Igor FedykRecently, concerns about a potential escalation of tensions in the Balkans have become increasingly prevalent. The primary driver of these concerns lies in Serbia’s active military rearmament, coupled with the nationalist rhetoric emanating from its political elites. This rhetoric is perceived by neighboring countries as indicative of ambitions to establish a so-called ‘Serbian World’ in the region, potentially even through the use of military force. But is the threat from Serbia really as serious as it is portrayed?
Is Belgrade Willing to Take Risks for the Sake of the ‘Serbian World’?
When discussing the Serbian army’s active rearmament—something that has raised concerns among Serbia’s neighbors—it is important to recognize that this process is not entirely unusual. Serbia’s neighbors, including Croatia, Slovenia, Montenegro, Albania, and North Macedonia, are NATO members and can rely on external assistance in the event of military aggression. These countries are also increasing their military budgets and modernizing their arsenals.
In contrast, Serbia is officially a neutral country and can depend only on itself. As such, it not only has the right but also the obligation to ensure an adequate level of security and defense for itself.
Although, the necessity of Serbia’s military buildup is questioned by many within the country itself. Critics argue that Serbia, surrounded almost entirely by NATO member states—which currently have no aggressive intentions toward it—faces little real external threat. Any potential confrontation would likely stem from Serbia’s own aggressive actions, and in such a scenario, Serbia would stand no chance against NATO’s overwhelming power.
Moreover, Serbia would find itself largely isolated in such a conflict. Russia, often portrayed as a close ally, is deeply entangled in Ukraine and incapable of offering significant support in terms of weapons or manpower. Similarly, China’s interests lie far from enabling a potential war in the Balkans. Beijing prioritizes stability in the region to safeguard trade routes, such as the Pan-European Transport Corridor 10, which facilitates the movement of goods from Greek ports to central Europe. And it is for this reason that Beijing is lobbying for the development of infrastructure for Pan-European Transport Corridor 10 in North Macedonia, which, in turn, harms Corridor 8, which Skopje should implement in the interests of ensuring NATO military mobility.
It is worth questioning whether Belgrade itself has any genuine interest in war. Speaking of a ‘Serbian world’ is one thing, but turning this idea into reality—especially through military aggression—is an entirely different matter.
Any use of force against a neighboring NATO member would instantly activate Article 5, compelling the Alliance to respond with its full military capability. The same applies to any aggression against Kosovo, where NATO’s KFOR mission is stationed. Last autumn, KFOR increased its presence to over 4,500 troops, bolstered with additional heavy weaponry.
Back in 2022, NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg warned Serbian leadership against harsh actions toward Kosovo. “Our KFOR peacekeeping mission remains focused on its UN mandate: Should stability be jeopardized, KFOR stands ready to intervene,” Stoltenberg stated during a meeting with Serbian President Aleksandar Vucic.
Another critical factor discouraging Serbia from military action against its neighbors is its relationship with the European Union. As an EU candidate country, Serbia enjoys several benefits, including access to EU funds and financial support mechanisms. While its progress toward membership has been more rhetorical than practical, the advantages of candidate status are significant.
Most importantly, Serbia’s trade relations with the EU are vital to its economy. Although Belgrade often emphasizes its partnerships with Moscow and Beijing, the EU remains its primary trading partner. For instance, last year, the EU accounted for 60% of Serbia’s total trade. This economic lifeline would be at serious risk if Belgrade attempted to emulate actions like Putin’s invasion of Ukraine.
Serbia faces a clear choice: continue trading with the EU and develop as a stable, prosperous European state, or pursue a reckless military adventure, resulting in international isolation and severe political and economic consequences.
Dodik’s Separatist Rhetoric: All Talk, No Action
As for Milorad Dodik’s blackmail by secession of Republika Srpska from Bosnia and Herzegovina, which, if implemented, could lead to a new war, he has not yet gone beyond his threats. And there are clear reasons why.
Despite his frequent declarations about secession, Dodik is well aware of the practical barriers to achieving this goal. He lacks the necessary legal powers, and his ambitions are counterbalanced by the presence of the High Representative in Sarajevo and the Bosniak and Croat members of Bosnia and Herzegovina’s Presidency, who hold veto rights. Moreover, Dodik’s rhetoric does not enjoy the full backing of Republika Srpska’s key political parties, who understand the catastrophic consequences such a move could entail. Economically, Republika Srpska is ill-equipped to survive separation. Isolation, sanctions, widespread poverty, and internal instability would render it unviable as an independent entity. In this case, Dodik could quickly lose his power. And power is the only thing that interests him today.
Should Republika Srpska attempt unilateral secession, any ensuing military conflict would almost certainly not work in Dodik’s favor. The EUFOR mission maintains a presence in Bosnia and Herzegovina, including in Republika Srpska, and the balance of military power heavily favors Sarajevo. Bosnia and Herzegovina boasts professional armed forces, whereas Republika Srpska relies solely on its police force.
For now, Dodik’s separatist agenda seems more about posturing than real action, designed to consolidate his grip on power rather than risk its loss through a futile gamble.
In the event of an escalation, Banja Luka would find itself completely isolated from any external military support. Despite its professed solidarity, Belgrade is unlikely to risk direct intervention, as doing so would label Serbia as the aggressor, bringing about the very consequences previously discussed. Meanwhile, Sarajevo would have a legitimate right to seek international assistance, putting Republika Srpska at an even greater disadvantage.
Dodik’s separatist rhetoric, therefore, serves primarily as a tool for domestic consumption. It enables him to maintain his popularity within Republika Srpska, ensuring his grip on power without taking the dangerous steps his rhetoric implies.
As a result, fears of an imminent construction of a ‘Serbian World’ in the Balkans or military aggression by Belgrade against its neighbors are somewhat overstated. However, this does not mean that the nationalist rhetoric emanating from Belgrade or Banja Luka, nor Serbia’s military rearmament, should be ignored. These developments demand careful monitoring and swift, measured responses to prevent the moment when the ‘Serbian World’ could transition from a fringe nationalist idea into a tangible threat—not only to the Balkan region but to European stability as a whole.