Mykhailo SamusMyroslav Liskovych, Ukrinform, Kyiv
Recently, analysts from JP Morgan Chase & Co., one of the largest American banks, presented four potential scenarios for the future development of events in Ukraine: the South Korean (15% probability), Israeli (20%), Georgian (50%), and Belarusian (15%) models. However, many Ukrainian experts consider this assessment not only flawed but potentially harmful to the formation of a realistic strategy.
Mykhailo Samus, a military-political expert and director of the New Geopolitics Research Network, shares this view, emphasizing that there is only one possible scenario – the Ukrainian one.
In this conversation, the expert analyzes the current situation at the front, assesses the real risks and opportunities of summer 2025, dissects the further development of the situation in the Ukraine–USA–Russia triangle, explains the internal struggle of Kremlin influence groups competing with each other, discusses Ukraine’s “trump cards” in the field of armaments, and answers whether we are truly lagging behind the enemy in drone production.
— Mr. Mykhailo, how would you assess the scenarios proposed by JP Morgan analysts?
It’s hard to take seriously attempts to “stretch” certain historical scenarios onto the current situation in Ukraine – especially when comparing events in other parts of the world that unfolded under completely different historical, economic, military-political, military-strategic, and geopolitical conditions. This is a classic case of “forcing a square peg into a round hole.”
Yes, one might recall the Korean scenario if speaking solely about the technical aspect of a ceasefire or so-called conflict freeze. But that’s just one element, and the development of events in Ukraine will certainly not repeat the path of South or North Korea. Other options—the Belarusian, Moldovan, or any other – don’t withstand analytical scrutiny when mechanically transferred to the Ukrainian context. This is more of a caricatured, simplified, “comic book” approach, which has nothing to do with serious analytics.
The real situation doesn’t develop according to templates and certainly not according to outdated concepts. Take, for example, JP Morgan’s “Georgian scenario,” according to which Ukraine, after the war ends, won’t receive reliable security guarantees, will remain unstable, and eventually – after several changes of power – will again fall into Russia’s sphere of influence. Supposedly, another pro-Russian president will come, and we’ll return to the past. These forecasts seem like fantasies of people who either don’t understand Ukrainian history or don’t know that we’ve already had Yanukovych.
— And we’ve already received that “vaccine,” with all its painful consequences…
Absolutely right. Yes, eventually, a stage of political centering may come, but in my opinion, in the short term, Ukraine is more likely to move toward further radicalization. This is natural – historical processes usually develop in waves: after a stage of escalation—rollback, and vice versa. But the important thing is this: the miscalculations of many external “scriptwriters” lie in the fact that they ignore the main point – Ukraine is moving toward Europe. And this movement is already changing the country. But not only Ukraine – EU accession will also change the European Union itself. We are not a passive object of geopolitics but an active subject of change.
In this sense, the Ukrainian scenario doesn’t fit into any established formulas. We are creating it right now – in real-time. Every decision, every step, every second acquires system-forming significance. What we do today will determine the face of the country for decades, and possibly centuries, ahead.
— Continuing the topic of scenarios… What, in your opinion, are the real prospects for the development of events in the Kyiv–Washington–Moscow triangle? What, according to your estimates, will happen in the coming weeks and months, and what should we prepare for?
Today, at least two powerful groups of influence have formed around Putin, proposing fundamentally different scenarios for development – both at the front and in relations with the West.
The first – conditionally called the “war group.” This is the old Kremlin guard: Patrushev, Chemezov, Kiriyenko, Vaino, and other representatives of the military-industrial complex. They control multi-billion-dollar flows directed at the war against Ukraine. We’re talking about real money that ends up in the hands of specific individuals who determine what, how, and who spends state budget resources. In the current conditions – falling oil prices, growing economic difficulties – for them, this may be the last chance to “clean out” the budget completely. They are not interested in any ceasefire, as military contracts have already been signed, drones are being produced, ammunition is arriving, soldiers are dying, and the “machine” of war and profits is working. The generals don’t object because they have no other choice. The idea is this: conduct a large-scale summer campaign, show at least some “successes” at the front to convince Trump that our ultimatums are not empty fantasies but supposedly realistic scenarios. Currently, all this rhetoric looks unconvincing and artificial. But for it to be taken seriously, they need successes on the battlefield. The political and military concept implemented by this group of influence in the Russian government is tailored to this logic.
Opposing them is another group – conditionally the “business group” or Dmitriev’s group. Its essence: the Russian economy is on the brink of collapse, and if they don’t get out of it now, by autumn it may be too late – for Russia itself and for maintaining dialogue with the USA. Proponents of this concept – not only Dmitriev but also Americans – Vitkoff, Kushner, and others – are building bridges to Trump. Their plan: stop the war, open the way for joint projects worth hundreds of billions of dollars—resource extraction in the Arctic, selling Russian gas to Europe under the American brand, diamonds from Yakutia, investments in the “Greater Eurasia.” The goal is to earn “like adults,” cynically, brazenly, on a large scale. This scenario also attracts part of the Russian elite, especially the oligarchy, which has lost a lot during the war and seeks a return to big profits.
— And these two concepts have now entered into direct confrontation…
Exactly. The “war group” hints to the “business group” that the time hasn’t come yet – let us live until autumn. After all, the money for the war has already been allocated, logistics are launched, the “meat” is hired, the defense industry is working. If this machine is stopped – someone won’t get their profit. And already in autumn, when a real budget deficit begins, interest in the war will naturally fade. Then the “war group” will be ready to reorient to Dmitriev’s business plans, including joint projects with the Americans. But not now, when the profit is not yet in hand.
Until autumn, therefore, expect a consistent implementation of time-dragging against the backdrop of intensified offensive actions. When Trump gets irritated – the Kremlin immediately makes an informational bow: look, here are our proposals, we are for negotiations. So that Trump can say: “See, sanctions are not needed, Putin is already ready to negotiate.” Then – a few weeks of rumors about upcoming meetings, another round of discussions, and all this imperceptibly flows into the political summer holidays in the USA. And then – autumn.
— What about the American “arrangements”?
— When it comes to the political situation in the United States, it must be acknowledged: the Republican Party is experiencing a deep internal crisis. On one side, there is a group close to Donald Trump attempting to turn the political process into a tool for personal enrichment. On the other, a significant portion of Republicans is trying to preserve the party’s political future and their own careers beyond the Trump era. This majority now realizes that the Republican Party is rapidly losing influence and is in a state of actual disintegration.
From this logic, in the fall – with the onset of the active phase of the political season, including preparations for congressional by-elections – we may see attempts by this part of the party to regain control. They will try to oppose Trump’s oligarchic circle and publicly declare: enough of the experiments and political games that are destroying both the party and its key leaders. Lindsey Graham, for example, has seen his political reputation suffer severely.
Continuing on the current course risks the United States losing global authority and facing growing political disorientation at home. The Democrats are likely to win the next elections. This could mean a long-term loss of power for Republicans and the beginning of a prolonged phase of reevaluation. Only in 10–15 years might a new generation of Republicans emerge that will attempt to restore the party’s reputation by recognizing the Trump era as a historical mistake and national disaster.
Thus, both American and Russian political landscapes are trying to buy time until autumn. The Kremlin hopes to hold out until the worsening of the economic situation, after which they aim to secure a revision of sanctions policy and the restoration of contacts with the West.
In the United States, politicians with a strong survival instinct – those who might be called “political animals” – already understand that the Trump experiment has exhausted itself. It is they who, in the context of congressional by-elections, may become the driving force behind tougher decisions – such as legislating secondary sanctions against Russia with rates up to 500%, or even imposing an oil embargo bypassing a potential presidential veto if Trump resists.
— How will the enemy’s offensive develop in the summer of 2025? Which directions are the hottest, and why? What might Russian attempts to advance lead to, given their current capabilities?
— The Russian summer offensive is a repeat of the 2024 scenario. A complete copy. The only difference is that after Ukraine’s Kursk operation, Russian forces found it much harder to operate in Kharkiv, Sumy, and Chernihiv regions. In 2024, they viewed operations in the Kharkiv, Kupyansk, and Sumy directions as levers to weaken the Armed Forces of Ukraine and create conditions for advancing in Donbas. The situation is different now.
— But Russia’s basic approaches haven’t changed: pressure from the north on Chernihiv, Sumy, Kharkiv; demonstrative actions in the south; and a concentration of main efforts in Donbas: Kostiantynivka, Pokrovsk, Kramatorsk, Sloviansk, Lyman?
— These areas remain in focus, as Russia’s strategic goal remains the full occupation of Donbas. Launching operations in Sumy is too costly and ineffective for them. Kharkiv is another example: their maximum gain has been advancing a few kilometers over months – no strategic effect. Politically, it’s zero.
Donbas may be their last chance. Because 2026 will be different. In 2024, Russia exploited delays in U.S. arms supplies and Europe’s ammunition shortages. But much has changed. Europe is increasing aid, and Ukraine is transitioning to a new organizational model – corps structure. Ukrainian command is becoming more coherent and effective daily. Moreover, Germany has revised its policy – this means greater volume and technological quality of support. Ukraine is already developing its own missile weapons. In 2026, both Ukraine and Europe will see a significantly higher defense capability.
Russia, by contrast, may face disaster. There is no systemic novelty in Russia’s actions – only repetition, attempts to squeeze out the last remnants. Same directions, same tactics. They’ll keep hammering Pokrovsk, Toretsk, Chasiv Yar… They’ll try something in Zaporizhzhia and Kherson. But they have no technological or organizational advantage.
— A recent report about the creation of a motorcycle company within the 425th Separate Assault Regiment “Skala” and its debut nighttime assault in Kursk region divided expert opinion. Some see major benefits – speed, maneuverability, surprise effect. Others warn: the high vulnerability of personnel casts doubt on using motorcycles in major assaults. What’s your position?
— Let’s look at it logically: a hammer is a tool. One can use it to hurt oneself, another to craft art. The same applies to military means. Russians have IFVs, we have IFVs – the equipment may be similar, but how it’s used depends on doctrine.
In the Russian army, the “meat assault” approach dominates. Ukraine, on the other hand, follows a different logic of warfare. When a motorcycle company is formed – it’s important to understand its purpose. If it’s a unit for reconnaissance or special tasks – that fits our goals entirely. It doesn’t mean motorcycles will be used for frontal assaults, as the enemy does.
We are conducting a strategic defensive operation. Rapid movement is an important component, but usually it’s used in the rear, second echelon, or for reconnaissance. In certain conditions, a motorcycle can be more effective than a Humvee or armored car: smaller silhouette, greater mobility, ability to complete a task quickly and disappear before the enemy drone spots you.
Unfortunately, many think in stereotypes. They see a motorcycle – immediately associate it with senseless Russian-style attacks. But war isn’t a set of templates. It’s an art of adaptation, ingenuity, a contest of minds and decisions. Each side tries to create something new to gain an advantage—and to counter the enemy’s innovations. Creating motorcycle companies doesn’t mean we’re copying someone else’s script. We act within our own Ukrainian doctrine.
— What do you think of criticism of Ukraine’s UAV production? Allegedly, we’re already falling behind the enemy. Is that true?
— I repeat: war is a constant contest of technologies, doctrines, and tactics. And overall, today we are in a state of technological and doctrinal parity with Russia. General Zaluzhnyi said this directly in a recent speech: the current front-line situation is an operational stalemate caused by a highly transparent battlefield and technologies accessible to both sides. One side surges ahead, the other quickly adapts – and so on.
Take fiber-optic drones. Yes, Russians scaled this faster. But we are rapidly catching up. In some areas, we even have a technological edge. So it’s incorrect to say Russia has systematically outpaced us. And Western media, I believe, contribute confusion – they often publish shallow conclusions without grasping the context, scale, or combat logic, which then get copy-pasted into Ukrainian discourse.
If Russia truly dominated, we’d see it on the battlefield. Instead – we see parity.
— What can you say about Ukraine’s “trump cards” in armaments? Previously, our hopes were pinned on Western long-range artillery, cruise missiles, ATACMS, and F-16 fighters. What about now?
— First of all, all the weapons you listed remain relevant. There is no magic “superweapon” that can instantly change the course of the war. This is systemic work requiring a comprehensive approach. For example, many hope that once we receive Taurus missiles – everything will change. But that’s not the case. Cruise missiles are important, of course, but the moment has passed, and at this stage they’re no longer unique. They will help – yes – but won’t be decisive alone.
Artillery, ISR, aviation – all remain fundamental and decisive. These are high-precision means of destruction, and none have lost their value. Regarding aviation, we are only beginning to make it truly effective – in both tactics and weaponry. We haven’t yet fully tapped the potential of F-16s or Mirages. We still haven’t neutralized the threat of glide bombs (KABs). It’s complex work underway, with many decisions ahead.
Looking to the future, the main advantages will emerge in advanced technologies: AI systems, robotic platforms that will gradually replace both manpower and some armored vehicles. Also, unmanned systems – airborne and maritime – that have already reshaped combat. It’s in this sphere – advanced technologies, AI integration, and autonomous solutions – that I see the opportunity for Ukrainian superiority in the near term.
— Mr. Mykhailo, there are again many reports about Chernihiv, Sumy (allegedly Russians have established control over four border settlements) and Kharkiv – with the occupiers’ command reportedly aiming to create a 20-kilometre buffer zone. How realistic is that?
— Recall when Putin first began talking about this – that was about a year and a half ago. What happened afterward? A buffer zone appeared – but on Russian territory. So, Putin can fantasize all he wants, spin narratives for his propaganda machine, but it has no bearing on reality. These are just signals to Trump, and again, to Western media.
— Occasionally, there are also publications suggesting a possible renewed attempt to attack Kyiv – from the direction of Belarus. Some versions mention Volyn or Rivne regions. Is there any reason to believe that the joint military exercises planned for autumn in Belarus, with Russian participation, could escalate into a new wave of northern offensives?
— No, there are currently no grounds to speak of a real threat from Belarus. Moreover, the General Staff of the Belarusian Armed Forces has already officially reported a reduction in the scale of exercises: the number of participants will be halved – from the announced 13,000 to 7,000 troops. That scale no longer looks serious. If this figure includes Russian military as well, then talking about any serious threat to Volyn or Kyiv is completely inappropriate. To conduct such an operation, they would need to deploy a force of 150,000–200,000 troops.
— But it’s impossible to deploy such a grouping without being noticed…
— Exactly. There is, however, a much more realistic hypothesis: under cover of these exercises, Russians may concentrate forces in the Leningrad Military District, creating potential threats to new NATO members and the Baltic States. It’s important to understand that the “Zapad” exercises aren’t just a Belarusian event. They are comprehensive drills encompassing territories of the former Western Military District, now split into the Leningrad and Moscow districts.
Therefore, it’s quite likely that the downsizing of exercises in Belarus is a deliberate move to reallocate military activity to northwestern Russia. There, a new strike force could be formed, targeting not so much the Suwałki Corridor as exerting pressure on Finland, Estonia, and other Northern European countries. This isn’t just about a show of force, but about possible provocations aimed at testing NATO cohesion and provoking discussion around the application of Article 5. That scenario looks significantly more plausible.
— And the final question: when, in your view, might a turning point occur in the Great War, when Ukraine seizes the initiative?
— At this stage, we must recognize: we are in a state of doctrinal and technological parity, and operational stalemate. Expecting a dramatic breakthrough soon is unlikely. Launching large-scale offensive operations without substantial reinforcement is extremely difficult.
Putin’s regime remains resilient even amid economic degradation, so we are dealing with a long-term scenario. Russia is already exhibiting traits of a North Korea 2.0 – an autocratic, militarized state, isolated from the world, yet capable of sustaining its war machine for a long time.
So for now, unfortunately, there are no grounds to speak of a strategic breakthrough. In the autumn, there may be windows of opportunity for freezing the conflict. For many, that word is unpleasant, but it’s important to accept reality rather than live in illusions. In 2022–2023, we were close to changing the course of the war – think of the Kharkiv, Kherson operations, the liberation of Kyiv, Sumy, Chernihiv regions. But at that moment, we didn’t yet have the full set of capabilities to achieve a decisive breakthrough.
Today, we must acknowledge: the war is entering a phase of protracted confrontation, and a frozen conflict scenario looks increasingly realistic – primarily because Russia may be willing to accept such an option.
In the event of a freeze, our main objective will be the systematic strengthening of the Defence Forces, development of the defence-industrial complex, and preparation for a possible new phase of the war. “Freezing” is not the end of the war. We must regain all temporarily occupied territories, restore sovereignty, and build a strong European state. That is only possible with powerful Defence Forces and a modern defence industry, integrated into the European security system.
Ukraine must assume a leadership role in shaping a new European defence architecture. We must help our partners build deterrence forces capable of effectively countering Russia. Ukraine can become the nucleus of these European defence forces. Our task is to teach Europe not to fear Russia – psychologically and militarily. At present, much of Europe still fears direct confrontation with Russia. We must change that mindset.
