NGRNPutin’s Possible Plans and Preserved Options in Moldova
Uzdrisch Constantin, General producer, Romanian Public Television in Chișinău
September 28 is considered a “crucial” date for the Republic of Moldova. Since 1991, when Chișinău broke away from the old USSR, every election has been “crucial” — at least rhetorically. What makes these elections different, and why do I believe the Kremlin may not hesitate to use any technique, I will explain below.
Geopolitical Context
The illegal annexation of Crimea in 2014 by Russia and the large-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 completely shifted the geopolitical balance and opened new opportunities for countries such as the Republic of Moldova, Ukraine, Georgia, and Armenia.
With the loss of its velvet glove — the so-called “soft power” — over these republics, Moscow left the European Union with no choice but to open its doors to potential candidate states. Thus, the Republic of Moldova and Ukraine became EU candidate countries. This is not (only) the merit of Chișinău or Kyiv, but rather the result of the Eastern Partnership no longer being able to guarantee the security of these countries, prompting the EU to fast-track the accession process.
I wrote last year, before the presidential elections and the EU accession referendum, that another four years of pro-European governance in Chișinău would be too much for Russia, as it would lose even the remnants of its influence there.
The Actors
Today, Russia uses several levers against Chișinău. After almost completely losing its energy blackmail capability — Chișinău now only buys electricity from the Transnistrian region but has the alternative of purchasing from the EU market — the only connection left is a high-voltage line crossing Ukraine and the separatist region. This connection is expected to be cut once the Vulcănești–Chișinău high-voltage line is operational. From this point of view, Russia can no longer blackmail Chișinău.
In the past, Russia used to impose embargoes on Moldovan exports, suddenly declaring Moldovan wines and agricultural products dangerous for Russian consumers. After repeated embargoes and the reorientation of Moldovan producers, the EU has become Moldova’s main market.
Since the start of the war, Transnistria has turned into a “suitcase without a handle” for Moscow — hard to carry, impossible to abandon. The economic situation in the region worsens daily, and the winter of 2024–2025 has shown that the Tiraspol regime could collapse due to a lack of money and the inability to provide even a minimally decent life for the population. Thus, Transnistria remains a threat to Chișinău, but not as great as some claim. With Odesa free and Transnistria’s military power limited — especially since Kyiv has hinted it could help Chișinău eliminate the threat from Tiraspol entirely — the risk is reduced.
Moscow still maintains a network of politicians, opinion leaders, propagandists, and various activists funded by Russian money. After the test run with the Șor network during the 2024 presidential elections, Russia understood that it can influence democratic processes in Chișinău. In addition to pro-Russian politicians and parties, Moscow has invested heavily in the Gagauz Autonomous Region — in local leaders, propaganda, and electoral handouts to be used at the right moment. These factors undermine the idea of sovereignty and permanent neutrality for the Republic of Moldova.
The Orthodox Church of Moldova, under the Metropolis of Chișinău and All Moldova, directly subordinate to the Moscow Patriarchate, is another factor Russia uses against Chișinău. Its mission is to promote narratives such as “traditional family values”, “fighting LGBT”, “they want to steal our children”, and other spirituality-related themes.
Oligarchs are yet another tool Moscow will use extensively in this electoral campaign. Veaceslav Platon, dubbed the number one raider in the CIS and currently in London, is directly involved in Moldova’s political processes, financing and demonizing Chișinău’s authorities. Recently, another figure has resurfaced — Vlad Plahotniuc, an oligarch accused of state capture between 2016–2019. According to The Insider, Plahotniuc has traveled several times to Moscow to meet Dmitry Kozak, who managed the “Ukraine problem” until the 2022 invasion and is now in charge of Moldova.
From his first posts, it’s clear Plahotniuc wants to attack everything associated with pro-European governance in Chișinău. He openly mocks Moldova’s justice system — not without reason, as he likely still controls people in the Prosecutor’s Office and the courts. His mission is to weaken citizens’ trust in state institutions. This discrediting tactic was used by the Russians in 2014 in Donbas, facilitating the takeover of Ukrainian state institutions in Donetsk and Luhansk without resistance from the public. Moldovan oligarchs’ money, media resources, and especially kompromat should help Moscow regain control after the September 28 elections.
Scenarios
The Kremlin has already unleashed its full financial and propaganda arsenal on Moldova, but it could still be reduced or even neutralized. The most dangerous possibilities are violent scenarios that Putin is considering.
The recent statements by Russian Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Maria Zakharova and SVR director Sergey Naryshkin — claiming that NATO is preparing Moldova to become a second Ukraine — reveal the Kremlin’s plans to thwart a pro-European outcome in Chișinău. Russia could use mercenary groups in Moldova to provoke chaos and bloodshed simply to challenge an unfavorable result for the pro-Russian side.
The most likely Russian plan is a “civil war” in Moldova, possibly triggered from somewhere other than Transnistria. Everyone knows the potential of that region, and defense plans are largely in place. But what if Moscow has prepared several physical fronts — in the south, through Șor’s network (recently Șor threatened Chișinău with “forceful methods” at a rally in Comrat), and in the north, through so-called statists?
It’s possible the Trump administration caught wind of such a Kremlin scenario and therefore shortened an ultimatum from 50 to 11 days. Putin wants to buy time in Ukraine to be able to focus on Moldova. In this context, the Kremlin could trigger a new disaster elsewhere to return to negotiations in “new realities,” as Moscow likes to put it.
In the coming weeks, we will see further attempts to slander and dismantle public trust in the Moldovan state. The current directive is to associate the state with the Action and Solidarity Party and with all the failures of this government. In this political chaos, the goal is for the population to be passive in voting, while pro-Russians are mobilized — and for the public to be unwilling to defend state institutions the day after the elections, should the Kremlin decide to trigger these “new realities.”
I am certain the scenarios are still being written and rewritten, and squads of analysts and political technologists are already stationed in Chișinău, monitoring Moldova’s developments by the second. The big problem for Moldova is that the Kremlin is no longer deluded by absurdities like “Kyiv in three days” or “Ukrainians want liberation” — now it is calculating every move…