Yurii PoitaChina’s official position on the Russia-Ukraine war remains largely unchanged since 2022. But on the ground, China’s real stance—rather than declared stance—has shifted significantly in a pro-Russian direction over the past four years. China now provides massive economic, informational, diplomatic, and technological support to Russia, including assistance aimed at circumventing sanctions and sustaining Russia’s war machine, and possibly at creating an existential threat to European security and NATO.
China consistently promotes pro-Russian narratives about the war across various platforms, including diplomatic channels, media outlets, social networks, and expert forums, placing the blame on the West while entirely absolving Russia of any responsibility. The share of Chinese components and equipment in Russian weaponry and within Russian military production facilities has increased at least tenfold since February 2022. Meanwhile, Chinese diplomats have attempted to undermine Ukrainian peace initiatives. During meetings with European counterparts, Chinese experts have persistently and systematically sought to convince Europe to stop supporting Ukraine and instead concede to Russia’s demands in order to build “a stable security architecture” that considers Russia’s “legitimate security concerns”. Anti-Ukrainian content on Chinese social media, sourced from Russian outlets or independently generated, has increased significantly.
This piece looks into Chinese expert debates on the Russia-Ukraine war, and the involvement of Europe and the United States, but it is also complemented with insights gained from participation in Track 1.5 and Track 2 exchanges with Chinese experts. It concludes that despite formal calls for a peaceful settlement and its declarative neutrality, China may prefer a Russian victory—or at least a strategic upper hand over Ukraine—as this outcome could pose an existential threat to Europe.
This piece looks into Chinese expert debates on the Russia-Ukraine war, and the involvement of Europe and the United States, but it is also complemented with insights gained from participation in Track 1.5 and Track 2 exchanges with Chinese experts. It concludes that despite formal calls for a peaceful settlement and its declarative neutrality, China may prefer a Russian victory—or at least a strategic upper hand over Ukraine—as this outcome could pose an existential threat to Europe.
At present, Chinese experts are convinced that China absolutely made the correct choice three years ago by not severing trade ties with Russia, thereby securing support in the face of Western pressure. While they believe that the continuation of the war is not entirely detrimental for China, a peaceful resolution of the conflict—obviously on Russia’s terms—would be more beneficial for Beijing.
Skepticism More Than Support Over the Peace Negotiations and Europe’s Capacity to Defend Itself
Regarding the current stage of peace negotiations involving the United States, Russia, and Ukraine, Chinese scholars take a dim view of Europe’s prospects for ensuring its own security.
They discuss the possibility that the “Ukraine crisis” could escalate into a direct military confrontation between Russia and NATO. Lang Jiazereng of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences’ Institute of European Studies considers such a clash fairly probable given the military buildup by both Russia and Europe. Others argue that “Ukraine fatigue” is increasing in Europe and that, due to the weakness of the European position, Europe may begin to adopt a “pragmatic position” toward Russia—a view expressed by Dong Yifan from the Beijing Language and Culture University’s Institute of National and Regional Studies. In any case, Zhou Bo, a military commentator, considers that, should a peacekeeping mission be needed, it should exclude NATO European states and rather promote the participation of countries like Ireland, Austria and Switzerland—countries rather adverse to peacekeeping operations historically.
Some experts state that the prospects for European defense independence, such as the creation of a unified army, remain unrealistic. Zhu Junwei, Director of the U.S. Research Center at the National Observation Think Tank, is one who shares this view. Yan Xiaoxiao from the Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences further predicts that Europe will be unable to ensure its security politically and militarily, leading individual countries to orient themselves more strongly toward the United States, which would also result in the failure of European defense integration. Notably, the idea of deploying multinational European forces in Ukraine is viewed unfavourably. Indeed, some in China believe it could create a precedent for deploying foreign troops in the Taiwan Strait.
When Bluntness Takes the Lead: Direct Insights into Official and Non-Official Exchanges
An even more detailed and perhaps more truthful picture of China’s perception can be derived from closed-door expert discussions. During 2022 and 2023, this author participated in a number of such meetings with representatives of Chinese think tanks affiliated with government structures, including the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the military, up to the rank of major general (retired).
The discussions were held under the Chatham House Rule, which allows reference to the substance of the discussions, albeit without attribution. During exchanges lasting three to four hours, Ukrainian representatives deliberately adopted a confrontational and hawkish position toward China, directly accusing it of supporting Russia, of inconsistency between its statements and actions, and of divergence from the norms of the UN Charter and international law. This pushed the Chinese representatives out of their comfort zone. They started justifying themselves, speaking emotionally, and often going beyond their prepared remarks. Their psychological state, body language, and behavior were also analyzed, which, in the view of the Ukrainian participants, helped reveal a more realistic Chinese attitude toward the situation. In particular, during discussions in 2022, Chinese participants expressed regret over Russia’s defeats on the battlefield. They stated that Russia had made a mistake in the war against Ukraine, not by starting it, but by misjudging the opponent’s strength, preparing poorly, and failing to secure a quick victory. They expressed disappointment at the resilience of the Ukrainian military, the strengthening of transatlantic unity, and the consolidation of the broader Western bloc, which in their view needed to be weakened.
Statements by the Ukrainian side that Russia was also suffering a military defeat and that the Russian Black Sea fleet would be completely destroyed were received by the Chinese side with astonishment and shock. They also sought to understand how long Europe would continue supporting Ukraine and when “Ukraine fatigue” would emerge. Chinese repeated arguments about “five minutes of NATO missile flight time to Moscow,” claiming that Ukraine’s potential accession to NATO would pose a threat to Russia.
Chinese experts also raised questions on Ukraine’s decisionmaking system, specifically the role that President Zelenskyy plays in it. This further echoed Russian narratives claiming that Zelenskyy was not independent, that he was a puppet of the West helped by foreign advisers in Kyiv. Through this question, the Chinese side seemed to be implicitly alluding to this.
At the same time, Chinese commentators ignored Ukrainian arguments, while accusing NATO of starting the war. Instead, they argued that the “keys to the conflict” were held by the United States, which, through Ukraine, intended to weaken Russia and thereby ignored any Ukrainian agency in the dynamic of escalations. Their overall conclusion was that China understands Russia’s actions against Ukraine because Russia had been humiliated by the West and excluded from the European security architecture, a narrative that resonates in Beijing. In their view, China has experienced a similar humiliation and occupies a comparable structural position.
At the end of 2022, Ukrainian experts attempted to persuade the Chinese side to adopt a more pro-Ukrainian position by referring to Russian war crimes in Bucha and to Russia’s efforts to destroy Ukraine’s energy infrastructure that caused a humanitarian catastrophe in major cities. Notably, Chinese experts remained completely indifferent and insensitive to these arguments. They did not consider Russian missile strikes on Ukrainian cities to be war crimes, instead describing them as an effective way to undermine civilian morale and force the opponent to capitulate. When accused of supporting Russia, the Chinese side responded emotionally and angrily, rejecting Ukrainian arguments. They stated that China could not afford a Russian defeat, otherwise the United States would redirect all its resources against China.
They also rejected any possibility of distancing themselves from Russia. They used the metaphor of two tigers: if they fight, one will inevitably be wounded, and China has no intention of beingthe wounded tiger. Experts said China and Russia have, therefore, formed a new type of relationship based on friendship, good-neighborliness, and mutual respect—an approach also grounded in historical experience, when China and the Soviet Union had contradictions that led to military confrontation.
These and subsequent discussions led to several conclusions. First, China will not adopt a position that would worsen its relations with Russia, even if this contradicts the UN Charter and international law. Second, China views Russia’s war against Ukraine exclusively through a geopolitical lens and as an instrument to weaken the West. Third, China will keep disregarding Russian war crimes and will assist Russia in gaining the upper hand over Ukraine. Fourth, China will study Western reactions in light of its future actions regarding Taiwan. Finally, the possibility of constructive dialogue between Ukraine and China is low, since China holds a radical and similar view to that of Russia. Indeed, both see Ukraine as lacking full autonomy and being subject to “external control” or “Western-managed chaos”.
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