula must work: “More weapons, more new technologies for Ukraine + effective sanctions for Russia.” Ukrainian partners must reject all illusions and fears about Putin’s Russia and understand that their delay or refusal to support Ukraine harms not only it but also creates the preconditions for expanding the offensive of the modern “axis of evil” on the civilized, democratic world. Stopping this offensive means a more stable and secure world for our generation and future ones.

Igor Fedyk

Head of the South Eastern Europe Section

Igor coordinates the South Eastern Europe Section of the New Geopolitics Research Network. He previously worked as the Head of the Balkan section of the Center for Army, Conversion and Disarmament Studies, as well as the Deputy Editor-in-chief of the English-language magazine The Ukrainian Defense Review.

His current research interests are focused on the political, economic and social aspects of the development of the South Eastern Europe and Balkan countries, their interstate and inter-ethnic relations, as well as the relations with third parties (countries not from the region, international organizations), which have an important impact on the situation in the region and in Europe.

He is the author of a number of articles and analyses in various Ukrainian and foreign Media.

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