Igor FedykOn 15 April, the Second Black Sea Security Conference of the International Crimea Platform was held in Bulgaria’s capital Sofia.
The co-organizers of the event were the Ministries of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine and Bulgaria and the Ministries of Defense of Ukraine and Bulgaria, in partnership with the Ukrainian Center for Defense Strategies.
Delegations of 43 states and 9 international organizations took part in the event – at the level of ministers, heads of international organizations, and their deputies, as well as representatives of the diplomatic corps accredited in Bulgaria.
The main topics for discussion at it were joint efforts for safeguarding stability in the challenging geopolitical landscape, Ukraine’s military strategy for winning the battle for the Black Sea, and the participation of international organizations in ensuring stability in it.
In general, two main conclusions can be drawn from what was seen and heard at the conference.
1. The conference fully fulfilled its function as one of the means of keeping the topic of Russian military aggression against Ukraine, and in particular, in the Black Sea, as well as the need for continued comprehensive support of Ukrainian state, in the focus of the international community’s attention. This is evidenced by both the wide international representation at the event and the statements made by its participants.
2. Despite the large number of lofty and definitely right words of Ukraine’s international partners about the need to support it and oppose Russia’s aggressive behavior, it is obvious that NATO and its leading Black Sea state, Turkey, are not ready to turn them into extraordinary and bold steps.
For instance, Basat Öztürk, the Director General for International Security Affairs of Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Turkey, noted that when it comes to the Black Sea, everyone needs to be realistic about its characteristics, namely, that control over its straits is exercised by Turkey and that in this matter it will be guided by the mechanisms provided to it Montreux Convention.
For his part, Rear Admiral Refik Levent Tezcan, the Deputy Director General for Defense and Security of the Ministry of Defense of Turkey, noted that Turkey is not going to change its policy in the Black Sea, because it could be dangerous. “If there is a NATO presence in the Black Sea and Russia launches an aasault against one of the NATO ships, then what will happen? Then NATO will have to respond to Russia, and this already means a NATO war against Russia…Turkey constantly emphasizes that more [military] ships in the Black Sea do not mean more peace. This increases the tension. Russia perceives this as a threat. Therefore, Turkey is against it,” Refik Tezcan said and added that any step in the Black Sea “must take into account comprehensive and sincere consultations among the Black Sea allies.”
Commenting on the prospect of developing the specific NATO Black Sea strategy, Basat Öztürk noted that such a strategy is, in fact, defined in paragraph 79 of the Vilnius Summit Communiqué, which consists in supporting NATO’s regional efforts aimed at supporting security, stability and freedom of navigation using the provisions of the Montreux Convention. He named the Turkish-Bulgarian-Romanian initiative to create the trilateral Mine Countermeasures Black Sea task force as one of the concrete examples of the implementation of this strategy. It is important to note that Turkey’s position on the issue of strengthening NATO’s naval presence in the Black Sea and the development of the Alliance’s Black Sea strategy was generally supported by Angus Lapsley, NATO’s Assistant Secretary General for Defense Policy and planning, because this gives an understanding that Turkey’s position is essentially a reflection of the general consensus in the Alliance regarding these issues. In particular, the Secretary General’s Assistant noted that Turkey’s application of the provisions of the Montreux Convention has positive consequences for the strategic balance in the Black Sea and that NATO still does not have a specific Black Sea strategy, because Black Sea is already part of the Alliance’s wider strategy.