NGRNAndrii Kropyvka, NGRN Intern
Japan, given its pacifist Constitution and post-World War II public sentiment, does not have any military facilities abroad or other places where Japanese troops are permanently stationed, apart from the Self-Defense Forces military base in Djibouti. However, there is a certain likelihood that the Japanese authorities will consider soon the possibility to establish a military base on the territory of one of the states or dependent territories in Oceania, given the dynamics of security cooperation with the region during the last years, the recent proposal by Japanese Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba to deploy Japanese forces to the island of Guam, and Japan’s strategic interests in the region amid the growing Chinese presence and great powers’ rivalry in general.
In recent decades, Japan has significantly intensified its cooperation with Oceania, which was facilitated by the establishment of appropriate platforms for multilateral interaction. However, despite Tokyo’s undoubted interests in the South Pacific region, including freedom of navigation and security of sea trade routes, fishery issues, and strategic location, its security partnership with the vast majority of countries in the region was at a low level, especially compared to other influential regional players such as the United States or Australia. However, in recent years, there has been significant shift in Japan’s approach to security issues in its relations with the region’s states, considering the international initiatives of Japanese diplomacy, such as the promotion of the Free and Open Indo-Pacific. For this reason, Japan is beginning to pay much more attention to Oceania, where, after the COVID-19 pandemic, there has been a marked increase in Japan’s involvement in the regional security agenda. Thus, in 2021, the Japan-Pacific Islands Defense Dialogue was established, but currently its agenda is still limited mainly to soft security issues such as combating illegal and irregular fishing, cross-border crime, piracy, the effects of climate change and natural disasters and the implementation of measures to prevent them, etc. Closer to hard security issues is Japan’s interaction with the states that formally have armed forces, including Papua New Guinea, Tonga, and Fiji. To these states, Japan has made an offer to train their cadets at the National Defense Academy of Japan, and the government has promised to provide patrol boats and related equipment to them.
Tokyo has also prioritized Oceania as a part of the Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Forces vessels practice to visit ports in the Indo-Pacific and conduct various drills with its strategic partners in the region, known as the Indo-Pacific Deployment (IPD), extending the Indo-Pacific Deployment to include Oceania in 2021, and since 2022, most of these visits have been to this region. In 2022, Japan’s military presence in the region was also characterized by naval exercises with its partners in Tonga, Fiji, the Solomon Islands, and Palau. At the same time, the Japanese navy was involved in the aftermath of the underwater volcanic eruption in Tonga earlier that year.
Japan’s security cooperation with Australia is also reaching a fundamentally new level, as both countries realize the importance of their bilateral relations amid the overall security situation in the region, and Japan needs Australia’s support to effectively implement its own security initiatives. In 2022, Tokyo and Canberra signed a security agreement that made it easier for the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Forces to operate in the Pacific Ocean region, and in 2025, Japan will join the Australian and US Marine Corps exercises, which traditionally take place in Northern Australia, for the first time. At the same time, Australia will take part for the first time in the annual US-Japanese military exercises in Japan.
One of the reasons for the significant increase in Japan’s activity in Oceania and its interaction with leading players in the region is China’s growing presence in the Pacific not only in terms of investment, assistance, and infrastructure projects, but also its gradual shift to the security matters in conjunction with the existing security challenges for Japan that it is creating in the South and East China Seas. For example, Tokyo and Washington, tried to convey to the Solomon Islands government their serious concerns about the outcomes of the severance of diplomatic relations with Taiwan and the subsequent signing of a security agreement with China in April 2021, but failed, as this did not change the decision of the island authorities to sign a contract with a Chinese state-owned company in 2023 to modernize the Honiara port, which could theoretically be used by the Chinese navy. In this regard, Japan does not involve China in its multilateral cooperation platforms with Oceania, thus trying to create more favorable conditions for itself in the region and partially isolate China. Japan’s recent concern about China’s presence in Oceania is also caused by the exploration of significant deposits of rare-earth metals on the seabed near its island of Minamitorishima (geographically part of Micronesia) in 2024. According to preliminary estimates, their development will let Japan largely satisfy domestic demand and challenge China in the market of rare-earth metals and products that use them. Given that, it is quite likely that the Self-Defense Forces garrison on the island will be strengthened in the coming years.
In the context of enhancing its presence in Oceania, Japanese Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba’s desire to make the US-Japan alliance more balanced is also indicative, in particular by deploying Japanese troops on the island of Guam on a permanent basis. However, it is still difficult to outline the prospects for these intentions, given bad memories associated with the Japanese army among most islanders, as well as the changing position of newly elected US President Donald Trump on many foreign policy issues, which sometimes applies to Guam. However, there is no doubt that the Trump administration, as with its European NATO allies, will welcome increased efforts by its allies in the Indo-Pacific to ensure regional security and deter China, although this is far from reality that Shiberu’s proposal for Guam will be further developed (at least in the way the Japanese prime minister envisions it). These intentions of Japan may be hindered by the domestic political prospects of Shiberu himself, given that the ruling party performed during the 2024 general elections worse than expected and lost the majority in the lower house of the country’s parliament. Moreover, most of his ideas are not welcomed unanimously within the Liberal Democratic Party itself. Among them is the idea to introduce universal conscription in Japan, amid the challenges that its Self-Defense Forces are already facing in terms of implementing national and regional security tasks caused by the understaffing of their personnel due to unfavorable demographic trends in the country and the low popularity of military service among citizens. It requires Japan to prioritize national security and to make a smart allocation of existing resources. However, despite the complexity surrounding the idea of deploying Japanese troops to Guam, the possibility of Japan conducting joint exercises with the United States on Tinian and other parts of the Marianas in the future, which is already being considered by the Japanese authorities, given the participation of the Self-Defense Forces in military exercises on Guam last year, remains relevant.
Conclusion.
The dynamics of Japan’s security cooperation with Oceania and the current regional situation create preconditions for further development of the situation, which is highly likely to occur:
- Japan will continue to increase its intermittent military presence in the region within the Indo-Pacific deployment and security cooperation with the Pacific states on the basis of the Defense Dialogue;
- Establishment of the Japan Self-Defense Forces military bases on the territory of one or more sovereign states in Oceania in the short ir medium terms seems unlikely;
- Regardless of the further development of the Japan-US bilateral relations after Trump’s administration return to power, Tokyo will continue to strengthen its security partnership with Canberra, given its constructive influence on the situation in the region;
- Japan will seriously consider increasing the number of its military contingent on its remote island of Minamitorishima in the short and medium term, where significant deposits of rare-earth metals were found on the seabed in 2024;
- Japan will be unable to deploy its military contingent on the island of Guam on a permanent basis, as Prime Minister Ishiba wants, because of significant domestic and foreign policy challenges;
- Despite the unlikelihood of Japanese troops being deployed to Guam, Japan will extend its participation in military exercises conducted by the United States on the island and in other parts of the region.