NATO on the Brink of Crisis

The NATO summit in The Hague, scheduled for late June, risks becoming a symbol of the end of the Alliance’s strategic leadership. The Alliance, once a pillar of democratic security, is increasingly turning into a bureaucratic shell that avoids calling war a war, refrains from identifying Russia as an enemy, and is afraid to irritate Trump by raising uncomfortable issues.

The planned format of the Hague summit—a brief and shallow communiqué – demonstrates that NATO is consciously avoiding uncomfortable topics. The agenda includes no concrete decisions on countering Russia’s war against Ukraine, not a word about China or the “axis of evil,” and no signals about Ukraine’s future in NATO. Essentially, the summit is becoming a meeting of strategic denial. While Russia turns Europe into a battlefield and China acts as Russia’s military-industrial rear, NATO’s central mission has become not to anger Trump.

A King’s Dinner Instead of Strategic Decisions

The summit is being reduced to a single working session focused on defense budgets and spending. The key event: dinner with the Dutch King. Instead of discussing the war in Europe, the prospects of direct confrontation with Russia, and Ukraine’s role in European defense, these issues are being excluded – to avoid raising sensitive topics in Washington during the election period. NATO has become a hostage to American domestic politics.

The key principles of NATO – collective defense and the deterrence of aggressors—are being eroded. European security today rests on Ukraine’s resilience and sacrifice, yet NATO cannot bring itself to officially acknowledge Ukraine’s role or name Russia as an existential threat.

This is no longer just a strategic error – it’s a deliberate surrender of leadership and political responsibility. The founding idea of NATO in 1949 was to deter the Soviet Union and protect democracies. If today NATO cannot directly name Russia as an enemy, nor recognize Ukraine’s role in ensuring the security of the Euro-Atlantic space, then this is a clear sign of systemic degradation.

The fear of provoking Trump has become a decisive factor in NATO’s current strategic positioning. But in a scenario of real war – for example, if Russia attacks the Baltic states – this lack of pre-agreed plans and concepts for response could lead to disaster. NATO is not prepared. And that is its main problem.

A Strategic Opportunity: A European Defence Core

However, this systemic crisis of NATO opens a window for a new strategic direction. It is time to develop a fully functional European security component, within or alongside NATO, with Ukraine as a key player in this new architecture.

This component should be based on the following principles:

1. Political independence in decisions regarding the European and Eurasian theatres of operations;
2. Institutional backbone in the form of a unified European Defence Force, with joint command, logistics, and deterrence tools;
3. Financial responsibility, with commitments to increase defence spending to at least 5% of GDP to fund deterrence instruments, including missile systems and air/missile defence;
4. Ukraine’s integration as a full-fledged participant in building this security architecture.

This security core could function as part of a transformed NATO, which would include two equal structural components:

• A European division, responsible for the European and Eurasian theatres;
• An American division, responsible for operations in the Atlantic, Arctic, and Indo-Pacific regions.

Such a division would allow NATO to preserve unity while adapting to the new geopolitical realities, ensuring both autonomy and coordination.

Three Pillars of the New European Defence Triad

To establish a real and capable European security core, three strategic military components are needed:

1. Long-range missile forces, capable of deep strikes on Russian territory – cruise and ballistic missiles capable of disabling key enemy infrastructure. These capabilities must be integrated with NATO, EU, and Ukrainian targeting systems, and operate within a real-time situational awareness and kill-chain loop.
2. Multi-layered air and missile defence, including systems for intercepting ballistic missiles with ranges up to 5,000 km and high-capacity systems for countering long-range drones. These systems must be developed in Europe in cooperation with the United States, Israel, or Ukraine.
3. A European nuclear deterrence system, which would ensure strategic parity with Russia. Ukraine could participate in this programme by providing technology, industrial capacity, and command-and-control solutions.

Strategic Investment in Defence and Industrial Sovereignty

A long-term rearmament programme and the creation of a European security core will require increased defence budgets. EU countries must commit to spending at least 5% of GDP on defence. Funds should go towards strategic R&D, development and procurement of critical technologies, joint production and logistics systems, and joint EU–Ukrainian–US–Israeli ventures.

The foundation of a European security architecture must include Ukraine, both politically and militarily. Ukrainian experience, technological capabilities, and combat-proven solutions must be integrated into joint EU defence systems. Ukraine must be recognised as the frontline state protecting Europe from the Russian threat – and as a co-architect of the new Euro-Atlantic defence framework.

Not Trump’s Mood, but Europe’s Will

The strength and future of NATO and European security should not be measured by Trump’s mood or the length of summit communiqués. It should be determined by Europe’s ability to defend itself – and Ukraine’s role at the core of this capability.

It is time to build a new security system that matches the era of large-scale war, multi-domain operations, drone warfare, and strategic missile threats. Either Europe assumes responsibility – or Europe becomes the next battlefield.