Alliance4EuropeAuthors & Consortium organisations:
ISD, Alliance4Europe, Debunk.org, GMF Alliance for Securing Democracy, DEN Institute, EU DisinfoLab.
Project Contributors: Karolin Schwarz, CeMAS, Polisphere, 411 and Kemea
Foreign and domestic actors exploited societal divides ahead of Germany’s 2025 federal election. Russian-aligned campaigns used AI, bots and media impersonation to spread disinformation, distort engagement and undermine democratic trust.
Executive summary
The 2025 German federal election took place in a volatile political landscape marked by multiple geopolitical crises, economic uncertainty and declining trust in institutions. This report by ISD and contributing organisations offers a comprehensive analysis of the foreign information manipulation and interference (FIMI) that shaped the pre-election period. It examines the motivations behind these influence operations, the actors involved, the techniques employed and the broader impact on democratic discourse and electoral integrity.
Foreign and domestic actors exploited existing societal divisions – particularly around migration, economic instability and national identity – by deploying coordinated campaigns and leveraging digital platforms to spread disinformation. Key operations such as Operation Overload, Storm-1516 and Doppelgänger were instrumental in disseminating misleading narratives and manipulating public opinion. They often made use of tactics such as AI-generated content, impersonation of credible institutions and abuse of social media infrastructure.
Themes in disinformation narratives included electoral fraud, anti-migrant sentiment, economic collapse, support for Ukraine and the delegitimisation of democratic institutions. We found it particularly concerning that campaigns integrated AI-generated content and bot networks and that sanctioned outlets such as RT DE (formerly RT Deutsch) continued to reach German audiences and diaspora communities in Germany despite being officially banned.
Given the often significant interaction between FIMI actors and domestic communities, the report highlights tactics employed by foreign entities as well as the selective and strategic adoption of similar approaches by domestic actors, including the right-wing populist Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) party. Despite efforts from civil society, regulators and platforms, significant gaps in policy enforcement and platform accountability remained.
To safeguard democratic integrity, the report recommends a coordinated, multi-stakeholder approach involving regulatory reform, enhanced transparency, media literacy and long-term investment in democratic resilience.
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