Trump’s Nuclear Diplomacy. What to Expect from US-Iran Talks?

After a long hiatus, the United States is once again talking to Iran about its nuclear program. In his first term as president, Donald Trump withdrew from the nuclear deal with Tehran and tightened sanctions against it. Now, the same Trump wants to restore it.

Tehran’s Nuclear Intentions

Iran’s nuclear program has been troubling the international community for quite a long time. Started in the 1950s with US support, it was called “Atoms for Peace” and was aimed at peaceful scientific research. Later, in 1970, Tehran ratified the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), thereby allowing the IAEA to monitor its development of peaceful atomic energy. After the so-called Islamic Revolution in Iran in 1979, cooperation with the Agency stopped. Iran continued its nuclear program, but it did so secretly.

The secret was revealed in 2002, when the National Council of Resistance of Iran published information that the country was carrying out nuclear projects. This resulted in an IAEA investigation, the UN Security Council accusing Iran of failing to comply with its obligations under the NPT, and a demand to suspend these projects. After Iran rejected the accusations and demands, the UN Security Council imposed sanctions on it.

However, this did not stop Iran at all, and the country continued to develop its nuclear program. This further worsened its relations with the United States and Europe, which in the early 2010s increased sanctions pressure on it.

Short-term reconciliation

In the mid-2010s, the degree of tension surrounding Iran’s nuclear program decreased somewhat. This led to the conclusion of an agreement in Vienna on July 14, 2015, between Iran and the five permanent members of the UN Security Council, plus Germany and the EU, known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, or the Iran nuclear deal. It, in particular, provided for Iran’s agreement to eliminate its stocks of medium-enriched uranium within 13 years, reduce its stockpile of low-enriched uranium by 98%, and reduce its gas centrifuges by about two-thirds. Iran also agreed to enrich uranium to only 3.67% for 15 years and not build heavy-water reactors. In return, the IAEA received regular access to all Iranian nuclear facilities. In exchange for complying with these provisions, Iran would receive relief from US, EU, and UN Security Council sanctions.

The agreement entered into force on January 16, 2016, and was to remain in force for eight years or until the IAEA report concluded that all nuclear material in Iran was used for peaceful purposes. But two years later, in May 2018, US President Donald Trump announced the US withdrawal from the Iran nuclear deal. That same year, Washington renewed sanctions against Tehran.

Despite external pressure and instead of stopping, Iran continued to enrich uranium. Attempts by Donald Trump’s successor as US President Joe Biden to revive the Iran nuclear deal were unsuccessful.

As of February 2025, according to the IAEA report, Iran’s stockpile of 60% enriched uranium had grown to 274.8 kg. The agency estimates that, with further enrichment, this would be enough for six nuclear bombs, or more nuclear warheads at lower enrichment levels.

Mutual interest in the deal

Almost immediately after returning to the White House in 2025, Donald Trump declared that he was ready to work on a new nuclear agreement with Iran, which would allow it to “be a great and successful Country, but one that cannot have a Nuclear Weapon”. At the same time, on the eve of this statement, he signed an executive order renewing his strategy of “maximum pressure” on Tehran. Its essence is to apply sanctions and coercive mechanisms to those who violate existing sanctions, as well as to conduct campaigns aimed at “reducing Iranian oil exports to zero”.

According to Ukrainian political analyst Vadym Denysenko, in its desire to conclude a nuclear agreement with Iran, Washington is guided by two main motives. The first is the understanding that without such an agreement, stability in the Middle East is impossible. Secondly, the logic of Trump’s actions is now directly subordinated to the goal of weakening of China.

For his part, the president of the Center for Global Studies “Strategy XXI” Mykhailo Honchar believes that Washington chose the diplomatic path of encouraging Iran to abandon its nuclear program after realizing that it would not be possible to achieve this by military means. Therefore, Washington began to work out the option of returning to the agreement concluded during the presidency of Barack Obama. However, keeping the option of using military force against Tehran.

Also, according to Mykhailo Honchar, there is another explanation why Washington preferred diplomacy to resolve the issue of the Iranian nuclear program. According to the expert, the Russians put in a good word for Iran with the Americans. And the Americans probably took Moscow’s promises that it would help them settle everything with Iran.

Currently, Iran is sending the signals of readiness for dialogue regarding its nuclear program in exchange for easing the sanctions. However, it completely rejects the possibility of its complete termination. Tehran’s compliancy has its own explanation. The country’s economy is in an extremely difficult situation. The devaluation of the national currency continues, which negatively affects the purchasing power of the population.

Will it be possible to agree on something?

On April 12, in Oman’s capital Muscat, the delegations of the United States and Iran held direct negotiations on the Iranian nuclear program for the first time in a long time. The White House called them as “very positive and constructive” and “a step forward on the path to achieving a mutually beneficial result”. Tehran, on the other hand, stated that the first round of negotiations took place in a “constructive atmosphere and based on mutual respect”.

After that, on April 19 and 26, the second and third rounds of negotiations were held, which their participants also characterized quite positively. Oman, which acts as a mediator in this process, noted regarding the negotiations that both sides “showed a common desire to reach an agreement based on mutual respect and compliance with obligations”.

However, despite the favorable characterization by Washington and Iran of their first steps in the ‘nuclear’ talks, the real picture may be completely different. “Today we see that Trump’s strategy towards Russia has completely collapsed. But he continues to say that everything is going well and that some kind of agreement will be reached now. The same, I think, may be the case with Iran,” Mykhailo Honchar says. At the same time, according to him, even if the US and Iran manage to reach some kind of agreement, it is unlikely to please the third interested party — Israel.

Vadym Denysenko agrees with him, saying that Israel is the main opponent of the “Obama-style” agreement. “It seems that for Israel, the base scenario is an attempt to destroy Iran’s key nuclear facilities regardless of whether the agreement is signed,” the political scientist notes, adding that the US cannot ignore this. He assumes the likelihood of signing an agreement, however, he notes that the US cannot guarantee Iran the inviolability of its nuclear facilities from Israeli strikes. In general, both of them agree that Iran is currently ready to make certain concessions in order to obtain a partial lifting of the imposed restrictions and buy itself time to advance in its nuclear program. “Iran wants to drag out this negotiation process. It can be dragged out for years. And time is what Iran needs in order to complete all its nuclear affairs. And of course, in exchange for participating in the negotiations, it will demand the lifting of the sanctions regime,” Mykhailo Honchar notes.

To read the full article in Ukrainian, press here

Igor Fedyk

Head of the South Eastern Europe Section

Igor coordinates the South Eastern Europe Section of the New Geopolitics Research Network. He previously worked as the Head of the Balkan section of the Center for Army, Conversion and Disarmament Studies, as well as the Deputy Editor-in-chief of the English-language magazine The Ukrainian Defense Review.

His current research interests are focused on the political, economic and social aspects of the development of the South Eastern Europe and Balkan countries, their interstate and inter-ethnic relations, as well as the relations with third parties (countries not from the region, international organizations), which have an important impact on the situation in the region and in Europe.

He is the author of a number of articles and analyses in various Ukrainian and foreign Media.

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