Three conclusions regarding Chinese prisoners of war

Ukrainian President Zelenskyy stated that the Armed Forces of Ukraine captured two Chinese citizens who fought in the Russian army. He added that there are currently approximately 155 Chinese citizens known to be fighting against Ukraine on the territory of Ukraine, and about whom there is accurate information regarding their passport data, recruitment channels, etc. While their real number is estimated to be much higher. He also emphasized China’s “military support” for Russia, equating it to the DPRK and Iran.

The Ukrainian Foreign Ministry summoned China’s charge d’affaires ad interim in Ukraine, and Foreign Minister Andriy Sybiga questioned China’s declared peaceful position, as well as China’s reliability as a permanent member of the UN Security Council.

Currently, an investigation is underway and the main question is whether the detained servicemen belong to the PLA – are they regular servicemen or reserve soldiers and whether they were sent by the Chinese government to the territory of Ukraine to carry out combat or special missions.

The Chinese Foreign Ministry denied its responsibility, noting that it always asks its citizens to refrain from participating in military conflicts. While Reuters, citing American officials “familiar with intelligence,” noted that the Chinese on the battlefield “do not appear to have direct ties to the Chinese government,” while Chinese military officers are in the theater of operations with Beijing’s approval in order to learn the lessons of the war.

In this situation, it is indicative and important for analysis that China, from the very beginning of the news about the prisoners, began to censor its information space, removing from social networks and the media any mention of the detained Chinese citizens, even from the friendly Russia Today.

The Russian media, experts, and Kremlin-controlled Telegram channels unanimously denied the Chinese presence.

At first glance, the affiliation of the captured Chinese to the PLA or the Chinese government has not yet been confirmed; in addition to the Chinese, the Russian army includes hundreds of mercenaries from dozens of countries around the world, so Beijing, at first glance, had nothing to fear.

At the same time, such significant active work by the PRC to hide these facts and reduce mention of them gives us an interesting clue.

Firstly, Ukraine’s demonstration of the participation of even civilian Chinese in the fighting, and support for Russia’s military efforts in this regard, is an extremely sensitive issue, and therefore can be an effective tool for Kiev to pressure the PRC.

Based on this, Ukraine needs to support the discussion in the information space of aspects of the involvement of the Chinese in the war against Ukraine, for which it should provide new information obtained from the results of interrogations of Chinese citizens. Ukraine’s repeated appeals to China in 2022-2024 have not yielded results – China has become a critical enabler of the Russian war and the Russian defense industry.

Kyiv’s new trump card in the form of a “stick” – may give China an additional incentive to adjust its position and reduce support for Russia.

Secondly, in parallel, efforts should be intensified to identify the presence of Chinese in the Russian army and, if possible, to capture other Chinese citizens. As well as strengthen intelligence efforts to identify career or reserve PLA servicemen on the territory of Ukraine (if they are really there). If this succeeds, Ukraine will have another serious argument that can be used to change Beijing’s policy regarding the Russian-Ukrainian war. This is especially relevant given China’s efforts to improve relations with Europe in the context of a trade war with the United States, but evidence of direct military support by China for Russian military efforts could significantly complicate this process, and therefore Kyiv could demand that China reduce technological support for Russia.

Third, given the intensification of China-American competition and the beginning of a tariff and trade war, it is important for Kyiv that Ukraine’s key military partner, the US, understands the interconnectedness of the European and Indo-Pacific theaters. Information that China is increasing its support for Russia could be an additional argument for Kyiv in negotiations with Washington regarding the provision of reliable security guarantees to Ukraine and the continuation of military-technical supportfor Ukraine, as well as additional sanctions on Russia and China.

Yurii Poita

Head of the Asian Section

He has been working as a Head of the Asia-Pacific Section at the Center for Army, Conversion and Disarmament Studies (Kyiv, Ukraine). Yurii also is a sinologist and member of the National Union of Journalists of Ukraine.

He studied at the Institute of International Relations of the Kyiv International University, the Wuhan Research Institute of Postal and Telecommunications (China), Zhytomyr Military Institute (Ukraine). At the moment Yurii is a PhD candidate at the Al-Farabi Kazakh National University.

He has experience in defense, international journalism, analytics and research.

Research interests: China’s influence in the post-Soviet space, “hybrid” threats to national security, Ukrainian-Chinese relations, the development of the situation in the Asia-Pacific and the Central Asian region.

He took part in a number of expert and scientific discussions in Ukraine, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Israel, China and other countries. He has participated in research projects on the consequences of educational migration to China, interethnic conflicts and the protest potential of Kazakhstan, creation of a new Asian strategy of the MFA of Ukraine, study of Ukraine’s relations with the countries of Central and East Asia.

Speaks Ukrainian, Russian, English and Chinese.

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