Igor FedykNext week Brussels will host a meeting of the European Council. There are high hopes for it in Ukraine, because accession negotiations with it could be opened at this meeting, and this would be a serious step ahead on its European integration path. The Council’s meeting will be important for the EU itself, because there could finally be decided how exactly its further enlargement will take place. Which is also important for Ukraine and other candidate states. The issues of the upcoming European Council’s meeting and what Ukraine can expect from it, the EU enlargement process, as well as Ukraine’s European integration prospects, we have discussed with Pierre Mirel, a former director for the Western Balkans in the European Commission and expert on the enlargement issue.
The European Parliament recently approved a report on the need to reform the European Union. Proposals for the implementation of such reforms were also approved. What are these proposals and how realistic is their implementation in practice?
Well, they have adopted a list of comprehensive proposals. To simplify, I would say that the European Parliament had three main objectives. One was to give itself more power to become more important in the framework of EU institutions, in particular, by giving it a legislative initiative. Also it was suggested that President of the EU Commission to be elected, not appointed, and then confirmed by the EU Council. Second was to ensure that some reforms would facilitate the functioning of EU institutions. And the third objective, I think, was to take into account, as much as possible, what citizens, or those who participated in the Convention on the Future of Europe, expressed as their wish for changes.
Some proposals could be accepted without any problems, but I don’t think that at this stage the EU Council or member states would go as far as electing the President of the Commission or accepting qualified majority voting for across the sectors, or giving full legislative initiative to the European Parliament. For me, it’s idealistic, but unrealistic.
Also, they propose to limit the number of commissioners, which I personally think is not a good idea. First, although the Commissioners in Brussels are independent from their country of origin, they are the face of the country for its citizens. Second, having by every country its own Commissioner reinforces the capacity of the EU Commission and the EU in general to explain the policies to the country and to make sure that public opinion would accept it. For example, it would be much easier for Ukrainians, once Ukraine will be a member, to accept some decisions of proposals from the EU Commission if there is a Ukrainian Commissioner in Brussels.
Pierre Mirel
There are concerns that the EU is unlikely to carry out reforms in the foreseeable future, precisely because reforming the Union’s institutions and decision-making mechanisms will be a very difficult and long-term process. How real are such concerns?
Well, it’s becoming really cumbersome when you have one single country, say Hungary, opposing and blocking important decisions within EU. So, you cannot continue like that. At the same time, excluding one, two, or three member states from an EU common position, would, in my view, weaken the position of the EU as a whole. Because then the citizens of those countries or the third states would claim that there was no consensus, that X number of countries were excluded, so that is unfair, there’s no legitimacy, etc. So I’m not sure that qualified majority voting would be accepted across the sectors, including foreign security.
In my opinion, there can be two possible ways out of the situation. One is to go to four-fifths majority. The French and the German governments have appointed a team of experts to look at possible reforms of the EU treaty. They are suggesting changing the rules on Article 7, whereby you can impose sanctions on a country that does not respect the so-called fundamental rule of law. And they say that if there’s a lack of consensus in European Council, then after a certain period of time, one should move to a four-fifths majority. I think the same should be done for the opening of accession negotiations. An alternative which I’m also pleading for is to have not a single veto to oppose a certain decision, but at least three of them. So, you will not fall into the hands of only one country, which, for nationalistic or far-right reasons is opposing this or that decision.
Is it possible to enlarge the European Union without implementation of the reforms you mentioned?
If the EU really wants to stick to 2030 and have at least one or two new members, then some reforms definitely have to be done. The minimum in my view would be to include some minimum reforms in the accession treaty of the first or first two new members.
And what about the reforms of the budgeting processes?
Well, that would be very difficult. But on the other hand, how to enlarge and ensure the same budget support if there are no additional resources? That’s absolutely impossible, because it means two difficulties. The first is that you need accept to increase EU resources by new taxation, for instance on financial transactions. Then you’ll have enough resources to continue more or less the same policies, like common agriculture policy, cohesion policy, etc. But I don’t think that certain member states will accept to increase, or to increase tremendously contributions to the budget. So, the alternative is to reduce the budget support to certain policies – common agriculture, cohesion. And here you will face the opposition not only from the Eastern European farmers, who greatly benefit from the CAP, but also from the French and the Germans.
Of course, at the end, there will be a compromise. I think, there will be additional resources, which some countries may like it or not, they will have to accept if they support enlargement. But there will be less money for certain policies, which will be modified.
Next week there will be a meeting of the European Council. What do you expect from it? Do you expect important decisions on EU enlargement there?
Well, I expect the EU Council to agree on the principle of gradual accession. This has been pushed very strongly by Charles Michel since more than one year. Most Western Balkan countries are very happy with that. And after acceptation of the gradual accession principle, the Council is likely to ask the EU Commission to work out next year a comprehensive system, including on the use of the reversibility clause, whereby financial support would be frozen if reforms are stuck or backsliding.
The other two important decisions will be on Bosnia and Herzegovina and, of course, Ukraine. I think Bosnian candidate status will be accepted. I expect even strong pressures to open accession negotiations with Bosnia and Herzegovina, but I don’t think it will go through this time. As for Ukraine and opening the negotiations with it – that will to the large extent depend on the three countries: Hungary, Slovakia and Netherlands. I think Hungary would be in difficulty, at least at this stage, to find new arguments for opposing. But you can expect everything from Orban. Slovakia – we don’t know what will be Fico’s final position. So, what remains, is Netherlands. Although, it will be a government of Mark Rutte, who will take a decision, but in the political tradition of Netherlands, even a caretaking government, or any government actually, has to get the approval from the parliament before any major decision in Brussels. So what will be the position of their parliament? That remains to be seen. And here we should not forget that in 2016 it was the Netherlands who opposed the association agreement. A small NGO, that convinced Rutte’s government to go for a nationwide referendum. I suppose, there will be many pressures on Mark Rutte to accept opening negotiations with Ukraine, and as he is leaving the political scene, he may be inclined to push and go ahead. But nevertheless his final position is a big question mark.
So, you mean that there might be an unpleasant surprise regarding Ukrainian issue on this meeting. Right?
It could be. In that case, the sort of exit possibility would be to say: “We will meet again in the European Council in June with a short, intermediary report of the European Commission in April-May to see whether Ukraine is still on the track of making the good reforms.” This has been done in the past with different candidates.
Won’t it be a kind of a disaster for the EU if there will be no start of negotiations with Ukraine in December? Won’t it affect the credibility of the EU?
I don’t think so. You know, there are frustrations in the Balkans. Not just because Ukraine has received a candidate status when some countries have not. But people are suspicious in the Balkans that the EU, for political reasons, is looking through magnifying glass at the Western Balkans and through rose-tinted glasses at Ukraine, as minister Schallenberg was hinting at. There is this sentiment, not just in the Balkans, but also you can read in the press of the Western EU countries, that EU is going very far with Ukraine. Granting candidate status was not contested by anyone, because refusing to grant candidacy last year would have signified a victory for Putin. But starting the negotiations is another process. Also I must say that granting candidate status and now opening accession negotiations, the EU would create a lot of expectations in Ukraine, giving the feeling that every year a big decision is taken, so accession should take only a short period of time. Well, I’m afraid it will take a longer period of time that may have more people feel. And therefore, unfortunately, it can cause frustrations and enlargement fatigue within Ukrainian society as it has already with the Western Balkans.
Today we see changes in the political landscape of the EU. The government of Robert Fico came to power in Slovakia. In the Netherlands, the populist Freedom party won the elections. Viktor Orban is still in power in Hungary and feels himself quite well. Next year there will be elections to the European Parliament and a new composition of the European Commission. How seriously will these factors affect the EU enlargement?
I think they will. The strengthening of Eurosceptic and far right political parties in Western part of Europe will affect enlargement. In particular, because of budget resources. People will say: “We need to reduce inequalities in our countries, we need to tackle climate change, we can’t afford spending billions for countries which are counting too much on Brussels”, etc.
As for the EU Commission, I’m not sure it will be affected seriously, because I guess, the traditional parties – Social Democrats, or the Greens, or the Liberals, or the Conservatives – will still constitute the majority in most member states. And therefore the commissioners would come from these parties, but not from the far-right ones. So, the EU Commission not, but European Parliament – yes. It might be different and, possibly, with a reinforced far-right group.
How realistic is 2030 as a date for enlargement?
I think it’s realistic for the EU to be ready. The EU has to be ready. Here, there’s really a question of credibility. Not so much vis-a-vis Ukraine at this stage, but vis-a-vis the Balkans, because they’ve been waiting for 20 years. And therefore you have all these different discussions, proposals coming from the European Parliament, coming from this Franco-German experts group and others. So, I think it must be ready.
You mean it will be reformed. Right?
Yes, I think it will be ready for some reforms. Maybe as I said before – for minimum reforms.
Will that be enough for enlargement?
I think, yes, for, at least, one or two. And given today’s situation, the only country that is at the best place for being ready, is Montenegro. It’s a small country with no bilateral issues with its neighbors. Despite it’s a multi-ethnic society, they work together pretty well, and there have never been real difficulties between the different groups in Montenegro. Also, small country means small expenditures for the EU, so it can continue without big problems and changes current budget policies. So, if the current Montenegrin coalition and government stands, then Montenegro would have a reasonable chance of joining the EU around 2030.
And what about Ukraine? Does it have any chance of becoming a member of the EU by 2030?
I think it’s impossible by that time. I don’t see how it can do it. Well, on one hand, it’s amazing looking at how Ukraine is doing extraordinary things while fulfilling the accession criteria. But on another, will it be sufficient for membership? Will your leadership sustain the current pace of the reforms? That’s a question. Another thing is that the EU in the past, in particular with Western Balkans, has always been looking for something what is called a “track record”. That is, you don’t just adopt a law, but you have to demonstrate after that, at the certain period of time, that it’s working. Then you have what we discussed before – the question of the current policies: the Common Agriculture Policy or the Cohesion policy. You’ve seen the other day the reactions of the Polish farmers because of the import of grain from Ukraine. So, imagine what would happen in France, when time comes. Imagine what Hungarians and Poles would say if the cohesion fund is cut by 30-40 percent to give space to Ukraine participating in a renovated cohesion policy. So, this is another reason. And the fourth reason, which I think is the most important one, is that when the war ends up, if some part of the Ukrainian territory, unfortunately, is still occupied, what to do? Under such circumstances it would be very difficult to convince member states to go ahead with Ukraine’s accession. Because the Article 42-7 of the EU treaty says that if a member state is attacked, all the other member states should react or should provide aid and assistance in their power. And I don’t see how the EU would react. There’s no EU army. I don’t think there would be an EU army by 2030.
So, I don’t see how Ukraine could join, unless there is a peace treaty of some sort with Russia. You could say this is unfair. Yes, it is unfair. Because then we – Ukraine and the EU – would entirely be the hostage of Putin or whoever would be in power in Russia. As we are hostage today of Erdogan on the North of Cyprus. But the difference though is that Turkey is part of NATO. But Russia is not. So I don’t think that there would be a consensus among the 27-28 or whatever states to accept a divided and occupied Ukraine – even if it’s not the whole territory.
Nevertheless, all abovementioned should not prevent Ukrainian society and the state from doing everything possible to fulfill all criteria. It means that at a certain point – it could be 2030 or later – Ukraine would have fulfilled almost all the criteria. And then there would be transitory period, when it would be told that for the time being, because of that situation, it cannot be accepted fully, but it is 95% member, so it has all the benefits: in terms of policy, participation, EU Council, meetings, etc… And in the conditions in which it would be, I would say it will be a pretty good result for your country. But obviously, that’s only my very personal view!