Mykhailo SamusAlthough the phrase “little green men” has long seemed consigned to history – firmly associated with the brazen occupation and annexation of Ukraine’s Crimea in 2014 – it is back in the headlines. In Estonia, armed men in military fatigues without insignia were spotted near the border, triggering a sharp response: police cordoned off roads, and society asked the central question – is this already the prologue to Russian aggression, or merely a “hybrid” stress-test of Estonia’s and Europe’s response mechanisms? Against the backdrop of recent drone incursions into European airspace, provocations by Russian fighter jets, and acts of sabotage in European cities, Moscow’s signal is easy to read: the Kremlin is moving to a systematic testing of NATO’s and the EU’s eastern flank.
The “little green men” vignette on the Estonian border is a classic probing of a state system for speed and effectiveness of response. How will border guards, the military, police, territorial defence and local authorities react? And beyond that – how quickly and coherently does the state respond, and how synchronised are its allies? Meanwhile, Europe’s media space is filled with pieces on “what happens if Ukraine loses.” In the West, a distinct frame for this discussion is taking shape – one that, in fact, is critical for the future of Western civilisation.
If Russia wins: the scenarios under discussion
One catalyst for these debates is Professor Carlo Masala’s book If Russia Wins: A Scenario – a short yet sharp study that became a bestseller in Germany and the Netherlands. It models Russian aggression against Estonia in March 2028: two Russian brigades punch into Narva, while “tourists” disguised as civilians seize the Estonian island of Hiiumaa. Amid fatigue in Western capitals and a Kremlin-imposed “settlement” on Ukraine, Moscow tests whether the Alliance can uphold Article 5 when the case concerns “only” a border town. Masala underscores that after a “victory” over Ukraine, the Kremlin could change its geopolitical optics to avoid punishment – replacing Putin with a pseudo-liberal “new Gorbachev,” to whom parts of Europe would again be inclined to “forgive” the aggressor.
This storyline echoes the warning by American columnist George F. Will in The Washington Post: Russia is already at war with Europe, and drones over airports and bases are reconnaissance by force. Moscow is testing whether the West will shy away from decisions and how quickly it will move from statements to action. In parallel come “accidental” accidents, explosions, and maritime incidents – taken together, a creeping escalation calibrated to exploit the slowness of democracies.
European think tanks add their assessments. The European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR) as early as the start of 2025 sketched the consequences of a Russian “victory”: a demoralised and destabilised Ukraine, a new wave of emigration, toxic political dynamics, a legitimised Russian revisionism, and the unravelling of Europe’s security order. London’s Chatham House, modelling end-states to the war, warns that if U.S. support wanes, a “Russian victory” triggers a cascade of strategic effects – from collective doubt about American guarantees to a catalogue of “grey zones” where the Kremlin expands its footprint without overt escalation.
If Ukraine loses: the prospect draws closer
Debates in Europe over scenarios “if Ukraine loses” are becoming more realistic. Ten years ago, such modelling would have sparked protests from mainstream political forces in Germany or France (on the grounds it might “offend and provoke Russia”). Today, it has become one of the few realistic pathways for the current trajectory. The key point most Europeans now grasp is that a Russian “victory” over Ukraine is not about a new Russo-Ukrainian border – it is about a new reality in Europe. Possible consequences of an RF “victory” could exert the following pressures on the European continent:
- Possible unravelling of NATO through a crisis of trust among Allies. NATO could be forced into direct confrontation with Russia in the Baltic theatre. The “limited scale” of aggression in an Estonian border town is precisely the kind of test where hesitation by some partners could shatter trust and the Alliance’s core principle of collective defence.
- An economy under risk pressure. Investors would have to price high war risk into business models. Europe would drift, willy-nilly, into a “war economy” mode: sanctions, rearmament, investment not in social programmes but in defence industry, and the use of frozen Russian assets. All this would reshape Europe’s economic landscape. Yet it is obvious that Ukraine’s victory would be far cheaper than its defeat.
- Troubled European seas and skies. A “shadow fleet” in the Baltic, drone provocations, and threats to subsea infrastructure would become the new normal. This affects insurance, tariffs, and routes. Should Russia push further into Europe, these factors would multiply many times over.
- Political erosion. The rise of extremes in key states would slow decisions on defence and support for Ukraine. The Kremlin would keep playing on Europe’s fault lines, stoking migration crises and energy fears – exactly as laid out in “Ukraine’s defeat” scenarios.
- A precedent of impunity. If “success” in Ukraine is legitimised, rewarding aggression will stimulate new Kremlin adventures – from the Caucasus to the Arctic. Once the taboo on changing borders by force is broken, every “grey zone” becomes a stage for blackmail and armed provocations.
What Europe must do now
Call things by their name. Russia’s war against Europe should be called a war. The phrase “hybrid war” may soothe psychologically, but it blocks practical steps for countering and deterring Russia. While we hide behind the word “hybrid,” Moscow operates by the laws of wartime. Legal regimes, defence planning, budgets and industry must align with the real state of affairs on the European theatre.
Build a multilayered counter-drone air-defence system. Symbolic programmes like a “Drone Wall” can calm politicians, but what is needed is a real forward system built on Ukrainian experience: from radar networks and mobile firing means to EW and “digital perimeters” around critical sites. Common standards, joint procurement, weapons interoperability, and a clear division of responsibility are the keys to rapid results.
Support Ukraine as the best insurance against a major war. Russia is betting on attrition and a drawn-out, low-intensity conflict. The only answer is a long-term, predictable package for Ukraine: munitions, air defence, radars, EW, long-range strike means, plus repair and production capacity in Ukraine and the EU. Ukraine’s victory is cheaper for Europe than trying to contain Russia later on Europe’s own borders.
Systemic counter-sabotage against Russia. Ports, energy, communications, rail – these are traditional targets for Russian special services. Europe often fails to grasp this. Hence the need for joint rapid-response procedures: comprehensive action against the “shadow fleet,” cutting financing channels for proxy structures, criminal prosecution of agent networks, and protecting subsea infrastructure in coordination with the private sector.
An honest conversation with society. Russia skilfully plays on Europeans’ fatigue with the “Ukrainian war.” European politicians have one way to neutralise Moscow’s influence – explain frankly that as long as Russia can continue its aggression against Ukraine, the probability of a major war in Europe rises (not the reverse, as Viktor Orbán and other Russian influence agents in the EU claim). Europeans need to understand clearly: it is better to invest in defence and in helping Ukraine now than to fight Russian barbarians later on the streets of European cities.
Develop Europe’s defence industry. Europe needs joint orders for munitions, air defence and counter-drone systems, new production lines, interoperable standards, fast certification processes, and tax incentives for private investment. Joint programmes with Ukraine are not only support to the front; they also accelerate the cycle “from research to a combat system.”
The core lesson: Russia’s war against Ukraine is a war against Europe
Events around Estonia, drones over airports, and suspicious “incidents” at sea are pieces of a single mosaic. For now, Russia is measuring NATO’s reaction speed and the resilience of European societies: how effectively border forces respond, how long it takes a government to decide, what Washington will say, whether there are rifts between Paris and Berlin, how steadfast Warsaw is, how the Scandinavians act.
The “post-Ukraine-defeat” scenarios studied in think tanks and debated in the media testify to rising tension in Western academic circles and societies. Their chief value lies in the question itself: is it really more advantageous for Europe to “give up” Ukraine, as European populists argue? In practice, appeasement has its adherents in Europe. In reality, however, Ukraine’s defeat would bring a major war to the EU’s doorstep.
Europe has all the means to foil Russia’s designs: from scaling defence production to a joint anti-drone system; from robust logistics and infrastructure protection to pre-empting sabotage and speaking honestly to the public. In any case, the keystone of Europe’s strategy must be systematic, comprehensive support for Ukraine – to foreclose any scenarios of “if Ukraine loses.”