NGRNThe original article was published in Glavcom
Counter-offensive at Dobropillia
The Pokrovsk and Dobropillia axes remain the hottest sectors of the front and the main directions of Russian offensive effort. Moscow launched its campaign in early summer, aiming by autumn to seize the Pokrovsk agglomeration, push to the administrative boundary of Donetsk oblast, take additional ground in Zaporizhzhia, Dnipropetrovsk and parts of Kherson, and establish a so-called “buffer zone” along the state border in Sumy and Kharkiv regions. “These plans were not realised thanks to the skill of our soldiers, the sound, deliberate decisions of commanders, the timely implementation of corps-level reform, and effective strikes against the enemy’s rear,” General Syrskyi stresses.
He describes a new Russian method as a “strategy of a thousand cuts”: many small assault groups infiltrate simultaneously to gnaw into our defensive depth, sever logistics, obstruct evacuation from forward positions, and target drone teams. This was visible around Dobropillia, where Russian forces recently penetrated 12–20 km.
Ukraine’s Defence Forces “sliced” this salient, leaving part of the Russian grouping in a pocket. The concept was to bisect the assault formation, forcing the adversary to commit reserves from other sectors to rescue the trapped elements. Indeed, Russian naval infantry was redeployed from the Sumy axis to reinforce the effort.
According to Syrskyi, the Dobropillia operation shaped the course of Russia’s entire summer campaign. The counter-offensive there liberated 168 sq km, including seven villages; a further 182.6 sq km was cleared of enemy reconnaissance-sabotage groups. Assault units executed a substantial share of this fighting. On the Dobropillia axis “we eliminate, by various estimates, 200 or more Russian servicemen daily.”
Force ratios and operational tempo
Syrskyi judges the overall situation as difficult. Across roughly 1,250 km of active front, Russia has massed about 712,000 personnel. Each day sees 160–190 engagements, of which 15–20 are Ukrainian assault actions.
Over the past year the front line has extended by roughly 200 km. Beyond that, there remain some 2,400 km without active fighting where Ukrainian troops must still hold ground.
The “thousand cuts” approach is also evident on the Novopavlivka axis, where the boundaries of Donetsk, Dnipropetrovsk and Zaporizhzhia oblasts meet. For Russia it is politically useful simply to “plant a flag” and claim presence there.
“The situation in Dnipropetrovsk region is dynamic. The areas are vast, troop densities are insufficient on both sides. They have more forces, but they still lack the strength and means to mount a decisive offensive,” Syrskyi concludes. The Russians moved naval infantry from the Sumy direction to Novopavlivka to break through and dash either towards Zaporizhzhia or Dnipropetrovsk, “but our active measures thwarted their attempt. Their naval infantry is now bogged down in fighting on the Dobropillia axis.”
Deep Strike: successful attacks on Russia’s rear
In under two months, long-range Ukrainian drones struck 85 significant targets inside Russia, including 33 military objectives (bases, ammunition depots, aircraft) and numerous defence-industrial sites (drone, missile and propellant plants). The result is a fuel crunch in Russia that affects army supply, including units fighting in Ukraine.
“We will continue this strategy,” Syrskyi says, adding that expanding the units conducting Deep Strike is a priority.
Assault Troops
Just over a year ago, assault formations were first employed: the 33rd and 225th Separate Assault Battalions distinguished themselves during the breakthrough in Kursk region, while the “Skelia” battalion operated actively near Pokrovsk.
Lessons from Kursk informed the scaling-up of these and other battalions into regiments, with very positive results. “Creating Assault Troops as a separate service raises many questions. Some ask why not merge them with Air Assault Forces; why choose this development path? We are fighting an atypical war — a high-technology, drone-led war. We constantly seek forms, structures and methods that deliver the greatest effect,” the Commander-in-Chief explains.
Assault Troops work mainly in small groups, noted for high mobility and manoeuvre. They operate on the hardest sectors and were instrumental in the Dobropillia counter-offensive. They do not duplicate the Air Assault Forces: tasks and modus operandi differ. “The AAF are, if you like, elite infantry; the Assault Troops are rapid-reaction units.” Like the AAF, they receive priority manning.
Syrskyi argues that static positional defence is poor practice: it hands the initiative entirely to the adversary, who then dictates events. Defence must be active. “An assault soldier is not a kamikaze. He is a brave fighter and a patriot. They have their own tactics, concept and training. Every assault group operates with an accompanying UAV for reconnaissance. Assault commanders stay with their troops. Many rose from the ranks; many are Heroes of Ukraine.”
Drone interceptors and a new branch for counter-UAS defence
Ukraine is now forming a new service arm — Unmanned Air Defence Forces — to unify units employing drone interceptors, currently the most effective counter-Shahed capability. According to Syrskyi, interceptor drones are shooting down over 70% of Russian Shaheds, and the number of such teams at the front is growing.
The objective is to destroy as many Shaheds as possible in the combat zone, preventing their penetration into central regions and the national rear.
Alongside interceptors, army aviation attack helicopters are proving effective against Russian strike UAVs (in some sectors accounting for up to 40% of Shahed kills), and Ukraine is examining the procurement of specialised light aircraft for counter-UAS roles.
Electronic warfare capacity is being expanded in quantity and quality. “Our task is to ensure triple or quadruple EW coverage of key sites.”