Mykhailo SamusThe article was published at the Times of India
The successful meeting in Saudi Arabia on March 11 between Ukrainian and U.S. delegations surprised even the optimists. Following a heated exchange between President Donald Trump and President Volodymyr Zelensky in the Oval Office, bilateral relations had seemingly hit their lowest point in 30 years. The suspension of U.S. military aid, intelligence sharing, and arms deliveries to Ukraine was widely viewed as an open betrayal of partnership commitments.
Ukrainian officials and experts had differing assessments of the real dependence of the Ukrainian Armed Forces on American intelligence and weaponry. Some estimated that 90% of Ukrainian battlefield intelligence came from the U.S., while others believed Ukraine could adapt swiftly. However, all agreed that a breakdown in relations with Washington would be detrimental. Transitioning to Ukrainian or European substitutes for American arms and intelligence requires time, a resource that is currently one of the most crucial factors in the ongoing Russo-Ukrainian war.
Yet, Washington’s pressure tactics produced an unexpected result. The public learned that the suspension of U.S. support included the maintenance of electronic warfare systems for Ukraine’s F-16 fighters, specifically the AN/ALQ-131 electronic countermeasure pods. This created a significant risk for Ukrainian pilots, who rely on these jets to combat Russian aircraft and other battlefield threats. While this situation confirmed Trump’s assertion that Ukraine would struggle to last more than two weeks without U.S. aid, it also served as a cold wake-up call for NATO’s European allies.
Given that several European NATO members have contracted or are considering purchasing F-35 fighter jets, concerns emerged among European policymakers and analysts. If the U.S. could suddenly suspend support for Ukraine’s F-16s, what guarantees existed that it wouldn’t do the same for German or Polish F-35s under certain conditions? The same logic applied to European Patriot missile defence systems—if the U.S. could halt missile supplies or maintenance for Ukraine, why should European nations invest billions in American defence systems rather than developing their own defence industry?
These concerns have intensified European efforts to consolidate defence industrial cooperation and build independent European military capabilities. The U.S. approach toward Ukraine has inadvertently accelerated Europe’s push for strategic autonomy.
Despite this, the Jeddah meeting yielded unexpectedly positive results. First, Ukraine formally expressed readiness for a temporary 30-day ceasefire, contingent on reciprocal implementation by Russia. Second, the U.S. announced the immediate resumption of intelligence-sharing and military assistance to Ukraine. Within hours of the meeting, Ukrainian officials confirmed that American arms and intelligence support were once again flowing into the country.
Additionally, the delegations discussed humanitarian aspects of the peace process, including prisoner exchanges, the release of civilian detainees, and the return of Ukrainian children forcibly deported by Russia. The U.S. also committed to discussing these proposals with Russian representatives. Meanwhile, Ukraine emphasized the importance of involving European partners in any peace negotiations.
A significant outcome of the talks was an agreement between Trump and Zelensky to fast-track a comprehensive deal on the development of Ukraine’s critical mineral resources. This initiative aims to bolster Ukraine’s economy and ensure its long-term prosperity and security.
Overall, the Jeddah meeting marked a turning point in the war. Trump’s hardline approach toward Zelensky was driven by his need to confirm Ukraine’s willingness to seek peace. Instead of acknowledging Ukraine’s longstanding position – that it did not start the war and has always sought a just peace – Trump insisted that Russia and Putin wanted peace, while Ukraine remained obstinate. He even claimed Ukraine owed the U.S. $350 billion, despite the fact that American military aid has not exceeded $100 billion, with much of it reinvested into the U.S. defence industry.
The confrontation in the White House underscored Trump’s reluctance to recognize the reality: Ukraine wants peace, while Russia remains the aggressor. The Jeddah meeting, however, clarified this dynamic. The U.S. administration now acknowledges that Ukraine is genuinely pursuing peace. Trump himself admitted that “half of the peace deal is now on the table” and that it is up to Russia to sign it. As US Secretary of State Marco Rubio put it, with Ukraine agreeing to a U.S.-proposed 30-day ceasefire, “the ball is now in Russia’s court.”
After months of diplomatic stagnation, the peace process may finally gain momentum. Yet the central question remains: how can Putin be compelled to end the war against Ukraine? Various scenarios have been proposed, ranging from intensified sanctions and economic isolation to lifting restrictions in exchange for Russian cooperation. Given Russia’s worsening economic conditions, Putin might theoretically accept a ceasefire in return for sanctions relief. However, Putin’s decision-making is rarely driven by conventional economic or political logic.
Moreover, what compromises might the U.S. consider to pressure Russia? Would this involve abandoning demands for Ukraine’s occupied territories? Could Russia insist on Ukraine’s “demilitarization” by capping its military size? Might Russia push for restrictions on European military deployments in Ukraine, and could a multinational peacekeeping force – perhaps including Indian contingents – play a role in stabilizing ceasefire zones?
Another unresolved issue is the fate of the Russian Kursk region, a portion of which Ukraine has controlled since August 2024. Could Ukraine use this territorial leverage in negotiations, perhaps offering an exchange for parts of its own occupied regions? Or will Russia attempt to retake this area before the talks intensify, allowing Putin to claim Ukraine never held it? Even if Ukrainian troops have withdrawn from Sudzha (a Russian city that the Ukrainian Armed Forces have controlled since August 2024), the Ukrainian Armed Forces still control part of the Kursk region in an effort to prevent Russians from breaking through the Ukrainian border into Ukraine’s Sumy region. Putin has tried to twist Trump’s arm by feeding him disinformation about the alleged encirclement of Ukrainian troops in the Kursk region, but this may backfire on Putin as his lies have been verified too quickly.
The long-awaited conversation between Donald Trump and Vladimir Putin on 18 March revealed what was already clear – Russia is not prepared to end its war. For the Kremlin, talk of a ceasefire is merely a tactic to prolong aggression. Following their discussion, Putin refused to agree to a proposed 30-day truce, instead vaguely suggesting a mutual halt to strikes on energy infrastructure. Just hours later, he brazenly violated his own words, launching another wave of Shahed drone attacks on central Kyiv.
For Trump, the situation is fraught with difficulty. Pressuring Moscow would be an admission that his approach since taking office two months ago has been flawed. Yet pushing Ukraine to make concessions would appear both unjust and strategically misguided. The most likely course of action for Washington will be to announce another round of negotiations, urging Russia to accept what Kyiv proposed over a week ago – a ceasefire with no preconditions.
At the same time, Ukraine will find itself under increasing pressure from Washington. Trump, eager to gain leverage in talks with Putin, may attempt to push Kyiv into making even minor concessions to Moscow’s wholly unreasonable demands. Ukrainian analysts warn that this process could drag on for up to half of the year, with intense fighting continuing on the front lines. The duration of this phase will depend on whether the Trump administration is willing to move beyond its current diplomatic manoeuvring and exert real pressure on Moscow to force an end to the conflict. That, however, remains an open question.