Igor FedykUntil recently, the relations between Ukraine and Romania were quite cool. Kyiv looked at Bucharest with a kind of mistrust, and Bucharest, in turn, ignored its northern neighbor and directed all its eyes to the West. Now, Ukrainian-Romanian relations have not only improved, but are generally moving towards a strategic partnership. What made Ukraine and Romania look at each other in a new way? What is the prospect of developing their relationship into a strategic partnership? How Romania helped Ukraine after the start of the Russian aggression? What does Ukraine’s European and Euro-Atlantic integration mean for Romania? Does Russia try to hinder the Ukrainian-Romanian rapprochement? These and other questions were discussed with Iulian Chifu the former Adviser to the President of Romania on Strategic Issues, Security and Foreign Policy, and the President of the Center for Conflict Prevention and Early Warning.
Mr. Chifu, how do you see the current state of Romanian-Ukrainian relations comparing it to the ones that we had ten years before?
They’re incomparable. Back then it was a lounge in our relations. But meanwhile things evolved in the wrong way. Remember your Minister of Defence, then Prime Minister Ehanurov who declared that the main threat to the Ukrainian state is Romania. On one hand, I was angry, but on another, I was proud. Okay, if Ukraine considers that we are a major threat comparing to Russia – this means something. But actually this broke the relationship.
When was the turning point for a change in our relations?
It was an attempt in 2005, with the Basescu- Yushchenko commission, after the orange revolution. Than, I think that it was the annexation of Crimea in 2014 with very few ups and downs afterwards. But it is not comparable to what we are seeing after the 24th of February, 2022 when the relationship completely improved. The best confirmation of this is the help that Romania provided and continues to provide to Ukraine. First, it should be mentioned here the simple fact of welcoming more than 1.2 million of Ukrainian refugees here. And it wasn’t only the government who decided to do something for Ukrainians, but also the Romanian society, the Romanian citizens. And this shows the real state of relationship between our nations nowadays.
Romanian military aid was also significant. Here at the level of the citizens, it was a little bit more complicated to convey to them the level of support that Ukraine has received from Romania, because we had this policy of not disclosing the military aid and everything related to it. But in March 2023, according to the polls, 65% of the Romanians “knew” that we were making the military supplies, even though we didn’t have the formal communication to them.
Another important moment is the support of Ukraine, as well as Republic of Moldova, during the blackout, which happened there after the attack on the electricity distribution lines in 2022.
Now, we shared with you one of our Patriot systems. This is very important for your energy production, because the more air defense systems you have, the better you can defend your energy production facilities.
Helping you to export of grain was also a big achievement for us. Meaning that we succeed in building sea corridor from Odessa to Turkey through our territorial waters. Another big deal is the increasing of exports of Ukrainian goods through Romanian territory. And this made us to open new border crossings and to enlarge trans-border cooperation.
Also we had here less farmer protests then in Poland. And this is the merit of our government. It was a huge effort of mitigation, of discussing with them, of realizing what makes sense or what doesn’t make sense for them.
So, it was an enormous work, an enormous effort, and I’m very happy that we succeed in doing this.
In October last year, during president Zelenskyi’s visit to Bucharest, Romanian President Klaus Iohannis said that Ukraine and Romania decided to jointly start a concrete process of raising relations between them to the level of a strategic partnership. What is the interpretation of the concept of strategic partnership in Romania?
I our case,the strategic partnership have three levels. So we have security and defense strategic level. The second one is economy, energy trade and finances. And the third one is culture, people-to-people relations, education, research etc. But for being strategic, you need the “two plus two” format meetings (a dialogue mechanism between two countries’ defence and external affairs ministries – edit.) each half a year in the first layer. That’s the way that strategic partnerships have been developing by Romania with each and every of our partners.
Another point of the strategic partnership is the common session of the government, where all the bilateral issues are tackled directly. It’s one of the closest ways of dealing with multiple issues that we have. And in common session of the government you also can put problems that you have on the table and solve them because as you know already the problems and you are coming with the deliverables, solving as much as possible for them.
So, today we have a number of strategic partnerships. We have a structure of our security based on the strategic partnership with the US, with NATO and EU, plus the system of strategic partnerships with other countries like the UK, Poland, Turkey and others. And the relations with Ukraine are supposed to be upgraded at the strategic partnership level. The most important part, besides the in-depth of the bilateral relations and everything related to this, is that we are beginning this “two plus two dialogue”, which is done twice per year. Within this strategic dialogue the most important issues related to security, defense, strategic approaches of both of the countries are being discussed. And I can say, that current relations with Ukraine are one of the closest that we are developing with a third country. After some time, by the way we will have a document about strategic partnership that will be signed and which will fix concretely what we about to do, what we are already doing or have done.
When we should expect the signing of this document?
It’s hard to say. But I know that it’s a matter of negotiations at this point. I think it won’t last too much, because we also have to sign the security arrangements with you, which is under negotiation. We changed our state secretary for strategic affairs in the MFA, who was responsible for that. And now we have to catch up and to sign this security arrangements, which goes in accordance with the security arrangements between NATO countries and Ukraine.
As for the strategic partnership agreement, which for sure will include the security arrangements, I don’t know whether it’s going to be signed this or the next year. In our case, we will have two rounds of elections. But what I know for sure is that in Romania the signing of these documents is not related to one president or another, because with the grand coalition we will have a continuity one way or another.
How critical for our strategic partnership is to have these documents signed? Can we develop strategic partnership without them?
We are already developing our strategic relationship without them. Although these documents are symbolic, they’re also the substantial part of improving the bilateral relations. Their signing and ratification makes relations sustainable in time. So you can have them for a long period – no matter who comes to power in any of the countries.
So, can we say that these two rounds of elections in Romania that you’ve mentioned, will not affect significantly neither the current state of Romanian-Ukrainian relations, nor their turning into the strategic partnership?
No, they won’t affect them.
How beneficial for Romania is the Ukrainian membership in the European Union?
I can give you some strategic matters for us. It’s very important that we will have Ukraine as an EU country on our east. It means that we won’t be any more a front line state, which takes over everything coming from outside the EU in terms of threats and risks. So, it’s going to be easier if you have another country that shares all this with you. Second, we would like that all the Romanians, meaning also from Ukraine and Republic of Moldova, are under the same type of regime – having the same rules, the same rights, freedom of movement and so on. So, for us, Ukraine and the Republic of Moldova joining the EU is also a solution of the national question. It’s not about building the Greater Romania and so on, but about all the Romanians having more or less the same rules, the same way of living etc., not depending on the state were history leave them.
How does Romania view Ukraine’s membership in NATO? What conditions must be met for this?
For us it’s easy and completely understood. Ukraine should be member of NATO tomorrow. But, we have some countries – first of all the US and Germany – that are still looking not to lose one of the leverages for moving to negotiations with Russia. One of the leverages is not having Ukraine inside NATO. It doesn’t mean that it will be a matter of negotiation with Russia, but it’s a matter to make Russia come at the negotiation at a suitable moment when the conditions will be there. On the 11th of July, we will have the final declaration of the Washington summit where we will have the agreement and the formulation. Until now the declaration of the Vilnius summit says that Ukraine’s membership will be possible when the member states will be comfortable to agree on it. But you can’t tell the Ukrainians: “Look, you are going to be accepted when the war is ended”. It’s not possible, because once you make such a statement, you make the Russians never end the war. That’s why there are number of alternative formulations still under debate. And it’s going to be decided in the Washington summit per se. The irreversibility of Ukraine accession, the bridge towards NATO, the invitation – these are a matter of creativity and a matter of negotiations.
Even with the occupied territories?
It doesn’t matter. We have already precedents in that direction. Germany when entering NATO had an occupied part, the Eastern Germany. It doesn’t mean that NATO is going to enter the war or to defend the territories that are occupied. It will be the political decision, then and agreement and commitment, which can be translated into defense of the territory that is under Ukrainian control. But once again, we are not there. We have to wait till the decision of the summit.
I am asking about the prospect of Ukraine’s NATO membership with the occupied territories, because the same question arises in the context of Ukraine’s joining the EU. There is still no consensus in the EU on whether to accept new members with the occupied territories. Because after Cyprus accession and all the consequences that followed, the EU said: “Never again.”
Yes, never again.I’ve seen this so many times. But the level of flexibility is changing. We’ve already heard: never tanks, never air defense, never ATACMS, never shooting on the Russian territory… Now you have no NATO boots on the ground. But little by little there is an adaptation to the reality. And by the way, this idea of having red lines is a little bit excessive. As you’ve seen, the West always has been proportional with what Russia has done. But now, by responding to the actions of Russia, the West is also lifting more and more the red line at the threshold. And I believe that we will end this war with NATO boots on the ground. We will end this war with everything. It doesn’t mean that we will arrive there. But I told you how it happens. The mechanism of proportionality, defending civilian life and civilian infrastructure, and so on.
We know that NATO is discussing the issue of closing the sky over the regions of Ukraine that border its member states. How real does this option seem to you?
As for my country, you can’t do that from a national point of view. We don’t have a capacity of closing our national space because we don’t have yet the deliveries of everything that we ordered and paid for. Moreover it’s a matter of political decision, because actually it shouldn’t be one country’s decision. It should be the consensus within NATO. When NATO decides this, they will move a number of capabilities to the neighboring states to make them able to close the sky at least over the west of Ukraine. But I want to mention that what we have in NATO now is the debate about what we call a “forward defense”. The forward defense means that if I have an incoming missile or any kind or a group of troops, which is approaching my territory, they’re the legitimate targets for me and I will shoot them on their, but not on my territory. And this is a lesson learned from Ukraine. Look how difficult it is to regain the territory. So if I want that not an inch of my territory is under aggressor’s control, I should shoot him outside of it. Now, there is a number of countries, who have a very clear definition of forward defense, and who established the content and the substance of it.
Can we say that adopting the forward defense concept could be a kind of a bridge towards a decision within NATO to close the sky over at least western Ukraine?
That could be if there is apolitical support. There is a subject to the decision of the member countries where it’s going to lead us finally. It proves you that there is this emulation of trying to find alternative solutions in order to help Ukraine to close its sky, but avoiding things that can harm the prospect of ending the war.
What is the Romania’s vision of how to finally fence off Moldova from Moscow and promote the restoration of its territorial integrity?
We, I mean Romania and Ukraine, need to assist Moldovans every time, because they are not in a shape of doing it by themselves. First and foremost it refers to the constitutional referendum that they organize on the 20th of October, as well as the Maia Sandu’s attempt for a new mandate. As it looks now, these go on the right path. After that, we have August 2025 with the general elections where we need to have a pro-European majority in the parliament. And it will not be an easy task. So we have to employ all our resources and our capacities in coordination with the Republic of Moldova, and with the EU and NATO, to move ahead and help them.
And what about Transnistria?
We don’t have a problem with Transnistiria. Now the main challenge in the Republic of Moldova is the elections. Everything will be resolved with Transnistria when there will be an alternative channel built from Moldova to supply them with gas (from the beginning of next year, Transnistria will stop receiving gas from Russia – ed.). The guys in Tiraspol know well that their economic survival is related to the gas that they are receiving, so they are trying to find ways in supporting themselves to go ahead until they can reform their whole economic system. Russia instead actually doesn’t have anything offer to Transnistria anymore. They don’t have where to put the gas except via Ukraine. And even if they theoretically find the other way around, it will cost $90 plus per each hundred cubic meters. So there’s no sense for them to do that.
How do you see the military solution of the Transnistria issue in Romania?
It’s not acceptable. How can you enter the Republic of Moldova’s territory: with the agreement or the request? Look, if you are doing that, you give some arguments to Russia. Why to give arguments to Russia when it’s a mature fruit that will eventually fall into your hands? So Ukraine’s and Romania’s strategy towards Transnistria is to help Republic of Moldova to reintegrate it. To create dependencies, i.e. conditions for Transnistria under which, for example, if the border with Ukraine is maintained and they don’t have the possibility for smuggling and thus – for making money – they will fall. So, the only way for them to survive will be to turn to Chisinau.
Does Russia currently manage to somehow influence bilateral Ukrainian-Romanian relations?
Sure, all the time. Well, information warfare works for all the countries. You have a part of the public which is sensitive and absorbs this information. It happens in my country, in your country, and it happens in the Republic of Moldova.
And how successful are Russians in Romania?
The Russians are trying hard, but as you know, informational warfare is very special kind of animal. If you raise the awareness, the level of education, literacy of population, so it’s far more difficult for propaganda to reach them. I mean, you are getting to a certain level of the public, but not to a strategic part that could influence the state’s policy. We have a tiny margin of people, who are falling under Russian propaganda, but they are not the type of people who can press on the decision makers or be relevant for the economic system.
As for the political actors that participate in spreading the narratives of Russian propaganda, such for instance, as Diana Sosoaca – she entered the European Parliament, but she is not completely out of Romanian politics (she runs for presidency). Her support is still marginal, around or even less than 5%.
As for the AUR, which is extreme right party and made some statements against support of Ukraine, the interesting thing happened to them. For entering the European Conservatives and Reformists group they had to sign an agreement about the support of Ukraine. So they did that. And it is also good news, because that means that there are no more parties in Romanian parliament, who are against support for Ukraine.
Ukrainian version of the interview is published here