Sofiia HudymaThis article analyzes the difference in approaches toward China between the US National Security Strategies (NSS) under the Biden and Trump administrations (the 2022 National Security Strategy under President Joe Biden and the 2025 National Security Strategy under President Donald Trump). It compares how each strategy frames China in terms of national security priorities, strategic competition, alliance-building, economic and technological competition, and geopolitical objectives.
Key findings:
- Biden’s multilateral, values-based approach centered on a rules-based international order contrasts sharply with Trump’s bilateral, interest-focused “America First” strategy.
- Biden frames China as both an ideological and structural challenge to democratic values and global order, reflected in nuanced linguistic differentiation (PRC, Chinese Communist Party, Beijing). Trump views China primarily as an economic, technological, and military competitor, using simplified terminology and dedicating significantly less strategic focus to the relationship overall.
- While both administrations prioritize supply chain resilience, Biden proposes collaborative public-private partnerships and alliance-based coalitions (NATO, AUKUS, Quad), whereas Trump advocates unilateral protectionist measures and reduced alliance commitments.
Understanding the Linguistic and Conceptual Baseline
The comparative analysis of National Security Strategies (NSS) between the US’s current and previous administrations is vital for understanding the approaches used to address China-US relations historically, and how they differ from what we should expect in bilateral relations moving forward.
The comparative analysis of National Security Strategies (NSS) between the US’s current and previous administrations is vital for understanding the approaches used to address China-US relations historically, and how they differ from what we should expect in bilateral relations moving forward.
Certain linguistic details that might be overlooked at first glance serve as crucial indicators of each administration’s general perception of China and thus reveal the fundamental logic underlying each strategy.
Biden’s administration’s National Security Strategy (October 2022) uses the following terms when referring to China and related matters: China, Chinese, PRC, People’s Republic of China, Beijing, Chinese Communist Party, and Chinese Government. Across the document’s 48 pages and approximately 13,500 words, these China-related terms appear 64 times, accounting for 0.47% of the total word count. This diverse nomenclature suggests a differentiated analytical approach, distinguishing between the state apparatus (PRC, Beijing), the governing ideology (Chinese Communist Party), and the broader economic and political entity (China, Chinese).
Trump’s National Security Strategy (November 2025) demonstrates notably less terminological diversity, using only China, Chinese, and Beijing. Within the 33-page document containing roughly 10,000 words, China-related references constitute 25 mentions, representing 0.25% of the total word count. This represents approximately a 50% reduction in both frequency and linguistic variety compared to Biden’s strategy.
The diversion of terms in Biden’s approach implies a multidimensional analytical framework; Trump’s more restrained nomenclature may indicate either deprioritization relative to other concerns or a deliberate shift toward simplified framing.
Biden’s Rules-Based, Multilateral Framework
When examining the main ideas of both National Security Strategies, it is important to understand each administration’s global priorities and whether, or how prominently, China is featured on their agenda.
Biden’s NSS identifies two core priorities: a) an international order that is free, open, prosperous, and secure; b) as well as out-competing China as the primary strategic competitor. China is singled out as the only rival with both the intent to reshape the global order in its favour and an increasing economic, military, technological, and diplomatic capacity to do so.
Besides this fundamental challenge, Biden’s NSS outlines several other reasons that explain why China is a competitor that the US has to out-compete. These range from concerns about democratic erosion and the destabilizing effects of authoritarian governance on international stability, to China’s unwillingness to cooperate during global crises — as demonstrated during the COVID-19 pandemic. Economic asymmetries also concerned policymakers: the PRC makes the world dependent on its trade and enjoys international economic openness, yet resists its own market access and economic interdependence. Additionally, China’s recent military modernisation and expensive Arctic influence present strategic challenges as well.
Based on these assessments, Biden’s NSS presents a strategy for managing China relations: investing in core sources of American capacity at home, aligning the US’s efforts with those of its allies, and conducting the competition with China reasonably. The first two elements form the essential base for outcompeting China across economic, political, military, technological, and other domains.
The main means, with the realisation of which these goals had to be achieved, are the following:
Firstly, enhanced industrial capacity. The US will secure critical infrastructure, supply chains, and the semiconductor industry through public-private collaboration and strategic procurement to maintain technological competitiveness. As well as export controls and investment screening mechanisms that should be modernized to prevent strategic competitors from exploiting American and allied technologies.
Secondly, strengthened diplomatic relations. The US aims to deepen partnerships with democratic allies and states sharing American values. Through these coalitions, the US aims to increase cooperation on shared global challenges while advancing democratic governance, human rights, and protection against external coercion.
Thirdly, a modernized military. By pursuing advanced technologies and investing in the defense workforce, the US will strengthen deterrence amid rising geopolitical confrontation. This modernization positions the country to defend its homeland, allies, partners, overseas interests, and values globally.
Lastly, a rallied coalition of allies and partners. The US supports NATO’s adaptation to modern security challenges—including cyber defense, climate security, and countering the PRC. It is important to deepen multilateral relations through NATO, AUKUS, Quad, Five Eyes, IPEF, and APEC.
In addition to that, the NSS emphasizes the critical importance of a free and open Indo-Pacific. As it was stated that no region will be more significant to the world and the US, given its importance to international economic growth. As around two-thirds of global maritime trade and a quarter of global trade flow through the South China Sea, located in this region. However, achieving stability and openness in the Indo-Pacific requires collective efforts from the US and its regional partners and alliances, including ASEAN, AUKUS, Quad, IPEF, and APEC.
Recognizing China’s centrality to the global economy and its role in addressing shared challenges like climate change, Biden’s strategy calls for avoiding rigid bloc competition. Instead, the US prioritizes supporting Indo-Pacific allies’ sovereignty against coercion while advancing shared solutions to global problems — reflecting responsible, rather than escalatory competition.
Biden’s National Security Strategy acknowledges that while cooperation with China is possible where interests align — on climate change, global public health or disaster response — the strategy will not compromise American principles. The administration seeks to reduce military escalation risks through enhanced crisis communication and arms control efforts, while aiming to hold Beijing accountable for human rights abuses in Xinjiang, Tibet, and Hong Kong.
Trump’s Unilateral, Interest-Focused Framework
Unlike Biden’s NSS, Trump’s National Security Strategy frames American priorities differently. Rather than emphasising a rules-based international order, Trump’s strategy centers on “America First” and securing direct national interests. While both administrations identify China as a strategic competitor, Trump’s approach differs fundamentally in scope and emphasis.
Trump’s NSS identifies the following priorities: restoration of American economic dominance, reduction of costly overseas commitments, and prioritisation of homeland security and border control. China is featured in this framework as an economic and technological competitor rather than an ideological or alternative challenge. In the same manner as Biden’s NSS, Trump’s strategy recognises China as an economic competitor, but, unlike Biden’s emphasis on democratic values and alliances, Trump seems to prioritize bilateral economic leverage.
The strategic approach that is outlined in Trump’s NSS is different from Biden’s multilateral focus. Rather than investing in allied coalitions, Trump’s strategy is to take unilateral action through trade and strategic decoupling in critical sectors. Similar to Biden’s emphasis on supply chain security, Trump’s NSS calls to reduce American dependence on Chinese manufacturing. However, the means differ — Trump proposes to rely on protectionist policies rather than public-private collaboration.
In the same manner as Biden’s NSS, Trump’s NSS emphasises military modernisation and technological derangement, but Trump couples this with skepticism toward alliance commitment. The new strategy calls for burden-sharing, not American-led coalitions, and American-sponsored security agreements.
Trump’s NSS acknowledges the Indo-Pacific economic importance, similarly to Biden’s strategy. However, unlike the previous emphasis on alliance-strengthening through AUKUS, Quad, and IPEF, Trump doesn’t center on it and drifts away from long-term alliance obligations.
Taiwan Straight was traditionally mentioned, similarly to the last NSS, it was stated that the US does not support any unilateral change to the status quo, and deterrence of a conflict over Taiwan is a priority. However, it was mentioned that the US will build a military power capable enough to deny aggression in the First Island Chain if such were to occur, yet it was also noted that the US allies in the region must do much more for the collective defence.
While Biden’s NSS calls for avoiding bloc competition and pursuing joint solutions in climate change and public health with China, Trump’s strategy is silent on these dimensions.
Overall, Biden’s and Trump’s National Security Strategies both identify China as a competitor, yet differ in their approach to tackling it. Biden emphasises multilateral alliances and competition within a rules-based order, while Trump prioritises reduced security commitments and frames China as a competitor in economic, technological, and military spheres, but not as an ideological one.