NGRNWe prepared Analytical Briefing on the Fit for war by 2030? European rearmament vis-a-vis Russia lagging in numbers and technologies research by Kiel Institute and Brugel.
1. Summary
While defence spending has increased significantly, the pace and structure of rearmament efforts across the EU and UK remain insufficient to ensure strategic deterrence by 2030. Production bottlenecks, over-dependence on the US, market fragmentation, and a lack of long-term coordination severely undermine Europe’s capacity to respond independently to potential large-scale conflict scenarios.
2. Key Findings
2.1. Production Gap vs. Strategic Needs
- The report highlights a stark shortfall in critical military capabilities. Artillery systems and ammunition are being ramped up, but the production of tanks, infantry fighting vehicles, air defence systems, and long-range missiles is lagging dangerously behind.
- To reach credible deterrence levels by 2030, Europe would need to increase defence industrial output by up to 6 times its current levels.
2.2. Time Lag in Procurement
- Even when orders are placed, most deliveries are expected only after 2028. Such lead times erode the strategic value of increased budgets.
- Without accelerated timelines, Europe risks entering the next decade still under-equipped to respond to Russian military aggression.
2.3. Transatlantic Dependence
- Europe remains heavily reliant on the United States for critical platforms such as fighter aircraft, missile defence systems, ISR (Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance), and military logistics.
- This dependency could prove strategically fatal if the US reduces its commitment to NATO or prioritises the Indo-Pacific.
2.4. Market Fragmentation and Cost Inefficiency
- The EU defence market is fragmented along national lines, with limited coordination in procurement, resulting in small production runs, higher per-unit costs, and limited interoperability.
- The report notes that Europe is set to spend over €800 billion on defence by 2030, yet without structural reform, much of this spending may not translate into usable combat power.
2.5. Innovation Deficit
- Mere replication of legacy systems is inadequate in the face of evolving threats, including drone warfare, AI-enabled strike systems, and electronic warfare.
- European defence efforts remain slow to prioritise autonomous systems, resilient communications, and battlefield digitalisation.
3. Strategic Implications
- If Europe fails to close the production and capability gaps by 2030, the continent will remain vulnerable to coercion and limited war scenarios launched by Russia.
- A delay in rearmament would also perpetuate the imbalance within NATO, fuelling political tensions and undermining credibility.
- The continued reliance on US systems risks strategic paralysis in a multipolar world where American priorities may shift.
4. Recommendations
4.1. Accelerated Industrial Expansion
- Governments must provide long-term contracts to stimulate capital investment in industrial capacities.
- Defence production must be prioritised at the same level as energy or critical infrastructure.
4.2. Common European Procurement Mechanisms
- Expand initiatives like the European Defence Fund and EDIRPA (European Defence Industry Reinforcement through Common Procurement Act).
- Establish joint procurement offices for key systems such as MBTs, SPHs, and missile systems.
4.3. Innovation and Technological Leapfrogging
- Allocate fixed budget shares to disruptive technologies (e.g. drones, AI C2 systems, counter-UAV).
- Promote joint R&D hubs between member states and private industry.
4.4. US-EU Strategic Division of Labour
- Prepare for partial decoupling by developing independent European strategic enablers: AWACS, airlift, C4ISR.
- Shift from “complimentary” posture to “redundant but independent” capability.
5. Recommendations to the Government of Ukraine
5.1. Strategic Engagement with EU Rearmament Initiatives
- Actively align Ukrainian defence-industrial strategy with EU rearmament programmes.
- Seek integration into joint procurement and production chains, particularly for artillery, drones, and ground platforms.
5.2. Industrial Partnerships and Localisation
- Initiate bilateral and multilateral co-production projects with EU manufacturers to localise critical technology and ramp up capacity.
- Offer Ukrainian production bases for joint ventures aimed at meeting European demand gaps.
5.3. Innovation as a Niche for Ukrainian Competitiveness
- Leverage Ukraine’s combat-proven technologies in unmanned systems, EW, and AI-driven platforms to gain strategic partnerships.
- Position Ukraine as an innovation hub within the broader European defence tech ecosystem.
5.4. Advocacy and Political Dialogue in Brussels
- Establish a permanent Ukrainian defence-industrial representation in Brussels.
- Intensify engagement with EU institutions to promote Ukraine’s inclusion in European defence frameworks such as the EDF and ASAP (Act in Support of Ammunition Production).
5.5. Strategic Communication and Security Guarantees
- Emphasise Ukraine’s frontline role in deterring Russia as a core argument for deeper defence-industrial integration.
- Use strategic dialogue to shape European perceptions of Ukraine not only as a recipient of aid, but as a security provider.
6. Conclusion
The report by the Kiel Institute and Bruegel is a timely warning that Europe remains ill-prepared for the high-intensity conflict scenarios that may define the 2030s. Without urgent structural reforms, increased production capacity, and a radical shift in strategic planning, the EU and its partners will fail to achieve genuine strategic autonomy or deter future aggression. The window for action is closing fast.
Ukraine, meanwhile, must seize the opportunity to embed itself into this accelerated European rearmament process—not as an outsider but as a full-spectrum contributor to regional security.