Trump’s second presidential term. What will it be like for Ukraine?

Former U.S. President Donald Trump and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy meet in Trump Tower, September 27, 2024.  Julia Demaree Nikhinson / AP

Donald Trump makes a triumphant return to the White House. Alongside this, there’s considerable speculation that relations between the US and Ukraine may turn rather frosty, with potential reductions in American military aid to Ukraine. Mykhailo Samus, director of the New Geopolitics Research Network, shares his perspective on just how likely these projections might be.

What Ukraine should expect from the new term of Donald Trump and whether Kamala Harris would have been better option for Ukraine as the president of the United States

Now, Trump will be different, compared to his first term — the situation has changed, and the context is altogether different. Moreover, given the actions of the Biden administration as of late, Trump’s return at the very least suggests that this will no longer carry on. For instance, its response to President Zelensky’s Victory Plan — which essentially outlines reasonable steps to quickly support Ukraine — strikes me as wholly inadequate. Adopting this plan might well have allowed Harris to demonstrate the Democrats’ achievements regarding the Russian-Ukrainian war and Ukraine’s potential victory. Yet, Ukraine was not invited into NATO, it wasn’t provided with long-range weapons, nor was it granted permission to strike Russian territory, which, in effect, allowed the Russian army to press on with its offensive in the Donbas.

All of these factors are interconnected. In other words, the red lines drawn by the Biden administration have led to numerous issues at the front, ultimately prolonging the effort to drive Russian forces out of Ukrainian territory. So, if we imagine that such a policy would have been continued in the future — with Ukraine receiving weapons in dribs and drabs — then all those notions of freezing the conflict, and so on, would have stood a much greater chance of becoming reality.

There’s another aspect to consider. Had Harris won, with Republicans holding both chambers of Congress, we’d likely have found ourselves in an even worse situation than the one from the end of last year through to April. Virtually everything would have been blocked — purely to undermine President Harris and the Democrats. This might well have been the worst-case scenario for Ukraine, and the most favorable for the Russians.

I believe that’s precisely what they were banking on — either some internal conflict they’d imagined over there, or a scenario where Harris won while Trump controlled Congress, potentially triggering a complete breakdown of the United States as a functioning state. So now, with Trump and the Republicans holding both the executive and legislative branches, the situation is not the worst it could be.

It’s clear that Trump and his team will prioritize boosting the American economy — creating conditions to attract investment and generate jobs within the United States itself. In terms of foreign policy, their main focus will likely be on countering China. It’s often suggested, in fact, that the Trump team views the Russian-Ukrainian war simply as a distraction from concentrating fully on China. Then there’s energy policy, of course, which would involve flooding the market with American oil, driving down prices, and so forth. And this, by the way, is also one of the positive aspects of the changes that will soon take place in the White House.

After all, during the Biden administration, there was much talk of sanctions, yet at the same time, Russia was quietly profiting from the export of energy resources. With these funds, it was able to finance the war and, in particular, pay contractors several thousand dollars each. On the other hand, Trump’s energy policy could have a significant impact on Russia’s ability to sustain its military aggression against Ukraine.

What can Ukraine offer Trump to garner his interest in supporting it?

It seems to me that Putin inadvertently gave Ukraine a gift when he pulled North Korea into the conflict against it. Ukrainians can now calmly and clearly explain to Trump that containing China, in any meaningful way, is currently impossible, as it’s no longer just a matter for the United States alone. Just as Russia, North Korea, or Iran are no longer separate issues. In fact, there is now an ‘axis of evil’ led by China and Russia, with North Korea and Iran as allies, along with several countries in Africa and the Middle East. Therefore, I believe there’s now an opportunity to explain to the Trump team that, in essence, Ukraine’s defeat would directly strengthen China — something that runs counter to Trump’s interests. It would go against his entire strategy.

Furthermore, Ukraine could declare its readiness to take on a certain responsibility for European security. After all, Trump keeps insisting that he doesn’t want to foot the bill, and in principle, he’s right. Now, more than ever, it’s time for what Macron refers to as Europe’s strategic autonomy. At its core, this should be a robust European security system, and here Ukraine, with its military experience and capabilities, could play a crucial role. I would even go so far as to call it the European division of NATO. In other words, there would be an American division, consisting of the United States and Canada, and a European one. These would be two self-sufficient divisions that would cooperate on an equal footing. Perhaps it wouldn’t even fall under NATO’s framework, but rather some other organisation. Regardless, the core idea remains the same: Ukraine would be an integral part of Europe’s security and defence. This would enable the United States to reduce its presence in Europe, cut its security and defence costs, and create a situation where Europe becomes more self-sufficient in these areas.

Trump’s promises to end the war in 24 hours

Trump will certainly try to do so. How long it lasts and in what direction it develops will largely depend on the individuals around him — specifically, how adequately and swiftly they respond to the situation. Putin, quite clearly, will seek to increase the intensity of hostilities in order to buy time and extract as much as he can for himself. However, we mustn’t forget that President Biden is still in office and, in principle, has the chance to make history with a few heroic moves. For instance, he could invite Ukraine into NATO. What’s stopping him from doing that now? Or he could ensure Ukraine receives everything needed for the F-16s and grant permission for strikes on Russian territory. If he were to do this, it would place Ukraine in a much stronger position when negotiating with Trump. If he doesn’t, then Putin will find himself in the stronger position.

And then the question arises: how can Trump influence Putin to make him take seriously any possibility of ending the war? Will Trump pursue what Pompeo suggested a few months ago? That is, if Putin begins to play games, drag out the conflict, and refuses to bring the war to a close on fair terms for Ukraine, Pompeo proposes providing Ukraine with a ‘lend-lease’ for 500 billion dollars, offering all types of weaponry, including fighter jets, ‘Tomahawks’, and so on. Will Trump go for that? That’s the question. And it will largely depend on who within Trump’s circle shapes his stance on the Russian-Ukrainian war.

Trump will say, ‘Alright, you have 24 hours, stop the war.’ And then the tactics will begin, which, to be honest, seems rather precarious at this point. This is especially true given that, unfortunately, the Biden administration failed to secure strong positions for us, and we, in turn, did not do enough to help ourselves build those positions. By ‘strong positions’, I mean at the very least, the blockade of Crimea. After all, freezing the war in its current state — with Crimea occupied, Russian troops in place, and the Black Sea Fleet present — would be a disaster for Ukraine. In reality, if we’re talking about any form of cessation, deferred statuses, or the like, Crimea must be demilitarized. Ukraine’s territorial waters must be respected. Otherwise, the issue of Russia’s blockade of our access to the sea will continue to cast a shadow over us.

The original text in Ukrainian is available here.

Igor Fedyk

Head of the South Eastern Europe Section

Igor coordinates the South Eastern Europe Section of the New Geopolitics Research Network. He previously worked as the Head of the Balkan section of the Center for Army, Conversion and Disarmament Studies, as well as the Deputy Editor-in-chief of the English-language magazine The Ukrainian Defense Review.

His current research interests are focused on the political, economic and social aspects of the development of the South Eastern Europe and Balkan countries, their interstate and inter-ethnic relations, as well as the relations with third parties (countries not from the region, international organizations), which have an important impact on the situation in the region and in Europe.

He is the author of a number of articles and analyses in various Ukrainian and foreign Media.

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