NGRNWhat Stake Does Moscow Still Have in Chișinău?
Uzdrisch Constantin, political scientist, journalist Romanian Public Television Chișinău
On October 20, 2024, the Republic of Moldova held a constitutional referendum asking citizens whether the country should amend its Constitution to formalize Moldova’s intention to join the European Union (EU). The goal was to prevent future governments from derailing the country from its pro-European path. Contrary to expectations, the referendum narrowly passed with 50.35% voting Yes and 49.65% voting No. Why was this outcome surprising? Let me explain.
The Unexpected Narrow Margin
Pre-election polls had indicated that over 54% of voters would support the referendum. However, those opposing it, guided by the Kremlin, focused on sabotaging the vote. Their initial strategy was to encourage a boycott, but when it became clear that the turnout threshold would be met, they switched to mobilizing a No vote. It is particularly strange that the difference between the Yes and No votes was so small, considering that over a million Moldovan citizens also hold EU passports (primarily Romanian, Bulgarian, Italian, French, or Portuguese).
Lessons from the Referendum
Although hailed as a political and geopolitical victory, the narrow margin left a bitter aftertaste in Chișinău. The authorities have already alleged that 300,000 votes were fraudulently purchased by criminal groups and political factions coordinated by Moscow, particularly the Șor group, led by Ilan Șor, an oligarch sentenced to 14 years for bank fraud who now resides in Moscow.
Pro-Kremlin factions opposed the referendum from the start, opting either to boycott or vote No. Meanwhile, pro-European forces, including the Party of Action and Solidarity (PAS), focused primarily on the presidential elections and neglected the referendum. PAS supporters assumed that the referendum and Maia Sandu’s reelection were assured without much campaigning. This complacency cost them in both the presidential race and the referendum.
Initiated by Maia Sandu, the referendum was seen as a personal project of the ruling administration. Some voters interpreted it not as a national question, but as a plebiscite on PAS governance, casting a No vote to express dissatisfaction with the current leadership. PAS has faced erosion of public trust, particularly as Moldova has endured multiple crises since 2021:
- Energy crisis: Russia’s gas supply blackmail.
- War and refugee crisis: Moldova sheltered hundreds of thousands of Ukrainian refugees fleeing Putin’s invasion.
- Economic crisis: Skyrocketing inflation is driven by war and disruptions to regional logistics.
The government’s failure to provide solutions or effective leadership exacerbated public frustration. Many PAS officials were accused of continuing corrupt schemes from the oligarchic regime of Vladimir Plahotniuc, and local PAS leaders behaved like “regional barons” after consolidating power. Adding to these challenges, PAS struggled to counter Moscow’s narratives against the referendum.
Moscow’s Tactics
The Kremlin deployed two primary strategies: boycott and No-vote mobilization, using several narratives:
- “Do you want Moldova to end up like Ukraine?”
This fear-based narrative warned that a Yes vote would provoke Putin to invade Moldova, as he did Ukraine in 2022. - Traditional Values vs. European Values
Russia exploited Moldova’s Orthodox Christianity, emphasizing resistance to EU-promoted values, such as LGBT rights, which Moscow framed as a threat to traditional family structures. - “Moldovans will become Europe’s slaves”
This narrative claimed that EU membership would ruin Moldova’s economy, particularly its agriculture, citing protests from EU farmers over Ukrainian grain imports. - Vote to buy through Ilan Șor’s networks
Parties controlled by Șor, such as Șansă and Renaissance, were heavily involved in directly purchasing votes to ensure a No outcome.
Unfortunately, PAS and other pro-European parties failed to effectively counter these attacks. As a result, many Moldovans were left confused and unable to grasp the referendum’s true significance.
What’s Moscow’s Agenda in Chișinău Now?
At this stage, Moscow’s objective is to position Alexandr Stoianoglo, a former MP under the Democratic Party of oligarch Vlad Plahotniuc and former Prosecutor General, as Moldova’s next president. While Stoianoglo tries to distance himself from Russian influence, his candidacy is backed by the Socialist Party, which maintains close coordination with the Kremlin.
On October 27, 2024, Stoianoglo faced Maia Sandu in the first presidential debate. He performed poorly, resorting to offensive and false statements targeting the EU, Romania, and Ukraine. Stoianoglo’s claims reflected familiar pro-Kremlin rhetoric:
- Gas imports from Russia: Stoianoglo falsely claimed that Moldova still consumes Russian gas via intermediaries. This statement had been previously promoted by socialist leader Igor Dodon but was debunked by Energocom officials, who provided evidence that Moldova sources gas from non-Russian suppliers.
- Infrastructure development: Stoianoglo criticized the lack of infrastructure projects under Sandu’s government, but Sandu refuted this, citing numerous projects, including the “European Village” initiative, which has benefited over a million citizens. In 2024 alone, the government approved 612 projects worth 2.8 billion lei.
- Investment from Romania: Stoianoglo claimed that no regional investment projects had been undertaken with Romania, which Maia Sandu dismissed as false. Over the past three decades, Romania has funded numerous infrastructure projects in Moldova, including bridges, kindergartens, cultural programs, and school buses.
- Connections with Veaceslav Platon: Stoianoglo denied having ties to controversial businessman Veaceslav Platon. However, investigative reports reveal that his wife has held stakes in Platon-affiliated companies. A 2020 video even showed Stoianoglo addressing Platon with the familiar greeting “Privet, Slava!”, suggesting a personal relationship.
- Misleading narratives about NATO and EU membership: Stoianoglo implied that EU accession would automatically mean NATO membership, a claim that Sandu dismissed as misleading. She clarified that Romania joined NATO three years before becoming an EU member, and the two processes are unrelated.
- Ethnic minority rights and Romanian citizenship: Stoianoglo made a baffling statement suggesting that only a Romanian citizen could protect minority rights in Moldova. Whether this was a slip or deliberate rhetoric, it is unlikely to resonate well with his supporters.
- Turkey and sanctions against Russia: Stoianoglo criticized Turkey for not aligning with Western sanctions on Russia. However, Stanislav Secrieru, a defence and security advisor to President Sandu, noted that Turkey, despite not officially adopting sanctions, avoids economic dealings that could jeopardize its access to Western markets and has actively supported Ukraine through arms supplies.
The Road Ahead: Parliamentary Elections in 2025
While the presidential election is a key battle, the most critical confrontation will occur during the 2025 parliamentary elections. Moldova is a parliamentary republic, meaning that real power lies with the parliament and government. Russia will likely use the same tactics it tested during the referendum to influence the outcome of the 2025 elections. The stakes are high, and Moscow’s interest in keeping Moldova within its sphere of influence remains as strong as ever.
In conclusion, the debates between Alexandr Stoianoglo and Maia Sandu have exposed numerous falsehoods and contradictions in Stoianoglo’s campaign. As Moldova continues its journey toward European integration, the importance of tangible results will outweigh populist promises or unfounded accusations. However, the real test will come in 2025, when Moldova’s parliamentary elections will determine the country’s long-term direction. Moscow has learned from its past mistakes and is likely preparing for an even more intense struggle for influence in Chișinău.