Tetiana IshchykUkrainian expert Yuriy Kostenko, a five-term Member of Parliament of Ukraine (1990–2012), author of the book The History of Ukraine’s Nuclear Disarmament, and head of the Ukrainian People’s Party, explained the role of China in military-technical cooperation with Iran, Russia, and North Korea in a commentary for the New Geopolitics Research Network (NGRN).
According to Kostenko, Russia is not a sufficiently strong player economically or technologically and requires assistance from other states. He argues that China, North Korea, and Iran have emerged as major supporters of Russia.
While China has so far refrained from providing lethal weapons to Russia due to its economic dependence on the West, North Korea and Iran, which are under UN and Western sanctions, face fewer restrictions and therefore openly supply arms and even troops to Russia.
Between 2022 and 2024, China repeatedly advocated for peaceful resolutions but simultaneously continued providing substantial financial and technological support to Russia. For instance, Russia imports approximately 70% of its machinery and 90% of its microelectronics from China. Beijing also exports dual-use goods to Russia worth over $300 million monthly, including products for the Russian defense industry. In May, the United States imposed sanctions on about 20 Chinese and Hong Kong companies for exporting drone components and helping Moscow bypass Western sanctions on other technologies. Additionally, trade volumes between the two nations have soared. According to China’s official data, Sino-Russian trade reached a record $240 billion in 2023, marking a 64% increase since 2021.
NATO, in its 2024 Washington Summit Declaration, described China as a “decisive enabler” of Russia’s war against Ukraine. In response, Moscow has transferred submarine, stealth aviation, and missile technologies to Beijing.
Kostenko believes that China benefits from the continuation of Russia’s war against Ukraine because it draws U.S. and European resources and attention away from the Indo-Pacific. However, he also contends that a total Russian victory would not favor China, as it would strengthen Russia’s military potential and global standing—a development contrary to China’s interests.
This dynamic could provide Ukraine with an opportunity to leverage.
At the same time, Kostenko highlights a significant problem: China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea collectively view the West as an adversary, coordinating efforts to weaken it. China, for example, purchases approximately 1.5 million barrels of oil daily from Iran via various channels and provides fuel, consumer goods, and food aid to North Korea. North Korea, in turn, has supplied Russia with dozens of KN-23 (Hwasong-11A) short-range ballistic missiles and potentially up to 5 million artillery shells, along with sending about 11,000 soldiers. In violation of UN sanctions, Russia supplies North Korea with oil, military technologies, air defense systems, and has decided to deliver MiG-29 and Su-27 fighter jets.
Iran provides Russia with domestically manufactured Shahed-136 drones and has facilitated the establishment of production lines for these drones in the Alabuga Special Economic Zone (Tatarstan), which now produces over 500 units monthly. In return, Russia has reportedly transferred its first Su-35 fighter jets to Iran.
Kostenko concludes that “the cooperation between China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea is systemic,” complicating Ukraine’s efforts to persuade China to align with its stance.
Simultaneously, Kostenko points out that the U.S. will face challenges in implementing the so-called “Nixon 2.0” strategy—improving relations with Russia to counterbalance China. This scenario, elaborated on by Professor Huang Jing of Shanghai International Studies University, examines the potential consequences for China if Donald Trump is reelected as U.S. President. Huang Jing argues that a potential U.S.-Russia agreement on Ukraine, as Trump seeks, could improve U.S.-Russian relations and lay the groundwork for a U.S.-Russia alliance against China.
Nonetheless, Kostenko doubts the feasibility of the “Nixon 2.0” strategy, stating, “The mentality of Russians, which is incapable of fostering friendly relations, will not allow it.”
Author: Tetiana Ishchyk – Intern at the New Geopolitics Research Network.