How does Ukraine influence the electoral campaign in Moldova?

Uzdrisch Constantin, political scientist, journalist Romanian Public Television Chișinău

On October 20, 2024, the citizens of the Republic of Moldova are expected to go to the polls to elect their president for the next four years. In addition to the president, Moldovans will also be asked if they want the Constitution to be amended so that European integration becomes a state priority.

Despite being a small state and, according to several statistics, the poorest in Europe, 11 candidates are vying for the top position, from the main political parties to independent candidates. Even though the country faces many internal problems, the war in Ukraine is one of the favorite topics of the candidates in the election race. In fact, these elections resemble more of a match of one against eight, with two moderate candidates. The one who must face the eight is the current head of state, Maia Sandu.

Maia Sandu, Party of Action and Solidarity (PAS): She became president in 2020, and in 2021 secured a comfortable majority for the party she created. She came to power with an anti-corruption and anti-oligarchic rhetoric. During her first term, Maia Sandu promised a complete reform of the judiciary, the eradication of corruption, and the de-oligarchization of the country. Her plans were disrupted by the Russian invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022; at least, this has become Maia Sandu’s and the governing party’s most frequent excuse. It is true that since February 24, 2022, the Republic of Moldova has faced a large wave of Ukrainian refugees fleeing the war. Shortly after, the energy crisis began, and Moldova risked freezing due to the lack of electricity, which was mostly purchased from Ukraine, and more critically, the absence of natural gas. It was during Maia Sandu’s term that Moldova began buying gas on European markets. The biggest criticism from citizens towards Maia Sandu’s term is the incomplete judicial reform, which stalled at the vetting and pre-vetting stages. Additionally, the PAS government and Maia Sandu’s leadership have been marred by some corruption scandals, which, even though they do not directly involve the president, implicate key members of her governing team. Among her achievements, Maia Sandu claims to have ensured peace and obtained EU candidate status. Indirectly, Maia Sandu references Ukraine here, as it was thanks to the Russian invasion that the EU decided to open its doors to Moldova.

The candidate who the polls place in second place is Alexandr Stoianoglo, former General Prosecutor and former deputy in the Democratic Party, who also served alongside the oligarch Vlad Plahotniuc. Stoianoglo received the General Prosecutor’s mandate from the hands of the former pro-Russian president Igor Dodon, who became notorious during his term for receiving bags of money from oligarch Plahotniuc and for his numerous visits to Moscow (Dodon is currently on trial for multiple corruption cases, illicit enrichment, and high treason). Stoianoglo is also under investigation in several cases and is currently on trial. He is also known for his role in the release of the number one raider in the CIS, Veaceslav Platon, who had previously been extradited from Ukraine. Stoianoglo avoids discussing the war in Ukraine but says that the situation is not very clear and that there isn’t only one side to blame. Stoianoglo is the candidate nominated by the Socialist Party of Moldova, a party that collaborates closely with parliamentary parties in Moscow. Previously, the entire PSRM parliamentary faction went on a “pilgrimage” to the Russian State Duma. The Socialists, like their candidate, avoid talking about the Russian invasion of Ukraine and argue that Moldova should remain friendly with Russia.

Another candidate with strong ties to Moscow, at least in the recent past, is Renato Usatîi. He entered Moldovan politics 10 years ago, presenting himself as a businessman connected to Russian Railways, which was then headed by Vladimir Yakunin, a close associate of Vladimir Putin. Usatîi has not yet managed to secure any high-ranking political office in Chișinău, with the highest public position he held being the mayor of Bălți, the second-largest city after Chișinău. Although he condemned the Russian invasion of Ukraine, Usatîi is among the politicians who claim that Moscow is not solely to blame for the war.

Vladimir Voronin’s Communists have remembered the one who was prime minister during the Communist government from 2001 to 2007, Vasile Tarlev. The former prime minister was one of the main guests at the launch of the “Eurasia Platform” held in Moscow. Tarlev was decorated by Vladimir Putin with the Order of Friendship.

Another candidate who has not spoken about the war in Ukraine is Irina Vlah, the former governor of the Gagauz Autonomous Region. During her two terms as governor, Vlah was one of the fiercest promoters of “friendship with Russia.”

The candidate openly promoting Moscow’s narratives is Victoria Furtună. A former prosecutor, Furtună became publicly known after being dismissed from the Anti-Corruption Prosecutor’s Office. Investigative journalism during the election campaign has shown that Furtună is the candidate of Ilan Shor, an oligarch sentenced to 14 years in prison who is now in Moscow. It was Shor who created the “Victoria-Победа” Electoral Bloc, generously funded by the Kremlin. Victoria Furtună entered the electoral campaign with a white dove and launched her campaign in Tiraspol, under the eyes of the pro-Russian separatist regime there. Furtună accuses Maia Sandu of wanting to drag Moldova into the war and claims she has an agreement with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky to attack Transnistria. This narrative has been promoted by Russian propaganda since the Ukrainian army’s liberation of Kharkiv. Victoria Furtună is also supported by a large part of the priests of the Moldovan Orthodox Church, which is under the Patriarchate of Moscow. Bishops like Markel of Bălți have directly campaigned in favor of Victoria Furtună.

Regardless of what visions one candidate or another may have, almost all of them have used Russia’s war against Ukraine to their advantage. Some have justified their failures, while others have justified the money coming from Moscow. The result of the presidential elections will be a new impetus for the Kremlin to adjust its electoral technologies for the parliamentary elections in July 2025.

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