NGRNBy Valerii Zaluzhnyi – key ideas, condensed
The original articles published in Dzerkalo Tyzhnia
1) From stalemate to adaptation. The war drifted into a positional deadlock reminiscent of World War I: a continuous fortified front, dense obstacles, and limited maneuver under constant fire superiority. In such conditions, defense became cheaper than offense and the battlefield “froze” into attrition warfare that structurally favors Russia unless Ukraine changes the game through strategy and technology.
2) The drone-EW revolution made the battlefield transparent. Tactical-level UAVs – especially FPV quadcopters – combined with proliferating sensors and artillery spotting turned the frontline and rear into a single “observation and strike space.” Concentrations of troops are immediately detected and hit; logistics and the notion of a safe rear at <40 km are eroding. The “lower sky” is saturated with small drones that continuously expand the lethal envelope.
“Thousands of drones and sensors have already formed a 20-kilometer ‘kill zone’ with a high probability of strike.”
3) Russia’s exit from the stalemate: mass, infiltration, wired FPVs. Moscow shifted toward relentless “sand-pouring” attacks by many small assault groups to wear down defenders, reveal positions, and force ammunition expenditure. It also sought to neutralize Ukrainian EW by developing new control links and even wired FPV drones to bypass jamming – an inflection point in the contest.
4) Ukraine’s counter-moves and the infantry burden. Ukrainian EW has blunted Russia’s first attempt at mass FPV breakthroughs; Western armored vehicles, well protected by EW, enabled localized raids such as on the Kursk axis. Yet infantry still bears the brunt: dispersed small groups must survive and fight autonomously under constant aerial observation and precision micro-strikes.
5) Strategic risk of a long positional war. A protracted positional phase mechanically amplifies the advantages of the side with larger manpower and industrial depth. For Ukraine, that trajectory is “predictably unacceptable” and demands a strategic pivot that restores tempo and imposes disproportionate costs on the aggressor.
6) Innovation is the only scalable equalizer. Ukraine cannot win an industrial-mass race on Russia’s terms. It must offset deficits by rapidly mastering, war-testing, and scaling new technologies – especially in drones, EW, autonomy/AI, protected communications, and counter-UAV – thereby regaining technological initiative and forcing Russia to adapt on Ukraine’s timeline.
“Only by introducing military innovations can Ukraine compensate for structural resource shortages and impose disproportionate losses on Russia.”
7) Doctrine and force-design implications. The positional reality and “transparent” battlefield compel a shift from massing to dispersion, autonomy, and resilience: smaller units, resilient comms, distributed logistics, and rapid kill-chains that integrate sensors, shooters, and EW. Protecting operators and launch sites becomes a priority as they are now prime targets.
8) The human dimension: mobilization under persistent strike. Persistent UAV-artillery kill chains drive casualties and psychological pressure. Mobilization and rotation must be planned with the assumption that extended exposure at the forward edge leads to “inevitable” physical or psychological breakdown without technological and tactical mitigation.
9) Lessons from partners and industry. Compared to 2023, Ukraine now sees far greater interest from militaries and manufacturers in solutions shaped by the Russo-Ukrainian war—especially in UAVs, EW, and AI. Some foreign developments already integrate these lessons. Ukraine itself has become a battlefield innovation hub, with dozens of firms showcasing credible, war-proven systems.
10) Strategy of sustainable resistance. A realistic end-state hinges on making war operationally senseless for Russia: Ukraine must survive, adapt, and win by constantly shifting the cost-exchange ratio through innovation and by maintaining the initiative. This demands institutionalized, continuous R&D-to-fielding cycles—not episodic projects.
“We must again seize and keep the technological initiative—forcing Russia to adapt, endure pressure, and defend.”
Brief takeaway
- The war’s center of gravity has moved to the UAV–EW–AI complex that renders the battlefield transparent and compresses the rear.
- Russia is pushing out of the stalemate via mass small-unit assaults, infiltration, and EW-resistant FPVs; Ukraine blunts this with superior EW but must scale faster.
- Innovation at speed—mastered, tested, and mass-produced—is the only sustainable path to restore initiative and impose disproportionate costs on Russia.