Yurii PoitaLast week, Putin made another state-level visit to China, during which he met with the President of the People’s Republic of China, Xi Jinping, took part in the opening ceremony of the Russian-Chinese EXPO exhibition and the Forum of the Regions, and together with Xi Jinping signed a joint statement on deepening partnership and a dozen other documents
At first glance, the visit is similar to dozens of similar, usually quite pathetic visits, with the signing of documents on “strategic cooperation” and “eternal friendship” and assurances of friendship. At the same time, the significance of the visit cannot be underestimated, as its results may pose a threat to Ukraine’s national security.
The role of China in the Russian defense industry
First, despite the fact that the probability of China transferring weapons to Russia remains unlikely, China became not only Russia’s main trading partner for two years from 2022 (exports increased from 146 to 240 billion US dollars from 2021 to 2023 ), but also the main source of components for Russian weapons and the defense-industrial complex. As of June 2023, the share of microelectronic components in Russian weapons increased tenfold and reached 75%. By 2024, according to the US, it will already be 90%. In addition, there is significant support for the production of Russian drones (in August 2023, the share of components from China was 67%) and high-precision machine tools for defense factories (in July 2023, 57% came from China, compared to 12% by February 2022, currently for according to US data – 70%).
The transfer of components by China to Russia allows to fulfill a number of tasks: to support the Russian defense industry, and to continue the war against Ukraine; for many countries, China remains a formally neutral player, since the components are dual-use and do not contain ready-made samples of weapons. There are reasons to believe that despite China’s official denial of the facts of deliveries, deliveries will increase. This is one of the key threats to Ukraine and Europe, as it significantly strengthens Russia’s military capabilities. Especially since a number of signed contracts could simply not be made public.
Chinese-Russian intergovernmental cooperation
Secondly, Putin’s visit was actually held after the appointment of a new Russian government, which included a number of people who have considerable experience and already developed connections with China, and some even speak fluent Chinese. In particular, in the line of investment and priority projects, including defense industry and energy, relations will be built between the first deputy head of the Russian government, Denis Manturov, and the first vice-premier of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China, Ding Xuesian. The specified Chinese official will also coordinate cooperation in the field of energy and anti-sanction measures with the Deputy Prime Minister Oleksandr Novak. The peculiarity of Ding Xuexian is that he is the most influential person in the State Council of the People’s Republic of China, the only member of the Standing Committee of the CPC Politburo (sixth in rank), heads two Russian-Chinese commissions (on energy and investment cooperation), and is considered a close person to Xi Jinping.
The development of Siberia and the Far East will be coordinated by the Deputy Prime Minister of Russia, Yuriy Trutnev, and the Vice Premier of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China, Zhang Guoqing. This Chinese official in charge of industry and information technology, emergency management and state-owned enterprises, worked for Norinco – the main defense contractor of the PRC for ten years, was the secretary of the CPC in Liaoning province, which borders Russia, so he has a good grasp of the regional cooperation situation.
The new Minister of Defense Andrii Belousov, who was Manturov’s predecessor as the first deputy head of the government, already has developed connections with the Vice Premier of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China Ding Xuexian and his predecessor Han Zheng, currently the Deputy Chairman of the People’s Republic of China.
Former Minister of Industry and Trade Manturov, who was appointed as the first deputy head of Mishustin’s government for industrial affairs, including the defense industry, previously took an active part in Russian-Chinese defense cooperation talks, and was the first Russian minister to visit China after Prigozhin’s uprising. Manturov is well versed in the situation in the People’s Republic of China, and his deputy, Oleksiy Gruzdev, was the trade representative of Russia in the People’s Republic of China in 2013-2016 and is fluent in Chinese.
Therefore, if the work of the new Russian government is aimed at transitioning to a more militarized economy, China will play a key role in these efforts, which will pose threats to Ukraine in the short term.
“Peace initiatives” of China
Thirdly, the actions of China are being observed, which may be aimed at disrupting the Ukrainian peace plan, which will be presented at the summit in Switzerland, by promoting the Chinese alternative “peace plan”, which does not correspond to international law or Ukrainian national interests. Despite the fact that the “Position of China on the settlement of the Ukrainian crisis” of 2023 (which states the thesis about the need to respect territorial integrity) has not yet undergone changes, some subsequent Chinese statements no longer include this clause. This applies, for example, to the recently signed Russian-Chinese joint statement on deepening partnership, which did not mention the need to ensure territorial integrity.
In addition, in the document of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China based on the results of the third round of China’s “shuttle diplomacy” to the countries of the so-called Global South (he visited Turkey, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and held telephone talks with Brazil, Indonesia, South Africa and Kazakhstan), among three principles and six points, there is no mention of respect for territorial integrity. It is quite likely that during the negotiations, Li Hui promoted exactly this formula for resolving the conflict. In addition, it is not known whether this was a consequence of China’s “shuttle diplomacy”, but it was after it that the presidents of Brazil and South Africa refused to participate in the summit.
Instead, China is calling for a ceasefire and the resumption of peace talks with Russia. If such a plan is implemented, it will lead to the military defeat of Ukraine, since: a) it anchors Russia on the occupied borders; b) creates conditions for the cessation of arms supplies to Ukraine (since peace negotiations will most likely lead to the cessation or significant reduction of arms supplies from Europe). And in the already “deeply concerned” European capitals, the impression will be created that the conflict is over, and therefore ways to de-escalation must be made.
Ultimately, this will give Russia the opportunity to split Ukrainian society and undermine confidence in its Western allies. Instead, Russia will not stop strengthening its military component, and after reaching the appropriate level of combat capability, will continue hostilities with a new force.
What should Ukraine do?
First, one should not underestimate the negative consequences for Ukraine of deepening the Russian-Chinese partnership. The experience of two years of full-scale war has shown that China does not play and is unlikely to play a constructive role in resolving the conflict. Attempts to get him on their side, even in such matters as nuclear safety, maintenance of the grain corridor and the return of deported Ukrainian children, have not brought any results. Instead, China systematically works to help Russia, in particular in the defense industry, and increases its support.
Secondly, the Ukrainian government should clearly express its concerns about China’s support for Russia in public and non-public communication. According to a number of observations, the European partners do not have any information from the Ukrainian government about the amount of Chinese components in the Russian defense industry, which weakens the possibilities for them to impose sanctions on China. It was often heard: “if Ukraine is satisfied with China’s position, but does not say anything about Chinese components, then why should we impose sanctions?”.
Beijing sees that Europe, apart from declarative statements, does not take practical steps against Chinese companies, so it calmly increases the volume of supplies. While publicly denying this fact.
Third, it is worth abandoning attempts to involve China in peace initiatives, including participation in the peace conference in Geneva. Even if the representative of the People’s Republic of China participates in the event, he will very likely promote his “peace formula”, which does not provide for the restoration of the territorial integrity of Ukraine, while at the same time he will call for the cessation of hostilities and the cessation of the supply of weapons to Ukraine, which, in the conditions of Russia’s increase in its military capabilities, is a direct threat to Ukrainian statehood.