Kateryna KrasinaThe full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine has led to significant changes in how Europe, and specifically Austria, understands the risk architecture for its national security and the ways to respond to major threats. According to the Risk Monitor 2026 published by the Austrian Ministry of Defence, confrontation between Russia and the EU, as well as hybrid attacks, is among the key risks for Europe. European security is being rethought: since the US increasingly focuses on its own interests, Europe can no longer rely solely on external guarantees.
In an interview with Ulf Steindl, Senior Research Fellow at the Austrian Institute for European and Security Policy, we discussed pressing issues for Europe today: EU security policy, the prospects of creating a common EU army, threats from Russia, and Austria’s potential role in the EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy.
Ulf Steindl’s expertise centres on issues of European and Transatlantic Security, the European Defence Technological and Industrial Base (EDTIB), EU–NATO complementarity, and the EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP).
Key Takeaways:
- The prospect of a unified European army remains unlikely, as states lack consensus at the political and institutional levels. That said, its gradual formation through regional integration appears feasible — we already see such steps in the example of cooperation among the Scandinavian countries.
- In light of US policy, the EU is gradually strengthening its strategic autonomy in critical areas (including the development of its own strategic enablers).
- From Austria’s perspective, Russia is a major risk to European security. Particular concern is linked to hybrid threats: disinformation, drone raids, and infrastructure sabotage.
- In Europe, the likelihood of a Russian attack on an EU member state is being discussed. Currently, this is not likely if NATO and EU structures remain reliable. However, the use of hybrid attack methods by Russia is not ruled out.
- Currently, Austria — given its neutrality — cannot play a significant role in the EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy, though opportunities for cooperation in the information domain and in the area of strategic enablers remain open.
The European Army and EU Security Policy
The debate about a “European army” has been ongoing for some time, yet it lacks clarity — primarily because the concept of such an army itself remains ill-defined. Currently, three potential models of a “European Army” can be identified, each interpreted differently in public discourse.
The first model is a European pillar within NATO (the European component of the North Atlantic Alliance), which in practice already exists. The second model is a single, unified European army — a fully integrated military structure incorporating the armed forces of all member states. This format is considered unlikely due to, among other factors, coordination difficulties, a lack of political will to create a “European Army”, and unresolved questions of legitimacy — in particular regarding who would command such a structure and how. The third is the “28 armies” model: 27 EU member state armies and one joint force, built through deepening regional cooperation. Steindl considers this option as the most realistic path towards integration.
An example of this approach is the coordination between the Scandinavian countries under NORDEFCO (Nordic Defence Cooperation) — a defence cooperation structure of five Nordic states (Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Sweden), founded in 2009, where joint training already takes place and plans are being made to deepen cooperation in the areas of defence materiel, command, and the conduct of joint operations.
Cooperation in the E6 format (Germany, France, Poland, Spain, Italy, the Netherlands) also looks promising. In addition, the formation of joint armed forces on the basis of a Coalition of the Willing is possible. This group of countries acquired new significance in the context of European defence at the beginning of 2025. In February–March of that year, a number of states — foremost the United Kingdom, France, and Poland — pledged strengthened support for Ukraine against Russian aggression and readiness to be part of a peacekeeping force deployed on Ukrainian territory.
EU security policy is broadly undergoing change, driven primarily by the policies of the Donald Trump administration. In view of the unstable partnership with Washington, as well as the possible reorientation of US efforts towards the conflict with China, European countries have accelerated their shift towards strategic autonomy and are working to secure the so-called strategic enablers — strategic capabilities traditionally provided by the United States.
The EU is now actively investing in its own space infrastructure: the Copernicus programme provides satellite Earth observation and open data for monitoring; Galileo is Europe’s navigation and positioning system; GOVSATCOM guarantees secure satellite communications for the government agencies of member states; and IRIS² is an ambitious new constellation of around 290 satellites in multiple orbits.
At the same time, beyond the domain of strategic enablers, European states lack effective communication.
There are still serious problems associated with integration, political will, and legitimacy, connected to the potential need to govern a common army. The decision-making process needed for managing the potential European army is considered time-consuming, given the need to involve multiple decision-makers and navigate bureaucratic procedures.
The Likelihood of Russia’s Attack on an EU Member State
According to Austria’s current defence discourse, the likelihood of a conflict with Russia is growing. This is reflected in the “Risk Monitor 2026” of the Austrian Ministry of Defence, which identifies confrontation between Russia and the EU as one of the key risks for 2026. The Austrian and German governments acknowledge the increasing risk of escalation between Russia and NATO or the EU in the short and medium term. In Ulf Steindl’s assessment, the greatest danger lies in a combination of hybrid and limited conventional operations.
Among potential escalation scenarios, the expert highlights a possible incursion into the area of the Sułwalki Corridor — a roughly 100-kilometre stretch of the Polish-Lithuanian border separating Belarus from Russia’s Kaliningrad Oblast. In NATO assessments, it is considered the most vulnerable point on the Alliance’s eastern flank: were it to be severed, the Baltic states would find themselves in land isolation from the rest of NATO.
A possible Russian attack on Svalbard — a Norwegian archipelago in the Arctic — is also cited, as Russia has long disputed Norway’s sovereignty over it. Were Russia to establish control over the archipelago, it would be able to block two critical maritime corridors for allied naval forces — the Bear Gap and the GIUK gap — connecting the Arctic with the Atlantic.
As a third scenario, the expert identifies a Russian attack on the Baltic states using irregular formations — along the lines of the “little green men” of 2014. Such a situation would pose a security dilemma for European states: whether to accept heavy losses in order to retake territory, or to enter into negotiations with Russia if US support were not forthcoming. This would create a risk to the credibility and cohesion of both NATO and the EU.
The possible timeframe for a Russian attack on an EU state remains unclear. Some assessments suggest it could occur by 2027, others by 2030. Ulf Steindl cautions against over-reliance on specific timelines: the timeframes may shift — that is, a full-scale invasion of an EU member state could occur at any point, and its timing will depend on the conditions of deterrence on NATO’s part: as long as the Alliance remains credible and capable of protecting its members, the probability will remain low.
A further condition for a Russian invasion of Europe is Russia having sufficient military forces to carry it out. In particular, while the war in Ukraine continues, an attack on another state is considered unlikely. However, the expert agrees that as Russia’s rearmament progresses, and if there is a peace agreement or ceasefire in Ukraine, the clock may start ticking — meaning Russia could redirect its military resources towards a military conflict with an EU member state. Moreover, should US forces withdraw from Europe or other extraordinary events occur, a window of opportunity for Russian hybrid actions would open, further increasing the likelihood of conflict.
Austria’s Role in the Common Security and Defence Policy
Austria’s role in the EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) is substantially limited by its constitutional neutrality, enshrined in 1955. Abolishing this status in the near term does not appear likely, given the prevailing public sentiment. Security policy in Austria is perceived by the public through a binary lens: neutrality or NATO.
Neutrality is one of Austria’s most enduring values: according to various polls, between 70 and 80% of citizens consistently express support for it. Following Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, public debate became somewhat more animated, yet no significant shift in public sentiment has occurred.
As a result, neutral status currently precludes Austria’s participation in joint command, but leaves open a number of cooperation formats. Vienna can contribute through participation in information exchange, as well as through engagement in strategic enabler projects and EU space programmes.
At the same time, aware of growing security risks, Austria is focusing on what does not conflict with its neutral status — building up its own defence capacity. The reforms to Austrian armed forces currently under discussion envisage extending basic military service from 6 to 8 months and introducing mandatory exercises upon its completion. The reforms aim to increase the number of trained reservists and reduce the time needed to bring them to readiness.
Austria is also engaged in discussions on reforming its export system — in particular through the potential reorientation of Austrian vehicle manufacturers towards arms production. Examples of Austrian manufacturers involved in these processes include Maschinenfabrik Liezen und Gießerei (MFL); Achleitner, which produces special and protected vehicles; Empl, which also produces vehicles and components; and Steyr Motors.
Notably, cooperation between Austrian companies and the Franco-German defence giant KNDS in the production of Leopard 2 tanks is drawing attention. The Styrian engineering and foundry company MFL signed a contract in 2025 worth approximately €2 million for the supply of high-technology turret hulls for these tanks. Meanwhile, Steyr Motors concluded a large-scale framework agreement running to 2034, providing for the delivery of at least 500 engine-generator units. In the domestic market, Empl is showing growth, strengthening a long-standing partnership with the Austrian army (Bundesheer). The manufacturer is currently fulfilling a new contract worth approximately €30 million for the production of special vehicles, tipper trucks and trailers. Such an activity in the defence industry already has a direct impact on financial markets: amid expectations of further investment in armaments, Steyr Motors shares posted sharp gains in 2025.