Mykhailo SamusAt the moment, the situation around Ukraine is characterized by an extreme aggravation of the main destructive factors:
– maximum pressure of the Russian armed forces on the frontline;
– Russia’s targeted missile attacks on civilian infrastructure;
– belated US assistance to Ukraine;
– Russia’s intensive information and psychological operations against both Ukraine and the West.
The situation is aggravated by the persistence of negative aspects of the ineffective mobilization system, which, even after the adoption of the new law, including as a result of active information and psychological attacks by Russia, is still unable to effectively fulfill the task of rapidly increasing the number of personnel of the Armed Forces of Ukraine.
The aggravation of the situation in the current period can be explained by the concentration of Russia’s efforts to achieve a breakthrough at the front during the so-called “window of opportunity” created by the delay in the US Congress’ decision to allocate aid to Ukraine. The Russian leadership managed to predict (having received information in time about the high probability of “turbulence” in the Congress for a long time) a significant shortage of ammunition, missiles for air and missile defense systems and other basic elements of the Ukrainian Armed Forces’ potential due to the lack of US support.
From a military point of view, the composition, potential and nature of the Russian Armed Forces groups involved in offensive operations against Ukraine indicate their ability to attempt tactical breakthroughs in certain areas of the frontline in Donetsk region in May-June 2024. In addition, the Russian Armed Forces may conduct several distracting tactical actions on the Kharkiv and Sumy directions. In these circumstances, the speed of the US and European assistance to the front line of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, as well as the quality of command and coordination of Ukrainian troops will be critical.
Russia’s plan
The intention of the Russian leadership may be to achieve maximum results on the frontline in 2024 (optimally, complete occupation of Donetsk and Luhansk regions; at most, to create conditions for entering the operational space for further advancement deeper into Ukraine and creating opportunities for a second offensive on Kharkiv, Sumy, Chernihiv, and Kyiv) in order to convince the new US president (in early 2025) that it is inexpedient to continue supporting Ukraine and that it is necessary to start “peace talks” on Russia’s terms.
It is likely that the Russian leadership understands that the new US president will be interested in ending the Russian-Ukrainian war, which will not be a defining track of either foreign or domestic policy agenda for him. The main focus of the new US president’s activities may be aimed at counteracting China’s further growth. Efforts to change the global economic model (through the “reindustrialization” of the United States in the context of the new technological revolution and the corresponding deprivation of China’s status as a “world economic powerhouse”) are likely to be the main focus of the next US president. Under such circumstances, a hypothetical pulling of Russia to the side of the United States (in order to weaken China) could become one of the activities of the new US administration.
In its turn, Russia, clearly understanding the current mood in the American establishment, hopes to use it to realize its own goals both in the war against Ukraine and to achieve its main goal – to restore its position as a “global pole of power.” The general idea of the Russian leadership may be to achieve a breakthrough on the frontline in the face of a shortage of Western aid for Ukraine and, at the time of the inauguration of the new US president (January 2025), to offer him to “quickly solve the problem with Ukraine” by forcing President Zelenskyy to “peace talks” (but in reality, to surrender on Russia’s terms).
The main target is the internal conflict in Ukraine
At the same time, in fact, Russia’s intention is not just to sign Ukraine’s surrender, but to create conditions for an internal armed conflict that will lead to the destruction of the Ukrainian nation and state.
Russia expects to achieve this by initiating negotiations with Ukraine, believing that any intention of the Ukrainian leadership to start negotiations with Russia will be perceived by the majority of Ukrainian citizens as a betrayal of their interests and nation. Accordingly, (as a result of Russia’s active information, psychological and other special measures) conditions could be created for an armed confrontation within Ukraine both between supporters of different political groups, and between armed formations (on the one hand, parts of the Ukrainian Defense Forces that will remain loyal to the President, on the other – parts that will consider themselves betrayed).
It is on the internal destabilization and destruction of Ukraine that Russia is counting, since even in the most favorable scenario, the Russian Armed Forces will not be able to gain decisive victories on the front and destroy Ukraine in the medium term. Therefore, Russia will focus its main efforts on weakening the internal unity and resilience of the Ukrainian nation.
Russia is counting on the internal destabilization and destruction of Ukraine, because even in the most favorable scenario, the Russian Armed Forces will not be able to win decisive victories on the front and destroy Ukraine in the medium term. Therefore, Russia will focus its main efforts on weakening the internal unity and resilience of the Ukrainian nation.
In particular, information and psychological operations of the Russian Federation can play an important role, which can be based on the following main narratives: “Ukraine is a dictatorial regime”; “Ukraine is a prison that keeps its citizens behind bars. Everyone needs to flee”; “Zelenskyi is a dictator who benefits from the war because he can avoid holding elections”; “It is better to be a fugitive than to die for the Zelenskyi regime”; “Children of MPs and politicians are having fun abroad, while ordinary Ukrainians are dying at the front”, etc.
At the same time, it is the theme of “repressive mobilization” and “Zelenskyy’s illegitimacy” that may be central to Russian efforts to undermine the situation in Ukraine. The so-called Maidan-3 plan of the Russian special services is likely to be based on these approaches.