NGRNMykyta Kuzmenko, NGRN Intern
November 2024 brought back to the international arena a discussion that seemed to have been resolved on December 8, 1987. Then, U.S. President Ronald Reagan and Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev signed an agreement eliminating an entire class of “Doomsday weapons”. Intermediate-range missiles were to disappear from the map of Europe and be entirely dismantled. Maintaining this disarmament regime was one of the few pillars of U.S.-Russia relations in the volatile 21st century—until 2019, when, after mutual accusations of developing and manufacturing such missiles, U.S. President Donald Trump terminated the INF Treaty. Five years later, during Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, on November 21, 2024, during a missile strike on Dnipro, the Russian Armed Forces used an intermediate-range ballistic missile, the “Oreshnik”, that they claimed was “brand-new”.
In accordance with Russian President Putin, the “Oreshnik” was the first intermediate-range ballistic missile with a multiple independently targetable reentry vehicle (MIRV) tested in combat. Western experts estimate that this “brand-new” missile is merely a modified version of the well-known RS-26 “Rubezh,” excluded from Russia’s “State armament program until 2027” due to financial constraints in 2018. It has now become apparent that certain works on this missile continued, with a modified version reportedly tested and even, according to Russian statements, put into mass production. However, Putin later admitted that as of December 2024, Russia possessed only a limited number of “Oreshnik” systems but was “prepared to use them and even more powerful intermediate-range weapons if necessary”. The actual capability of Russia to produce such missiles remains questionable, as do the precise technical specifications of the “Oreshnik” and its ability to reach 5,000 km.
Missiles in Belarus and a New “Euro-Missile Crisis”
It is compicated to discern Putin’s true intentions in authorizing the use of this missile and launching such an extensive PR campaign, but this event has already sparked wide-ranging discussions among the experts and peoples of NATO member-states. The main question is whether the “Oreshnik” poses a genuine threat to Western nations. If the missile truly has its claimed range, major cities like London, Paris, Rome, Brussels, and Berlin, along with U.S. Air Force Base Ramstein in Germany and elements of NATO’s missile defense system in Europe, could be within its strike zone. Armed with nuclear warheads, this missile could threaten NATO’s military facilities.
Setting aside deliberations about the “Oreshnik’s” effectiveness and Russia’s ability to produce it, its media impact is worth examining. Social media has seen heated debates between those fearful of the missile and skeptics of its capabilities. The situation is further complicated by statements from Belarus’s self-proclaimed president Alexander Lukashenko, who has requested Moscow to deploy the “Oreshnik” in his country. Technically, this is plausible since 50th Missile Army during the Soviet era, which included Pioneer systems—the predecessors of the “Oreshnik” was deployed in Belarus. The 49th Missile Division, centered in Lida in western Belarus, was located there. Although this army was entirely disbanded in the early 1990s, the infrastructure necessary for hosting, servicing, and operating intermediate-range missiles remains. Given a political decision, deploying new systems in Belarus would not take long, as demonstrated by the recent transfer of Russian tactical nuclear weapons there.
Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov’s statement further indicates Moscow’s intent to pursue such a scenario. He declared that the “Russian moratorium on deploying INF missiles is practically unviable and will have to be abandoned”. While Russia has not yet deployed intermediate-range missiles, its use of the “Oreshnik” against Ukraine indicates a readiness to breach its obligations once again. Moscow’s public rhetoric diverges from its actual ability to produce sufficient intermediate-range missiles to guarantee the destruction of European cities. Deploying a few systems, even with MIRVs, would not provide Russia an advantage but would only deepen the confrontation.
The potential deployment of Russian intermediate-range missiles on NATO’s borders in central Europe could escalate tensions to 1983 levels. Then the world came closest to nuclear war since the Cuban Missile Crisis when NATO planned the “Able Archer” exercises, and the USSR interpreted them as preparation for a nuclear strike. Concurrently, public protests against U.S. missile deployments swept Europe, especially Germany. At the same time, theoretical discussions emerged about the concept of a limited nuclear war in Europe, involving strikes only against European allies of the U.S. and the USSR without escalating to a global nuclear war.
Donald Trump and the Possibility of Compromise
If the current trend of escalating the development and deployment of intermediate-range missiles continues, these thoughts could reemerge among European policymakers. However, this time, the situation may be complicated by the general trend toward radicalization in European politics and Donald Trump’s return to power in the United States. Trump is known for his tough stance on U.S. commitments to European allies. If his administration follows the course of his previous term, it may only exacerbate fears.
However, some arguments suggest the opposite scenario. First and foremost is Donald Trump’s and his team’s campaign rhetoric. The president-elect has repeatedly emphasized that one of his first actions will be to end the Russo-Ukrainian war. If the original Trump plan seemed to be a double ultimatum to Russia and Ukraine, the another plan developed by Keith Kellogg, Trump’s special representative for Russia and Ukraine, offers more “carrots” than “sticks” for Russia. One of the steps the U.S. administration may take could be partially or completely lifting sanctions on Russia, requiring negotiations not only with Russia but also with other countries supporting the sanctions regime.
U.S. negotiations with Russia would signal a willingness on both sides to compromise. Putin likely envisions ending the war not through talks with Ukraine but through broader negotiations with NATO and the U.S. on the “future of Europe” and “Russia’s global role”. Consequently, his willingness to refrain from deploying missiles on NATO’s borders or to remove them may be high. Trump’s inauguration and his initial actions as president will be telling regarding the new confrontation over intermediate-range missiles. While potential negotiations to reduce this class of weapons may begin, Trump could also intensify the deployment of Tomahawk and SM-6 missiles, raising tensions. Alternatively, if his administration focuses on compromise with Russia to concentrate efforts against China, the “Euro-Missile Crisis of the 21st Century” might never fully unfold.
Conclusions
- The “Oreshnik” tests are more of a media spectacle than a military milestone. However, using such a missile and the threat of deploying it in Belarus raises questions about the robustness of the U.S. “nuclear umbrella” over Europe and America’s readiness for full-scale nuclear exchanges with Russia. Amid Europe’s rightward shift and the rapid spread of populist movements, this poses a serious challenge to NATO’s unity.
- Donald Trump’s return to office in the U.S. could either resolve the issue of intermediate-range missiles or escalate it. Nevertheless, the president-elect and his administration’s public activities suggest a willingness to reach a compromise with Russia, which could also extend to disarmament.
- Ukraine should focus on developing its missile defense systems to counter potential “Oreshnik” strikes by Russia. It is essential to encourage foreign partners, such as the U.S., the UK, and Israel, to collaborate on missile defense projects (e.g., like the Israeli ‘Arrow-3’ system, which is capable of out-of-atmosphere interception of ballistic missile warheads).
- Additionally, Ukraine’s primary goal should be integrating into NATO’s Europe-wide missile defense network, either through accession to NATO or by concluding special agreements with the Alliance. This would enable deploying NATO missile defense elements, such as Aegis Ashore systems or similar systems, on Ukrainian ground to protect critical infrastructure.
- Finally, establishing a European missile defense system could enhance security against missile attacks for Ukraine and entire Europe. Building on the concept of a strategic European army to ensure the continent’s independence, a european missile defence system could become one of its first components. Participation in creating such a system could involve all EU members, along with the UK and Ukraine, integrating the advanced industrial and technological achievements of Western nations with Ukraine’s combat experience.