Yurii PoitaThe Center for Strategic & International Studies published articles (here and here) with satellite images showing evidence of arms transfers from the DPRK to Russia. The transfer is carried out via the Korean port of Najin and Tumagang railway station to the Russian port of Danube, a coastal region.
The photo shows containers, boxes and equipment (Tumagang railway station – 73 railcars, Najin port – six sea voyages, 58 6-meter containers) and reception from the Russian side (Dunay port, Primorsky Krai).
In addition, the following conclusions should be drawn:
Firstly, Russia exhausted its reserves of artillery and ammunition, which were initially allocated for hostilities against Ukraine, after which it depleted part of its strategic reserves and began to search for ammunition abroad, including in North Korea
At the same time, the DPRK has ammunition reserves estimated at 4-6 months of full-scale hostilities against South Korea, but has significant opportunities for their production, especially cartridges for small arms, grenades for anti-tank weapons, artillery ammunition, rockets for MLRS.
Secondly, the sale of arms to Russia is likely to be carried out from the existing stockpiles of the DPRK, while the defense industry will replenish their shortage with new ammunition.
Thirdly, the contents of the containers sent from the DPRK to Russia are still unknown, as satellite images do not allow us to understand the contents of the shipments contained in the containers, wagons and boxes, at the same time, according to some estimates, they contain cartridges for small arms, anti-tank grenade launchers, shells for artillery and MLRS, mines.
The problem is that it is not yet possible to estimate the volumes that have already or may be sent, as well as the duration of transfers in the future, since it is not known what specific means and in what proportions are transferred and planned for further sending.
Another problem is that the available land and sea logistics between the DPRK and Russia allow to ensure the current rate of shipments and easily increase it due to the diversification of the ports of shipment and reception, which are in sufficient number both in the DPRK and in the Primorsky Krai of the Russian Federation with rail connections for transportation to the necessary part of Russia (for use in Ukraine or to replenish depleted stocks).
It is difficult to ensure constant monitoring of shipments and estimation of their volumes, due to the fact that after the publication of satellite images, Russia and North Korea will probably diversify the ports of shipment and loading, thereby misleading about the routes and volumes of supplies. In addition, the northern part of the Korean peninsula is characterized by high cloudiness, which significantly complicates the observation of objects using satellite optical reconnaissance.
The sending of arms and ammunition by China through the DPRK (with the aim of concealing the participation of the PRC in the provision of military-technical assistance to Russia) is still assessed as unlikely due to the fact that China has a sufficient number of its own sea, land and air corridors that can to ensure both the required volumes and the pace of deliveries. At the same time, the contents of the shipments will be hidden in the containers, which will enable China to claim that they contain non-military goods for bilateral trade. The issue of image for China currently plays a smaller and smaller role.