Ruben Mehrabyan
Ruben Megrabyan, The Armenian Institute of International and Security Affairs
The agreement reached between the delegations of Armenia and Azerbaijan on August 30, 2024 to agree on the regulations for further works on delimitation and demarcation of the interstate border is currently undergoing the procedures of domestic approvals prescribed by the constitutions of the countries for full implementation.
As it is known, out of more than 1000 km of the interstate border, a 12-kilometer section in the north between Tavush marz (RA) and Gazakh region (AR) has already been demarcated and occupied by the border guards of the two countries, and it is a question of continuing this process on the basis of the regulations agreed upon by the parties.
The regulations themselves are a set of provisions based on generally accepted international practices derived from international law, largely repeating the relevant international guidelines based on international experience.
According to the Armenian constitution, the regulations were sent by the decision of the government to the Constitutional Court for review for compliance with the Basic Law, after which they should be ratified by the National Assembly. And on September 30, 2024, the Constitutional Court published its 33-page opinion that the agreed regulation complies with the Armenian Constitution. It should also be noted that according to the document, Armenia and Azerbaijan reaffirmed their commitment to the spirit and letter of the 1991 Almaty Declaration, according to which the former administrative border between the former Armenian and Azerbaijani SSRs acquires the status of an interstate border.
Two aspects of the event are noteworthy:
- First, the recognition by the Constitutional Court that this provision is in line with the Constitution, which rejects the various claims made by official Baku regarding the Armenian constitution that it contains alleged “territorial claims to Azerbaijan”,
- and, secondly, the internal political context of this event, which is capable of reformatting the entire domestic policy and political arrangements inside the country towards the 2026 elections (if we consider the further course of events in the sense that the next elections will be regular), which, of course, affects Armenia’s relations with Russia – the country that, in fact, has itself violated the provisions of the Almaty Declaration (in Georgia in 2008, in Ukraine – from 2014 to the present day) and refuses to recognize Armenia’s borders as of 1991, while at the same time making efforts to destabilize Armenia internally, including attempts to use sabotage and terrorist methods.
The issue of official Baku’s reaction deserves a separate consideration and analysis; nevertheless, it is noteworthy that the recognition of the regulations agreed upon by the parties as compliant with the basic law of Armenia should have seemed to exhaust all of Azerbaijan’s concerns regarding the presence of a “hidden agenda” of official Yerevan containing real territorial claims to the neighboring country. However, as subsequent developments have shown, Baku decided not to change its approach and continue to make unacceptable claims to the Armenian Constitution, which is already regarded by Armenia and its Western partners as a far-fetched reason for refusing to sign a peace treaty, at least in the near future.
Let us examine two important aspects of the Constitutional Court’s decision for a better understanding of the subject of analysis.
What is new in the 33-page opinion of the Constitutional Court?
The Declaration of Independence will turn into a “child devouring its parent” if interpreted outside the framework provided by the Constitution, the Constitutional Court judges wrote in a ruling on the regulation of the demarcation of the Armenian-Azerbaijani border and immediately added that “… this document has never pursued the goal of constitutional dualism”. The Constitutional Court of Armenia reviewed and ruled that the provision on border demarcation was in accordance with the Constitution. However, the predominant part of the 33-page decision is not devoted to the demarcation, but to the Declaration of Independence enshrined in the preamble of the Constitution. The Constitutional Court concluded that the provision in the Preamble of the Constitution: “…based on the fundamental principles of Armenian statehood and national goals established in the Declaration of Independence” does not refer to any principle or goal not enshrined in the Constitution.
This extensive decision of the Constitutional Court is published against the backdrop of Baku’s almost daily demands to change the Armenian Constitution. The judges reasoned that they had the declaration in mind because the Constitutional Court does not yet have a “doctrinal position” on how it affects the content of the Constitution. However, Baku considers the Declaration of Independence mentioned in the preamble of the Constitution as problematic on the way to a peace treaty, arguing that it contains territorial claims against Azerbaijan, as the declaration refers to “the reunification of Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh”. This is a joint decision of the Supreme Soviet of the Armenian SSR and the Regional Council of the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast of December 1, 1989, i.e. an intra-Soviet document adopted at the time at the “local” level but later annulled at the “central” level in Moscow.
By the way, the Armenian Prime Minister recently said that if the Constitutional Court of Armenia decides that if the peace treaty contradicts the basic law, constitutional amendments will be required: “If our Constitutional Court decides that the peace treaty with Azerbaijan contradicts the Constitution of the Republic of Armenia (although our experts assure us that this is unlikely), we will face a concrete situation in which constitutional amendments will be required to achieve peace”.
Let us record here the main point: the Constitutional Court of Armenia determined: the Declaration of Independence should not be interpreted outside the framework established by the Constitution of Armenia.
Domestic political developments against the background of the Constitutional Court decision
From the outset, it was obvious that the resolution of the issue of the basis and principles of delimitation and demarcation of the Armenian-Azerbaijani border sharply reduces the room for maneuver in Armenia for the segment of various influence groups of the remnants of the overthrown criminal dictatorship and their structures acting in line with Russian interests, as well as for Moscow itself.
Naturally, the issue could not but become the subject of speculations and the target of various rhetorical techniques on the part of various public figures, directly or indirectly serving the above-mentioned groups of influence. Namely:
Some began to argue that the Constitutional Court is not independent, serving the executive power, which, for its part, is following the groundless claims of official Baku. In response, for example, the Speaker of the National Assembly Alen Simonyan said: “Did the Constitutional Court close the case of Robert Kocharyan by the decision of Azerbaijan?”. This refers to the CC’s decision that the articles under which Robert Kocharyan was accused (in the case of the events of March 1, 2008, etc.) “do not correspond to the Constitution”;
Another, such as a constitutional law expert, argues that the judges of the highest court have in fact found that the Declaration of Independence “has no legal significance”. According to his interpretation, the Constitutional Court is actually saying that the goal of “reunification of Armenia and Artsakh” contained in the Declaration of Independence becomes invalid and the declaration also loses its legal significance. “Simply put, with this decision the Constitutional Court declares that the national goals established in the Declaration of Independence, if they are not enshrined in any way in the text of the Constitution itself, i.e. in articles starting from 1, then they no longer exist,” he states, continuing: ”In fact, the meaning of the Declaration of Independence should have been spoken about, first of all, in connection with the signing of this peace treaty, because this treaty had a direct meaning regarding the independence of Artsakh, its belonging, reunification with Armenia and other related issues. But they already say in advance, in connection with the discussion of the constitutionality of this ruling, that the reference to the reunification of Artsakh in the Declaration of Independence of Armenia has no significance”.
… Whereas the decision of the Constitutional Court, if substantive, is not only final, but also creates a new reality that has nothing to do with the one described by the above circles.
It is also irrelevant to the claims made by official Baku, as described above.
Parallel internal political processes
Armenia’s internal political life in the period under review is characterized by the process of Moscow’s tightening pressure on Yerevan, both directly and through patronized groups of influence inside Armenia in the form of “parties”, “media” and “business”, against the background of the unprecedented rapprochement between Moscow and Baku, which moved to a new stage with Putin’s state visit to Azerbaijan. At the same time, pressure is being counteracted at different levels – state, political, social – in anticipation of multilateral meetings in Moscow (informal CIS summit) and Kazan (informal BRICS summit), where, as already announced, Armenia will participate at the highest level.
The pro-Russian opposition, led by Archbishop Galstanyan, holds its “autumn season” in the square in Yerevan, gathering no more than two or three thousand people in an attempt to revive a project aimed at undermining the negotiation process in general, and the delimitation/demarcation process (“in the name of saving Tavush”) in particular.
On October 2, 2024, after the rally, the archbishop, who led a procession of 300-400 people, went to the Public Television with a demand for a live broadcast to “address the citizens”, and around 23.00 local time the broadcast was provided in a “compromise” format: within the framework of the most watchable political talk show he was given time to “address”, then, by agreement, a dialog with the host in the form of answers to questions was to follow. The evening broadcast, which garnered more than a hundred thousand views, was simply a failure for the entire “opposition” mentioned above, not only for the archbishop, because of its political insubstantiality and lack of any meaning.
At the same time, the expert community still has reasonable fears that Russia will continue to train groups for subversive actions of a forceful nature and the realization of a coup d’état by armed means at the state level (MO, at the training bases involved in the war against Ukraine, and the 102nd base in Gyumri is under its subordination). The political background for such expectations in the run-up to the October multilateral meetings is the public activation of the heads of the Russian intelligence services – the Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) and the Federal Security Service (FSB), under which the border troops on Armenia’s border with Turkey and Iran are subordinated.
Since September 16, 2024, a campaign to collect signatures under the draft law on the beginning of Armenia’s political course towards full membership in the EU has been underway. At this stage, 50 thousand signatures should be collected within two months, after which the bill should be considered in the National Assembly. As of October 6, more than 35 thousand have been collected, which allows predicting that 50 thousand will be collected in one month instead of two. The campaign was organized by three extra-parliamentary political parties and several non-governmental organizations, united for this purpose in the “Platform of Democratic Forces”.
In parallel, the state of implementation of the reform agenda is hotly debated, and there is a perception that the process is often subject to intra-system sabotage, both due to group interests and the unwillingness of the bureaucracy to step out of its comfort zone. There is a perception that the Ministry of Justice was supposed to be the generator of changes in many legal procedures and regulations, whose activity within the framework of this mission began to raise at least a number of questions. Especially since the Ministry was headed by Grigor Minasyan, the brother-in-law of ex-President Serzh Sargsyan’s son-in-law Mikayel Minasyan, and there is a public opinion that the brothers’ political views do not coincide with each other, as well as with his father Ara Minasyan, who is still on the wanted list due to charges of embezzlement of state funds on a large scale.
The situation “exploded” after it was reported that little-known Sirvard Gevorgyan had been appointed by the Prime Minister to the post of Deputy Minister of Justice. The reason for that was a relatively old photo published afterwards, on which this person is pictured in the company of Robert Kocharian’s daughter and former Minister of Justice of the period of Serzh Sargsyan’s rule (they turned out to be classmates), posing with Kocharian’s book at its presentation. Naturally, this raised questions – how could a person with such connections and, accordingly, political leanings be appointed to such a responsible post.
The situation became worse and deeper. As it turned out, Sirvard Gevorgyan was nominated by Minister G. Minasyan to the post of deputy from the post of Secretary General of the Ministry, which she held for three years, and this appointment was a promotion for “good work”. In addition, MPs from the faction of the Civil Contract, which makes up the majority in the parliament, had previously raised questions about another appointment of Minister Minasyan: a former investigator from the group of those who handled the March 1 case (2008) and, as it turned out in the course of the investigation after 2018, were involved in the forgery of material evidence, in particular, the fired cartridge cases from automatic rifles, was appointed as the head of the Penitentiary Service. All reproaches were answered by the reply that they were “good specialists who are currently committed to the reform agenda”, which, of course, not only looked unconvincing, but inevitably became an irritant, and the breakup of the political team with the minister became inevitable.
Information appeared that MPs were collecting signatures under an appeal to Prime Minister N. Pashinyan with a proposal (with justifications) to dismiss Minister Minasyan. And on October 2, Minasian resigned, which N. Pashinyan immediately accepted, and the new Minister, according to open sources, should be a representative of the political team, as in the case of Defense Minister Suren Papikian, ID Minister Ararat Mirzoyan, Economy Minister Gevorg Papoyan and others. One can conclude that a trend has emerged – replacement of a number of key officials – “apolitical professionals” by political appointees.
At the same time, the strengthening of new structures such as anti-corruption bodies (courts, committee), public pressure on the Prosecutor’s Office and the expectation of more in the fight against corruption and crimes of officials made it possible for the Prosecutor General’s Office to appeal against court decisions to close cases against such persons as Robert Kocharyan, Serzh Sargsyan, etc.; then the decision of the Court of Cassation to reopen these cases, but already in the Anti-Corruption Court, a new structure where the influence of interest groups is minimal.
In addition, there is a consensus in the society and political class that the state institutions in their current state are unable to adequately respond to the challenges generated by Russia in coordination with Azerbaijan and the local “fifth column”, and in strengthening them – increasing their stress resistance and capacity building – it is determined who are the friends and enemies of Armenian statehood.