NGRNThe war in Ukraine exemplifies the continuous evolution of conflict – from localised combat operations to whole-of-state defence. This transformation has fundamentally reshaped the approach to combat engineering support. Engineer troops no longer perform merely auxiliary functions; they have become one of the key instruments in shaping the battlespace and ensuring defensive resilience – effectively, the architects of the battlefield.
This was stated by Brigadier General Vasyl Syrotenko, Chief of Engineer Troops of the Support Forces Command of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, during his address at the Combat Engineer & Logistics 2026 forum, a leading European platform for cooperation in engineering support and logistics, bringing together representatives of defence ministries, engineering equipment manufacturers, armed forces of NATO member states, and partner countries.
Further details are provided in General Syrotenko’s interview with Ukrinform by Pavlo Balkovski
WE HAVE MOVED BEYOND MULTI-LAYERED DEFENCE TO BUILDING A RESILIENT DEFENCE
– Over the past two years, engineer troops have effectively changed their approach to defensive construction. In simple terms, what exactly has changed? What does this echeloned, resilient defence look like in practice today?
– The approach to executing engineering support tasks has changed fundamentally. Not only recently – it is evolving continuously, and we remain in a constant process of transformation and adaptation to changing conditions.
If we speak about defence, the nature of warfare has developed so significantly compared to the past that perhaps only the term “defensive line” remains. In reality, these defensive lines now have entirely new substance and content.
We have progressed beyond simply establishing a multi-layered, echeloned defence to building a resilient defence – one that simultaneously enables manoeuvre for our forces and, above all, creates favourable conditions for the employment of unmanned systems, which currently bear the main burden of engaging the enemy.
Our task is to prevent infiltration or enemy advance on the battlefield. Accordingly, we observe the intensive construction of defensive systems – primarily a comprehensive set of engineer obstacles: wire entanglements, so-called “pyramids” (dragon’s teeth), combined with wire barriers, and successive anti-tank ditches. This constitutes a complex engineering system that restricts and denies enemy movement across our territory.
– What role do engineer obstacles play within this system? Why is emphasis placed on continuous non-explosive obstacles combined with mine warfare? How does this system function as an integrated whole, and why does it produce such significant enemy losses?
– Previously, the system of engineer obstacles was primarily intended to create favourable conditions for fire engagement. Today, however, continuous multi-layered obstacle systems – impossible to breach quickly – have become one of the principal factors in destroying the enemy on the battlefield.
They create conditions for other units to engage the enemy while also directly increasing the lethality coefficient. The enemy is often halted, disoriented, and entangled within these obstacles, unable to advance and suffering losses directly along these lines.
Moreover, obstacles exert a strong psychological effect: they create a sense of constant danger, uncertainty, and loss of control, reducing tempo, initiative, and morale.
As a result, the enemy is forced to alter plans, expend additional resources on reconnaissance and breaching operations, or seek alternative routes – allowing us to impose an unfavourable operational scenario. Thus, engineer obstacles are now regarded as a full-fledged means of enemy destruction, not merely an enabling system.
– How has the work of engineer units changed with the advent of unmanned systems? How does remote mining function today, and why has it become a key tool of deterrence?
– First, unmanned systems have proven to be a class of weapon combining accessibility, high precision, and operational effectiveness. They have fundamentally reshaped the architecture of warfare and are now among the primary factors influencing combat outcomes.
Accordingly, engineer obstacles are designed to enhance the effectiveness of unmanned systems. Traditional concepts such as the line of contact, deep rear, or safe zone have effectively disappeared – these are now covered by unmanned capabilities.
Engineer troops increasingly rely on mobile, unmanned, and robotic systems to perform engineering support tasks. For instance, UAVs are used for remote mining and establishing obstacle systems deep towards enemy positions.
– What does remote mining look like in practice?
– These tasks are carried out by dedicated remote mining units employing both UAVs and ground robotic systems. They enable rapid denial of enemy movement routes while simultaneously inflicting casualties.
The primary emphasis is on UAV-based remote mining. This significantly increases efficiency and, critically, reduces risks to personnel. Where sappers previously operated in hazardous areas, tasks are now performed remotely – faster, more precise, and safer.
Importantly, the entire process is monitored in real time. We observe both task formulation and execution, record the destruction of enemy personnel and equipment, and integrate all confirmed targets into the Delta situational awareness system, ensuring data reliability and objectivity.
Commanders at command posts can monitor the formation of obstacle systems in real time, make immediate decisions, adjust actions, and assess results.
LARGE STRONGPOINTS AND FORTIFIED AREAS WITH HIGH PERSONNEL CONCENTRATION ARE INEFFECTIVE
– Why have the Armed Forces of Ukraine shifted from large strongpoints to compact squad-level positions? What defines a modern squad position, particularly in terms of protection against FPV drones?
– The primary objective is to preserve the lives of our soldiers against high-precision weapons dominating the battlefield today.
This evolution began not in 2022 but as early as 2015, when stabilisation lines were constructed. At that time, large fortified areas were established, often equipped with artillery, mortars, and air defence systems.
Today, with the widespread use of UAVs, precision weapons, and guided aerial munitions, such large concentrations of personnel are ineffective.
Instead, small squad-level positions are sufficient – capable of covering obstacle sectors and conducting other tasks. Moreover, traditional large-scale frontal assaults are no longer characteristic of enemy tactics.
Modern positions must be low-observable, equipped with comprehensive anti-drone protection, and provide adequate protection against artillery and aerial threats. They must ensure observation, defined fields of fire, and defensive resilience.
– What engineering solutions ensure this? How do covered trenches and underground passages affect logistics and evacuation?
– The more the enemy operates from above, the deeper we must conceal ourselves. The deeper you dig, the greater your survivability.
Trench overhead cover began to be widely implemented in 2024–2025 as protection against drones and is now standard. Protective structures and communication routes are also covered to maximise survivability.
ANTI-DRONE CORRIDORS NOW EXTEND FOR THOUSANDS OF KILOMETRES
– FPV drones are a major threat. How have engineer troops adapted? What are anti-drone corridors?
– This is a rapidly developing area. Initially, anti-drone corridors were simple measures to protect personnel moving to positions.
Today, they have evolved into extensive systems – thousands of kilometres of protected routes covering key logistics corridors up to the front line.
These include road coverings, entry and exit points, and reinforced vulnerable sections such as intersections. They are widely implemented in cities like Izium, Kharkiv, Zaporizhzhia, Kherson regions, and most extensively in Donetsk region.
They ensure safe movement for logistics and evacuation vehicles.
The depth of drone engagement has expanded from 5 km to 50–100 km. The enemy even employs Shahed-type UAVs for remote mining and layered drone attacks.
Thus, anti-drone protection has effectively become a national-level task – ensuring safety up to 100 km from the line of contact.
– Are anti-drone corridors essentially nets stretched over roads?
– Yes. They must be cost-effective and scalable. These nets are engineered to support loads while allowing vehicle passage.
While no net can fully withstand an explosion, their design reduces fragmentation effects and deflects shaped-charge jets, significantly increasing survivability.
AUTONOMOUS POSITIONS AND AI ARE NO LONGER A FUTURE CONCEPT
– How realistic are remotely operated combat modules and autonomous positions? Is AI being integrated?
– Engineering support tasks are performed not only by engineer troops but by the entire Defence Forces, including the State Special Transport Service and civilian administrations.
AI-enabled remotely operated combat modules are already being introduced. Extensive trials are underway to establish fully autonomous positions incorporating integrated systems – small arms, automatic grenade launchers, air defence, and full-spectrum capabilities from reconnaissance and identification to engagement.
These systems will enable both deterrence and manoeuvre. Autonomous strongpoints are not a distant future – they are already being implemented.
AFTER UNMANNED SYSTEMS, THE ENEMY SUFFERS THE GREATEST LOSSES FROM ENGINEER OBSTACLES
– In summary, what is the role of engineering support in overall defence resilience?
– Engineering support has moved beyond its traditional tactical role to become a state-level function, extending deep into the rear areas, training grounds, and concentration zones.
It includes maintaining logistics routes, countering strikes on infrastructure, and restoring critical assets – much of which remains classified.
Today, engineering support operates across tactical, operational, and strategic levels.
Without diminishing other branches, it can be stated that after unmanned systems, the enemy suffers the greatest losses precisely from engineer obstacles.
On average, up to 1,000 enemy personnel are neutralised monthly on such obstacles.
These systems consist of continuous non-explosive barriers – wire obstacles and anti-tank ditches – combined with UAV-based remote mining both at the forward edge and in depth.
For example, in March 2026, engineer units of the Defence Forces of Ukraine destroyed 663 enemy personnel, 95 pieces of equipment, and three additional targets through obstacle systems.
Even when not destroyed immediately, the enemy becomes immobilised within these barriers, enabling UAVs to complete the engagement.
Therefore, the provision of engineer obstacles and munitions is a priority within the national defence strategy and military-political leadership.
Photo: Yulia Ovsiannykova, Danylo Antoniuk