Tetiana IshchykKey findings:
- Trilateral cooperation is critical: Japan, the U.S., and Taiwan need trilateral coordinated defense communication channels to avoid fatal mistakes during a crisis.
- Situational awareness and monitoring: Shared maritime and air monitoring platforms, data integration, and early-warning systems enhance the accuracy of threat identification.
- Protection of sea lines and escalation prevention: Securing maritime supply routes and regularly exchanging information on “red lines” reduce the risk of uncontrolled escalation.
In the context of a recent development that triggered a surge in tensions in East Asia- the statement by Japan’s new Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi regarding Taiwan, in which potential Chinese aggression was classified as an “existential threat to Japan,” thereby granting the country the right to exercise collective self-defense- the issue of regional security has sharply intensified.
This statement provoked an exceptionally strong reaction from the Chinese side, ranging from official diplomatic protests and threats to the imposition of economic sanctions and the conduct of large-scale military exercises, “Justice Mission 2025,” around Taiwan.
Against this backdrop, and in light of the current situation, it is worth paying close attention to expert assessments of a potential Taiwan crisis. In particular, this includes an exclusive interview with Tomohisa Takei (武居智久), former Chief of the Maritime Staff of the Japan Self-Defense Forces, published on July 24, 2025, by the Taiwanese media outlet The Storm Media (風傳媒) in the form of two articles: # 1, and #2.
First, In the interviews, Takei explains the need to strengthen defense cooperation among Japan, the United States, and Taiwan in the face of China’s growing military threat. He warns of critical vulnerabilities in Taiwan’s security system and calls for the urgent creation of a trilateral cooperation mechanism between Japan, the United States, and Taiwan. Based on the results of recent simulation exercises, he notes that the primary risk in the event of a conflict lies not only in the adversary’s military power, but also in the absence of unified communication channels, which could lead to fatal decision-making errors.
At present, there are no official defense communication channels between Japan and Taiwan. In a rapidly evolving situation, the lack of direct data exchange on suspicious vessels or aerial activity could cause delays that Takei describes as a “fatal risk.”
Since establishing official diplomatic channels is currently difficult, he proposes a “step-by-step model”: starting with informal dialogues among academics and retired military officers (Track 2), gradually involving government officials (Track 1.5), and eventually creating a full-fledged platform (Track 1).
In parallel, Takei considers the most realistic path to be leveraging existing U.S.–Taiwan communication mechanisms. If Japan were to join them as an observer or through data sharing, this would enable the formation of a trilateral model without the formal creation of new institutions.
Secondly, Takei places special emphasis on the development of shared information platforms in the maritime and air domains. Data sharing on sea lines of communication (SLOCs) and airspace could significantly enhance situational awareness without establishing cumbersome structures. He also proposes partial integration of Taiwan into existing joint emergency warning systems, such as early warning for ballistic missiles or anomalies in airspace. In his view, this would allow trust and operational experience to accumulate without radical political changes, laying the groundwork for closer cooperation in the future.
Thirdly, – an important element highlighted by Takei is the creation of so-called “off-ramp” mechanisms – tools to prevent uncontrolled escalation. This does not involve the immediate establishment of a joint command, but rather regular exchanges of views on “red lines,” early warning criteria, and multi-layered communication channels – from strategic leadership to the operational level. In his conviction, continuous dialogue and transparency are the most realistic means of reducing the risk of fatal mistakes during a crisis.
According to Takei’s assessment, Beijing has significantly accelerated its preparations for a force-based scenario. Through “military-civil fusion,” China is capable of converting civilian RO-RO vessels into military platforms within just 5–8 months.
Therefore, particular attention should be paid to strengthening friend-or-foe identification capabilities, as well as avoiding incidents of fratricide and misjudgments of the adversary’s posture. This can be achieved by implementing an enhanced monitoring system that combines AI-based recognition, sonar, and radar, as well as by integrating and cross-validating data from multiple sources to accurately determine the true intentions of civilian fleets.
Takei criticizes Taiwan’s outdated defense concept, which focuses solely on countering the enemy during an actual amphibious landing. He calls for a shift toward a strategy of “interdiction in the intermediate zone,” which includes strikes against enemy assembly points and supply bases before they even set sail. For this purpose, Japan plans to deploy around 1,000 long-range missiles to fill tactical gaps in the region’s defense.
The weakest point in Taiwan’s defense remains the protection of maritime supply routes. An analysis of Taiwan’s force posture shows an acute shortage of destroyers and long-range escort capabilities for cargo shipments. Without ensuring continuous supplies of fuel and resources, Taiwan would not be able to withstand a prolonged conflict.
Therefore, in Takei’s view, the creation of a joint system for protecting sea lines of communication with the participation of the United States and Japan is the most urgent task for the island’s survival.